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ABSTRACT 
 
Sara Bush Castro: Improvising Tradecraft: The Evolving U.S. Intelligence Regime and the 
Chinese Communist Party in the 1940s  
(Under the direction of Michael Tsin) 
 
The activities of U.S. intelligence officials in China’s Communist base areas in the 1940s 
reveal that the underdevelopment of the U.S. national security bureaucracy before World War II 
impeded the ability of accurate and timely intelligence about the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to reach U.S. policymakers. Structural deficiencies in U.S. intelligence practices affected 
U.S. foreign relations, including U.S.-China relations, in ways historians have failed to 
appreciate. Because widespread anti-Communist sentiment had significant consequences for 
postwar U.S. strategic behavior, historians of twentieth-century U.S.-China relations have 
generally assumed anti-Communism was the most important factor shaping U.S. intelligence 
about the CCP in the 1940s. Actually, inefficiency in the U.S. intelligence process as a result of 
inexperienced personnel, interagency friction, and abrupt expansion under the Truman 
administration were equally, if not more, influential on the content of U.S. intelligence on the 
CCP.  
American intelligence collection about the CCP in the 1940s, particularly at Yan’an, 
where the United States maintained a delegation of intelligence personnel known as the “Dixie 
Mission,” showcases inherent vulnerabilities in U.S. bureaucratic processes. Interagency rivalry, 
politicization, and logistical challenges regularly influenced the information that U.S. 
intelligence officers in Yan’an disseminated to policymakers. The activities of the Dixie Mission, 
iv 
 
from the collection of information in the field to dissemination of reports in Washington D.C., 
illustrate the extreme malleability of procedural norms for intelligence operations during World 
War II in the absence of a cohesive U.S. intelligence regime. Based on intelligence successes in 
the European theater, the National Security Act of 1947 inadvertently preserved problems that 
U.S. intelligence officials encountered in China in the design of the postwar U.S. national 
security regime.  
By illustrating the development of flawed bureaucratic procedures that were built into the 
postwar U.S. intelligence community, this study has implications for understanding the structural 
causes of so-called “intelligence failures” that have plagued the U.S. intelligence community 
since the late 1940s. It also helps correct a Eurocentric bias in the historiography of twentieth-
century U.S. national security, which currently lacks empirical studies of intelligence collection 
in non-Western countries prior to the Cold War. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
December 7, 1944. Exactly three years after Japan bombed the American naval 
installation at Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army Colonel David D. Barrett sat on a small U.S. military 
transport plane next to Zhou Enlai, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the key diplomatic spokesperson for his party. Barrett and 
Zhou had been in Chongqing to participate in a series of frustratingly unproductive meetings 
with Chinese central government officials and American diplomats regarding China’s war effort 
and the ongoing domestic political conflict in China.1 Japan occupied major cities in China’s 
northeastern corridor, central China, and southern China throughout World War II. Pushed out of 
the traditional urban seats of power, the leaders of China’s central government, most of whom 
identified with the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or GMD), reconstituted government offices in 
Chongqing, a city in China’s southwestern Sichuan province.2 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
served as China’s head of state and leader of the central government, but the government’s 
consolidation of political authority remained incomplete following the massive political reforms 
induced by China’s national revolution of 1911. The Chinese Communist Party presented the 
most powerful opposition to the GMD’s leadership, and despite their shared interest of defeating 
the Japanese, the two parties disagreed vehemently over their vision for China’s post war 
political system. 
                                                                
1 Further explanations of this complicated historical period follow on page 6 of this introduction and in Chapter 1. 
 
2 The Chinese for the Nationalist Party is sometimes Romanized as Kuomintang or KMT. 
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Following the unsatisfying talks, Zhou and Barrett had been attempting for more than a 
week to return to the CCP headquarters area at Yan’an in remote northern China, where Barrett 
headed a group of U.S. intelligence officials based there to observe the CCP leaders and collect 
intelligence on Japan.3 Several days in a row the plane had taken off but turned back when ice 
that had formed on the plane’s propellers broke off in chunks, slamming the windshield and 
fuselage and spooking the American pilot, who claimed he had “already used up too many points 
flying around China.”4  
Improved weather had granted a promising start to the flight on December 7. Although 
their meetings in Chongqing had not gone particularly well, Barrett and Zhou were eager to 
reach Yan’an and regroup. Their good mood continued for the first two-thirds of the flight until 
Zhou glanced casually out the window. “Colonel” he said to Barrett, “it seems to me something 
is wrong. The terrain outside looks definitely unfamiliar to me, and we should be in Yenan by 
now. I think we are flying west instead of north.”5 
This experience was undoubtedly terrifying to all aboard that plane. In 1944, few signs of 
modern technology and no airstrips existed west of Xi’an. The sparsely populated northwestern 
region of China featured deserts, mountains, and little anticipated help for any airplane 
attempting a crash landing or seeking to acquire fuel for a return trip to Chongqing. A lost 
American plane over north China would also have provided an extremely tempting target for 
                                                                
3 Today the most common Romanized spelling of 延安, the town where the CCP was based in the 1940s, is 
“Yan’an,” which I will use except in quotes from older sources, which frequently refer to the same location as 
“Yenan.” 
 
4 Barrett described the details of this incident in his memoir, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer 
Group in Yenan, 1944, (Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970), 69. 
All direct quotes related to this tale are Barrett’s. 
 
5 Barrett, Dixie Mission, 69. 
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Japanese anti-aircraft artillery, to which Barrett’s plane could have easily fallen prey depending 
on where it veered off course. Recognizing these dangers, Barrett and Zhou convinced the pilot 
to make a 180-degree turn. Based on memory and landmarks, Zhou helped navigate the plane 
back to the tiny makeshift airstrip in Yan’an. Barrett later recalled that without Zhou’s guidance, 
the plane likely would have run out of fuel and crash landed in “somewhere in the marches of 
Tibet.”6  
Given Zhou’s role as a central player in Chinese politics until his death in 1976 and the 
surprisingly significant, if rarely recognized, role Barrett played in attempting to implement the 
U.S. policy toward China in World War II, the hypothetical ramifications if the American plane 
had failed to reach Yan’an can quickly hijack the imagination. But the worst-case scenario did 
not occur that day. Instead, this anecdote is simply a useful illustration of a pattern of behavior 
that characterized U.S. intelligence operations in China in the 1940s: venturing with confidence 
into largely unfamiliar and dauntingly complex territory, buoyed by determination that the high 
stakes of the war justified almost any means to help achieve an Allied win, yet ultimately reliant 
upon the support of their Chinese hosts.  
Experiences of American intelligence officers and career diplomats working in China 
during World War II frequently revealed that the wartime strategic aspirations of the U.S. 
government in Asia exceeded the aptitudes and capabilities of its agencies at the time, 
particularly in the realm of efficient practices for the collection and dissemination of the strategic 
foreign intelligence required to implement expansive wartime U.S. foreign policy. Strategic 
intelligence collection targets non-public foreign information that other countries would not 
necessarily offer willingly or for free but that has significant—often existential—political and 
                                                                
6 Barrett, Dixie Mission, 69. 
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security implications for the state seeking it. Protectionist U.S. foreign policy of the 1930s and 
conservative ideas about diplomacy, sovereignty, and secrecy had prevented the U.S. 
government from developing more sophisticated administrative practices for collecting strategic 
foreign intelligence, providing it to policymakers, and sensitizing policymakers to its utilities and 
limitations.  
The U.S. intelligence regime experienced growing pains in the 1940s 
Many U.S. statesmen perceived the collection of such intelligence as unsavory work that 
risked betraying the trust of other countries to gain information that they deemed largely 
unnecessary to fulfill the relatively narrow foreign policy goals of the United States prior to 
World War II. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the longest serving holder of that title, was 
famously quoted in the 1930s as saying “Gentlemen do not open other gentlemen’s mail” to 
summarize his position on espionage and the collection of secret foreign intelligence. Historians 
frequently use the quote to characterize the position of U.S. statesmen regarding strategic 
intelligence prior to 1942.7 U.S. policy toward China prior to the Pearl Harbor attack had rarely 
necessitated in-depth knowledge of Chinese domestic politics for most U.S. government 
officials, and the White House under Roosevelt had pursued such information occasionally, non-
systematically, and out of the President’s personal sense of curiosity. More broadly, the U.S. 
foreign policy outlook in the 1930s disfavored the creation of a peacetime national intelligence 
regime for the United States; U.S. statesmen perceived foreign intelligence operations on a 
spectrum from ambivalence to hostility. This situation left U.S. officials working in China—and 
                                                                
7 For further on Hull’s statement, see John Ranelagh, The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1986), 27. 
 
5 
 
their sponsoring agencies—insufficiently prepared for the sudden change in their duties that the 
American entry into World War II necessitated. 
The U.S. intelligence system in the early 1940s reflected the domestic policy focus of the 
Roosevelt administration and Congress in the 1930s. U.S. intelligence capabilities at the time 
suffered from severe decentralization as well as a lack of expertise and designated resources. 
American disinterest in intelligence activity in the 1930 was well known. With regard to the 
minimalist approach to intelligence infrastructure that the United States maintained during the 
interwar period, historian of U.S. intelligence Charles D. Ameringer quotes Italian dictator 
Benito Mussolini in the late 1930s, who said that the United States “must have” the best 
intelligence system in the world “for no one has ever been able to detect it.”8  
Specific intelligence duties were delegated to agencies and organizations designed to 
perform other strategic, military, and foreign policy functions, such as the State Department, War 
Department, Army, and Navy. Although the United States had developed intelligence 
capabilities during World War I, the U.S. government only retained the cryptological services 
and a bare minimum of resources for espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage overseen by the 
Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC), comprised of the heads of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, G-2 and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).9 Few officials within these 
organizations performed intelligence functions as their full-time jobs, and none of the agencies 
specialized in the collection and dissemination of the strategic foreign intelligence that became 
vital to U.S. leaders in planning World War II and assuming new responsibilities for global 
                                                                
8 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1990), 113. 
 
9 For further on the IIC, see Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, 125. 
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security in the postwar environment. Furthermore, the agencies tasked with intelligence duties 
not only preferred to avoid communicating or cooperating with one another, but competition 
between them for scarce budgetary resources and influence with the White House contributed to 
incentives for rivalry between them, sometimes to the detriment of intelligence results.  
U.S. officials dispatched to remote areas such as north China during World War II soon 
discovered another drawback of the immature U.S. intelligence regime: the lack of protocols, 
norms, or precedents for their activities within the U.S. government context led to disagreements, 
disorganization, and inefficiency not only between the agencies for which they worked but also 
within them. In particular, complications frequently arose when the interests and observations of 
those posted in field conditions clashed with the priorities and perceptions of colleagues, 
managers, and top leaders making decisions from less dangerous rear areas, such as Chongqing, 
Delhi, and Washington. In January 1945, an official from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
the first U.S. agency dedicated to the collection of strategic intelligence, of which President 
Roosevelt had authorized the hasty establishment in 1942, succinctly described the state of 
American agencies collecting intelligence in China: “Their work is wholly uncoordinated and it 
is common knowledge that there is overlapping, duplication, confusion, and friction.”10 As the 
global war encouraged the U.S. leaders to assume new responsibilities for international security, 
the American national security regime shifted from an archaic set of military and diplomatic 
policy organizations to a loosely governed system staffed by experienced intelligence operatives 
willing to take great risks and participate in morally ambiguous political intervention on behalf 
                                                                
10 Memo from OSS Kunming to OSS Headquarters in Washington, January 15, 1944, U.S. National Archives and 
Records Administration (hereafter, NARA) Record Group (hereafter, RG) 226, Entry UD-UP 252, Container 31, 
Folder: Messages 201-E. A year prior to the official establishment of OSS in 1942, Roosevelt had designated 
General William Donovan to be Coordinator of Information (COI) with a small administrative staff to explore U.S. 
strategic intelligence collection. Also under Donovan’s leadership, the OSS replaced the COI, expanding and 
formalizing wartime intelligence functions the COI had conceptualized. 
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of the stated policy goals of the United States. But the transition was neither smooth nor simple, 
and, in some cases, controversies that surfaced in the process have become entrenched 
challenges for today’s intelligence regime.  
The politicized historiography of wartime U.S. intelligence activity in China 
Deficiencies in strategic foreign intelligence necessary to America’s strategy for fighting 
World War II often became apparent first to U.S. military leaders, who tended to pursue ad hoc 
intelligence collection missions in response to encountering specific intelligence requirements in 
the course of their duties. Such was the case in China, where General Joseph Stilwell, U.S. 
commander of the China-Burma-India Theater from 1941 to 1944, and American diplomats who 
had been detailed to his staff successfully lobbied the White House to sponsor a unique 
interagency intelligence group to make contact with CCP leaders. Stilwell’s interest in the CCP 
developed out of his frustration and disappointment with the capabilities and attitudes he 
encountered through regular contact with the Chinese Central government, its leader 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the troops Chiang led. Curious about both the rumors of 
CCP successes in guerrilla tactics against the Japanese troops in north China and the intensity of 
the rivalry between the Communists and Chiang’s Nationalist Party, Stilwell and his aides 
conceptualized the controversial intelligence-gathering mission to help inform U.S. leaders who 
saw China as a vital bulwark against Japanese expansion in territory and resources. 
The U.S. Army Observer Mission to Yan’an included intelligence officials from several 
U.S. agencies under the leadership of Colonel Barrett. The group was tasked with assessing the 
military and political capabilities of the Chinese Communists and securely reporting the sensitive 
information back to U.S. diplomatic and military leaders in Chongqing and Washington. U.S. 
officials nicknamed the Observer Group the “Dixie Mission” because it placed American 
8 
 
officials in Chinese “rebel” territory close to the Japanese battle lines. The group aimed to meet 
the Chinese Communist leaders, collect strategic foreign intelligence about both the CCP and the 
Japanese in north China, and help determine what role Communist forces might play in efforts to 
defeat Japan.11 The Dixie Mission members were among the first U.S. government officials to 
have face-to-face contact with CCP leaders. In the first year of the Dixie Mission’s existence, its 
participants frequently produced candid assessments of CCP capabilities and interests, often 
reporting impressions that were charitable, if not favorable, in tone. Lacking specific precedents 
and the type of oversight regulations for U.S. intelligence practices that evolved over the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the initial Dixie Mission participants also became heavily involved 
in plans to cooperate with and support the CCP guerrillas in fighting the Japanese in north China, 
mostly with poor coordination between U.S. government agencies. The controversy that erupted 
within the U.S. diplomatic and military leadership and with the U.S. government’s main 
designated ally in China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, over the actions of the U.S. 
intelligence officials in Yan’an in their relationship with CCP leaders significantly affected U.S. 
intelligence practices in China in the 1940s and influenced U.S.-China relations in ways that 
scholars and observers have been debating since 1945.   
Indeed, previous studies of the Dixie Mission have focused almost exclusively on 
evaluating its role in U.S.-China relations and the outcome of the Chinese civil war that ended in 
1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic under Communist leadership. The 
                                                                
11 The details of Roosevelt’s decision to create the Dixie Mission are documented in official correspondence that the 
U.S. Department of State released in Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Diplomatic Papers, China 
1944, 6-7 and 299-400. Historian Michael Schaller has also described Roosevelt’s negotiations with General Chiang 
Kai-shek who the U.S. government recognized as China’s official leader and with whom the U.S. government had 
established a wartime alliance. Chiang viewed the CCP as political competition and preferred to deny the 
Communists access to foreign officials. See The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia 
University, 1979), 147-175. 
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Communist rise to power in China met with such outrage in Washington that it spurred a debate 
that historian Maochun Yu has aptly described as “partisan and bitter,” with historical analysis of 
U.S. intervention in China in World War II morphing into “a smoke-ridden political 
battleground” particularly focused on evaluating the attitude of Dixie Mission participants 
toward Communist ideology.12 In part because so few Americans or Europeans had interacted 
with CCP members prior to that party’s rise to power, policymakers, journalists, and scholars in 
the 1950s and 1960s frequently linked the activities of the Dixie Mission with the American 
“loss of China” to the Communists.13 In this view, which historian Barbara Tuchman later called 
“one of the most damaging campaigns of vilification in recent public life,” the participants of the 
Dixie Mission were both culpable for not using their expertise to make U.S.-led negotiations 
more successful and disloyal to American-style liberalism for their charitable views of CCP 
capabilities.14 In other words, American policy in China might have successfully ushered a 
friendly and capitalist liberal republican government into power if the Dixie Mission personnel 
had not worked against their own government’s interests.15 The loyalty to the United States of 
                                                                
12 Maochun Yu, OSS in China Prelude to Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), xii. 
 
13 Regardless of their startling degree of politicization, several studies published in the 1950s and 1960s about the 
U.S. intervention in China in the 1940s remain useful to today’s scholars for their ability to accurately preserve 
historical details due to their contemporary nature. For example, studies such as Herbert Feis’s Pulitzer-prize 
winning book, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), and the studies Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland published 
about General Stilwell’s actions in China (see for example, Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States 
Army in World War II: China, Burma, India Theater (Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Army, U.S. Defense 
Department, 1953) remain in some ways the definitive texts for establishing the timeline of events in U.S.-China 
relations in World War II. 
 
14 Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1970), xii. 
 
15 The anti-communist intellectual atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s was in many cases discouraging to scholars 
attempting to pursue studies that could be perceived to portray Chinese Communism in a positive or complimentary 
manner, which complicated initial efforts at objective study of CCP ideology, goals, and intentions. Conversely, the 
foreign policy interests and anti-communist agenda of the United States government and, to some extent, Western 
European leaders in this period probably encouraged the study of contemporary Chinese politics as a means of 
contextualizing and advancing anti-communist foreign policy goals. Examples of such studies include Benjamin I. 
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several key Dixie participants came under scrutiny, and a few endured very serious career and 
personal setbacks as a result of their activities in Yan’an.16   
A new wave of academic interest in re-evaluating the role of the Dixie Mission in U.S.-
China relations developed in the 1970s as a result of a confluence of factors, including the 
declassification of the U.S. government documents from the OSS and the staff officers of the 
China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater in World War II, public debate over the U.S. actions in 
Vietnam and the implications of the Truman Doctrine, and rising and unprecedented public 
awareness of U.S. intelligence activities that had previously been kept secret from the public.17 
At the same time, the aging and retirement of many American participants in World War II in 
China encouraged a period of their public reflection in the form of published memoirs, 
interviews, and articles.18 Based on the new government sources and the memoirs from 
participants, new studies emerged suggesting that instead of the loss of China, the actions of the 
                                                                
Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), and Stuart R 
Schram, Mao Tse-tung, (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967). For further on the sources and effects of 
politicization on Cold War-era studies of the early PRC as well as the changes in the past two decades that have 
increased scholarly interest in early PRC history, see Julia Strauss, “Introduction: In Search of PRC History,” The 
China Quarterly 188 (December 2006), 856-7. 
 
16 John S. Service, a Foreign Service officer who served in the Dixie Mission, was arrested for allegedly leaking 
sensitive government files to a liberal publication in 1945. He spent most of the following decade trying to clear his 
name (and the charges were eventually dropped). John Davies, another Foreign Service officer who served General 
Stilwell on a special detail helping to conceive and organize the Dixie Mission, faced nine loyalty investigations 
between 1948 and 1954. He eventually left public service and opened a furniture business in Peru, too frustrated to 
remain in the United States for years. 
 
17 President Harry Truman in March 1947 delivered a speech promising the nations of the world protection from 
authoritarian, particularly Communist, forces. The policy became known as the Truman Doctrine. For further 
official details on the Truman Doctrine, see U.S. Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine,” online at 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine. Details about the intelligence activities of the 
United States between 1941 and 1970 began to reach the public throughout the 1970s through a series of leaks and 
journalistic exposés. 
 
18 Relevant memoirs, either autobiographical or ghost-written, published in this period include, among others, 
Barrett, Dixie Mission; John S. Service, with Joseph E. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II 
Despatches of John S. Service (New York: Random House, 1974); and Ivan D. Yeaton, Memoirs of Ivan D. Yeaton 
(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1976). Memoirs and biographies continued to appear throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. 
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Dixie Mission represented a “lost chance in China” whereby U.S. statesmen squandered 
opportunities for engagement with the CCP in lieu of an exclusive partnership with the corrupt 
and dysfunctional (but non-Communist) government led by Chiang Kai-shek.19 Debate over the 
hypothetical scenarios simmered into the 1980s as the United States normalized its relations with 
the People’s Republic and Beijing kicked off its period of post-Mao Zedong reform and opening 
up under Deng Xiaoping. 
The reforms in China prompted the third phase of historiography about the Dixie 
Mission. Increased—though hardly complete—access to Chinese government documents as well 
as increasing access to relevant Soviet documents generated an explosion of interest and new 
scholarship about Chinese leadership politics and foreign policy in the 1940s. In the 1990s, 
historians in China and abroad used newly available Chinese sources to deny that the United 
States possessed the agency necessary to shape the course of Chinese politics as previous 
scholars had suggested. Historians and political scientists throughout the past 25 years have 
explored emerging sources for the study of Chinese leadership intentions during and after World 
War II and have largely put to rest the “lost chance in China” debate.  
Historians versed in Chinese sources, such as Chen Jian and Michael Sheng, have argued 
convincingly that by the mid-1940s, CCP leaders would not have entertained any serious 
diplomatic accommodations with the United States for domestic political and ideological 
reasons. Chen argued in 1997 that “Contrary to the assumption of the advocates of the “lost 
chance” thesis, Chinese materials now available demonstrate that in 1949-50, Mao Zedong and 
                                                                
19 Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (1970) is one of the most 
emblematic studies to raise the question of a “lost chance in China” for the U.S. In her detailed analytic biography of 
Stilwell, Tuchman re-examined Stilwell’s role in World War II and argued that Stilwell’s harsh critique of Chiang 
Kai-shek was a wake-up call that Washington ignored at its peril. Another significant book frequently associated 
with this argument is E.J. Kahn, The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New 
York: Viking Press, 1976). 
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the CCP leadership were unwilling to pursue Western recognition, let alone to establish 
diplomatic relations with Western countries.” 20 Chen’s article was a more forceful articulation of 
suggestions by Michael Sheng that CCP ideology in the 1940s allowed for some flexibility to 
achieve short-term goals, but the CCP’s anti-imperialist long-term agenda would have ultimately 
prevented a U.S.-CCP partnership in 1949. Chen and Sheng separately refer to the idea of a 
squandered diplomatic opportunity as a “myth,” both arrogant and “American centered.”21 The 
welcome addition of the CCP leaders’ perspectives into the debate over the implications of 
American actions in China in the 1940s is compelling. The body of research that has 
subsequently analyzed the foreign policy attitudes of the CCP leaders has resolved and redirected 
the questions animating initial research on the Dixie Mission, all but neutralizing old arguments 
about hypotheticals that captivated scholars in the twentieth century. 
Moving beyond the “Lost Chance in China”: Dixie Mission as U.S. intelligence history 
Recognizing the potential relevance of the Dixie Mission example for U.S. intelligence 
history, this study attempts to move beyond the Dixie Mission’s politicized historiography to 
examine the case through a completely new line of inquiry: analyzing the intelligence activities 
of U.S. officials in Yan’an as a uniquely instructive example of U.S. intelligence capabilities and 
practices during World War II. Previous scholarly debates about the implications of the Dixie 
Mission have prioritized analysis of anti-communism as an influence on American strategic 
behavior. Consequently, historians have generally assumed that anti-communism was the most 
                                                                
20 Chen Jian, “The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance” in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence,” 
(Diplomatic History, 21:1, Winter 1997, 77-86).  
 
21 Chen Jian, “The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance in China,” 77. Michael M. Sheng, “Chinese Communist Policy 
Toward the United States and the Myth of the “Lost chance” 1948-1950,” Modern Asian Studies, 28:3 (July 1994), 
475-502. 
 
13 
 
important factor shaping U.S. intelligence about the CCP in the 1940s. Unfortunately, this 
approach oversimplifies the evolution of attitudes about communism among American strategic 
decision makers and overstates the influence of anti-communism in U.S. China policy prior to 
the late 1940s.  
In fact, evidence from the Dixie Mission demonstrates that inefficiency and 
unprofessionalism in the U.S. intelligence process as a result of inexperienced personnel, 
interagency friction, policymakers unaccustomed to handling strategic intelligence, and dramatic 
and abrupt expansion of the American national security regime under the Truman administration 
were equally important, if not more influential, than anti-communism in determining what 
information top U.S. leaders received about China’s Communists throughout World War II. 
Moreover, the details of the Dixie Mission point to the serious, long-term implications of the 
asymmetry between what top U.S. diplomatic and military leaders were asking intelligence 
officials to do and what services the rudimentary U.S. intelligence bureaucracy was capable of 
providing.  
Thus, this study aims to place the history of U.S. intelligence activities in Chinese 
Communist areas during World War II, and specifically the Dixie Mission, into a broader context 
of U.S. strategic and national security history. Understanding the extent to which the United 
States lacked the intelligence capabilities that its strategic and foreign policy goals required in 
World War II has significant implications for illuminating the creation of the postwar U.S. 
national security regime, including inherent challenges and structural weaknesses that endured 
into the Cold War.  
Few examples of U.S. field operations anywhere in the world have yielded nearly as 
many declassified operational communications as the Dixie Mission. The controversy 
14 
 
surrounding the Dixie Mission as early as 1945 and questions about the ideological loyalty of its 
participants to the United States led policymakers, journalists, and scholars throughout the 
twentieth century to lobby successfully for the declassification and release of volumes of 
documentary material about its activities.22 The Dixie Mission included the participation of 
virtually every U.S. agency involved in intelligence activity at the time. Thus, the declassified 
documents offer a rare opportunity to compare the reactions of each agency to events and to the 
activities of other agencies as well as to review how and to what extent the agencies 
communicated with each other. As these official documents surfaced, those implicated in the 
documents often produced their own explanations and recorded their memories in the form of 
memoirs, personal letters, and interviews.23 All these materials form the rich and extensive 
source base undergirding this project.  
The documents demonstrate how bad habits and poor practices developed in an ad hoc 
fashion to meet the specific intelligence needs generated by the strategic interests of World War 
II hardened into influential administrative norms. Competition between U.S. agencies and the 
improvisational spirit of World War II intelligence set a dangerous precedent for foreign 
intelligence activity that blurred the lines between intelligence collection and covert action or 
                                                                
22 The U.S. government has declassified almost all papers associated with the OSS and the China Burma India 
Campaign. Classified materials specific to the Dixie Mission case were also declassified and published by the U.S. 
government in China White Paper: U.S. Relations with China, with special relations to 1944-1949 (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), which was intended to support hearings regarding the “loss” of China and 
failure of U.S. China policy, and The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1970), which was prepared as part of investigations into the activities of John S. 
Service and other U.S. Foreign Service Officers who were suspected of leaking sensitive official information. 
 
23 In addition to a long list of published memoirs by individuals involved in the U.S. observer group at Yan’an, 
many personal letters between Dixie Mission participants that circulated in the 1970s and 1980s have been 
preserved in archival collections of their papers, particularly those held at Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The letters often offer more candid analysis and 
opinions than the contemporary official records, but they also introduce the historian’s challenge of analyzing 
memory—a very imperfect source of historical information. 
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other forms of black operations and operated with limited and dysfunctional oversight. That 
these activities were performed in the service of a war that America won and from which 
America emerged into a permanently altered global security environment convinced some 
policymakers to preserve the wartime precedent beyond the 1940s and into the Cold War. The 
norms proved difficult to dissolve when the Truman administration attempted to evolve the U.S. 
national security regime to a form appropriate to the responsibilities the United States had 
assumed in the changed global security environment of the post-World War II era. Moving from 
focused military objectives on two fronts in World War II to the diffuse, global conduct of 
containment involved a major shift complicated by the tenacity of wartime procedural paradigms 
for intelligence activity.  
Therefore, the Dixie Mission can provide a particularly instructive example for current 
interdisciplinary research about intrinsic administrative weaknesses in the U.S. intelligence 
bureaucracy and the ability of the national security regime to reform to accommodate changing 
threats.24 The challenges that global terrorism has presented for national intelligence regimes in 
the past two decades, as exhibited by the failure of the U.S. national security regime to prevent 
terrorist attacks in the first decade of this century has inspired new interest in studies of 
intelligence bureaucracy. This wave of new scholarship has provoked heated debates about the 
function and efficiency of U.S. intelligence agencies and the appropriate public expectations of 
these organizations.  
Political scientist Amy Zegart has developed a model that links the key findings of 
decades of research on organizational theory and bureaucratic behavior to what she terms the 
                                                                
24 The term “intelligence bureaucracy” refers to the administrative elements that comprise the 16 current U.S. 
intelligence agencies. “National security regime” is a broader term that encompasses the intelligence agency 
leadership as well as executive branch decision makers and other U.S. officials with responsibility for strategic 
decision making, such as top military leaders, senior White House aides, and the National Security Council. 
16 
 
“adaptation failure” of the U.S. intelligence community that resulted in its deficiencies in 
counterterrorism prior to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. Zegart 
argues that bureaucracies are naturally resistant to change, particularly from within; serious 
reform of intelligence agencies requires an impossible degree of selfless sacrifice on the part of 
policymakers; and the fragmented and competitive structure of the government itself works 
against its evolution.25 Zegart claims that “all organizations become more resistant to change as 
routines, norms, and relationships become firmly established,” and that intelligence agencies, 
similar to all U.S. government agencies, are “not built to change with the times.”26 Instead, 
effective change must originate externally, which the American political system generally 
prevents. Consequently, she concludes that “organizational adaptation almost always meets with 
defeat, becomes watered down, or is postponed until the next crisis erupts.”27 
Zegart’s research generated considerable debate and her main critics, including former 
National Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar, have attacked her model for demanding an unattainable 
perfectionism from CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies and for basing too much of her 
analysis on the proceedings of post hoc committees gathered to address intelligence failures. 
Pillar specifically rejects Zegart’s “extremely heavy reliance on postmortem inquiries, especially 
the 9/11 commission report,” which he suggests led her to misinterpret the U.S. intelligence 
                                                                
25 Amy Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Agencies,” International Security 29:4 (Spring 
2005), 79-80. In this article, Zegart succinctly summarized the main components of her research and the resulting 
model. She has provided more thorough explanations in her books, particularly Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and 
the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 2007) and to a lesser extent in Flawed by Design: 
The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) and Eyes on Spies: 
Congress and the United States Intelligence Community (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011). 
 
26 Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Agencies,” 96 and 100. 
 
27 Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Agencies,” 100. 
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community’s pre-9/11 assessments of the jihadist threat.28 While this critique is well articulated 
and valid, it risks underestimating the implications of the structural constraints that Zegart has 
identified, which may be more apparent through other empirical examples. The unique historical 
case of the Dixie Mission can thus contribute to the debate on institutional reform within the U.S. 
intelligence community by providing one such example. In fact, the Dixie Mission example 
suggests that the organizational weaknesses Zegart notes may have originated far earlier than her 
research specifies, with implications that are potentially more extensive than she anticipated.  
U.S. intelligence activities in north China in the 1940s as institutional failure  
Because field intelligence operations, particularly in World War II, were interagency 
missions, they often operated as a microcosm of bureaucratic relationships playing out on a 
greater scale in Washington. Structural deficiencies in the process of U.S. intelligence collection 
affected U.S. foreign relations and security in the 1940s, including U.S.-China relations, in ways 
scholars are only beginning to appreciate. It is possible not only to trace the development of the 
institutional norms and cultures that Zegart identifies in the improvisational intelligence 
operations of World War II but also to elaborate on the effects of adaptation failures. Similar to 
U.S. intelligence agencies since the end of the Cold War particularly since 9/11, U.S. agencies 
with intelligence responsibilities were asked to reform themselves in the 1940s. In particular, the 
Dixie Mission case emphasizes the diplomatic and strategic consequences—some positive and 
most negative—of relying so heavily on military intelligence officials in wartime to design and 
administer strategic intelligence collection operations. Thus, this project argues for a 
convergence between two lines of inquiry, each extensive but both largely separate in the past: 
                                                                
28 Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence Design? The Unending Saga of Intelligence Reform,” Foreign Affairs 87:2 (Mar-Apr 
2008), 142. 
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the exploration of the origins of the U.S. intelligence regime and historical analysis of the role of 
U.S. intelligence on the CCP in the failed U.S. foreign policy toward China in the 1940s.  
Linking analysis of the intelligence practices applied during the Dixie Mission in China 
to current debates in twentieth century U.S. intelligence history helps to correct a Eurocentric 
bias in the qualitative empirical examples available to security studies researchers such as Zegart 
from the standard canon of academic studies about the postwar origins of the present U.S. 
intelligence regime.29 Historians and political scientists have examined such important issues as 
the division of labor on intelligence issues between various civilian and military branches of the 
government, the role and evolution of congressional oversight on U.S. intelligence activity, the 
institutional history of U.S. covert military activity, and the links between intelligence and 
academia.30 Studies of this topic have tended to take a predominately top-down approach, 
focusing on changes that took place within institutions in Washington DC and the actions and 
                                                                
29 The most frequently cited works on the history of the OSS and the origins of the national security regime, 
particularly the CIA, include Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 
1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990)—technically the “official” published CIA 
history; Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-
1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Bradley 
Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Richard Harris 
Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1972); Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981). 
 
30 A few of the most significant studies that have shaped our understanding of the origins and specific structure of 
the U.S national security regime since World War II include George Chalou, ed. The Secrets War: The Office of 
Strategic Services in World War II (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992); Rhodri 
Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Barry Katz, Foreign 
Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-1945, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989); John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1985); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); 
and Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). For further examples of important studies in intelligence history, 
see the full bibliography at the end of this study. 
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interests of principal American leaders and policymakers, rather than focusing on intelligence 
activities that occurred overseas.  
Sensitivities preventing the release of American national security information created 
persistent practical barriers for scholars attempting to explore the history of contemporary U.S. 
intelligence and delayed the historiographic development of this field. As intelligence historian 
Michael Warner suggests, “Telling the story of intelligence feels odd because it is a story that 
desperately did not want to be told. Over the last century, thousands of people have worked to 
ensure that secret operations and findings would stay secret.”31 Nonetheless, historians and 
security studies scholars have long debated to what extent precedents established by OSS in the 
early 1940s influenced the development of American intelligence activities in the late 1940s and 
after.32 Reconsidered from today’s perspective, studies in the 1950s and 1960s of OSS suffered 
because the documents of that agency remained classified until the 1970s and into the 1980s.33 
The declassification and public release of official OSS records in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
occurred when U.S. intelligence activities were facing tremendous scrutiny by the American 
public and intellectuals. The trauma of the intensifying war in Vietnam coupled with the New 
York Times’ leak in 1971 of the “Pentagon Papers”—a detailed collection of government 
                                                                
31 Michael Warner The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2014), 3. 
 
32 President Harry Truman officially dissolved the OSS in September 1945, breaking up the short-lived agency by 
functional office and assigning its duties to other civilian and military agencies until the CIA was established in 
1947. 
 
33 According to historian Barry Katz, when Truman terminated the OSS in 1945, its records were divided between 
the Departments of State and War. The State Department received the files from the Research and Analysis division, 
which were transferred to the National Archives in 1946, but not declassified and made accessible to the public until 
1975 (when Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act—FOIA). The majority of the OSS files, including 
those on intelligence collection and covert action, were transferred to the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit. 
CIA began to declassify those files in 1980. For further information on sources about the OSS and intelligence in the 
1940s, see Barry M. Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-
1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 200. 
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documents that indicated President Johnson had deceived the American public and Congress 
about the realities of the situation in Vietnam—kindled widespread distrust of the executive 
branch and intelligence activities.34 Evidence that emerged throughout the 1970s of covert 
postwar American military interventions that the CIA planned and executed internationally, such 
as those in Cuba, Guatemala, Greece, Iran, and Indonesia, caused many scholars in this period to 
question the institutional evolution of American national security behavior. Several sought 
answers in then newly released OSS files.35  
Questions about the design and evolution of U.S. intelligence bureaucracy have 
continued to animate scholars through the end of the Cold War and into the first decades of the 
twenty-first century, which brought existential questions about how intelligence regimes 
practiced at facing-down state-based threats could be retooled to focus on non-state actors that 
threatened U.S. interests. However, most historians who have done so have tended to fall back 
on one of two approaches to their empirical research, narrowing their focus to examples only in 
the U.S. domestic administrative environment or relying on predominately European examples. 
Although eliminating international examples may allow for deeper consideration of 
administrative issues within national security, this approach is problematic because intelligence 
operations, by nature, are internationally focused.36 Similarly, analysis developed exclusively on 
                                                                
34 The Pentagon Papers case drastically affected the ability of scholars to study postwar U.S. national security 
activity. The New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers on June 13, 1971. Throughout June 1971, the 
U.S. government tried to prevent the further publication of the documents, but the Supreme Court overruled their 
attempts and allowed for the public release of the materials in a landmark decision on June 30, 1971. For further 
information on the history of the Pentagon Papers, see “Times Topics: Pentagon Papers” nytimes.com, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/pentagon_papers/index.html?scp=1-
spot&sq=pentagon%20papers&st=cse and “Pentagon Papers,” National Archives website: 
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/. 
35 See, for example, William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire 
(New York: Dial, 1977) or John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1987). 
 
36 One of the most important recent examples of this type of study are Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and 
Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1947-53 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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intelligence examples drawn from the European theater of battle can result in skewed 
assessments of U.S. capabilities and outcomes because, despite formidable challenges, U.S. 
intelligence missions in Europe tended to achieve more of their goals than in more remote 
locations such as China, whether through personnel skill, serendipity, or some combination of 
such factors.37  
Failure to include examples of intelligence operations from places such as China in 
analysis of U.S. intelligence activity in the 1940s leaves the field vulnerable to reproducing a 
teleological version of national security history often sanctioned by the U.S. government 
whereby the establishment of the CIA represented the relatively smooth and organic 
transformation of OSS wartime success into the Cold War intelligence service the U.S. 
required.38 Most studies prior to 2000 that addressed postwar U.S. intelligence activities beyond 
Western Europe focused either on covert action and intervention or on World War II cryptology 
and the origins of U.S. technical intelligence infrastructure. Valuable studies such as Laurence S. 
Witner’s book about American intervention in Greece and studies of U.S. intelligence operations 
in Guatemala by Richard H. Immerman and Piero Gleijeses concentrated on analyzing the 
evolution of covert action as a tool for U.S. foreign policy and strategic power projection rather 
than understanding the role of intelligence operations abroad in the evolution of U.S. intelligence 
                                                                
 
37 A particularly troubling trend in recent studies of U.S. intelligence history in the late 1940s and 1950s is rising 
interest in Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, and other national security decision makers and early CIA leaders 
whose success in European operations led to influential positions in Truman’s and Eisenhower’s national security 
regime. See for example, Douglas Waller, Disciples: The World War II Missions of CIA Directors who fought for 
Wild Bill Donovan: Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2015) and Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and their Secret World War (New York: 
Time Books/Henry Hold and Company, 2013). 
 
38 For examples of this line of analysis, see Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of 
Government, to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990) and Thomas F. Troy, 
Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, MD: 
University Publications of America, Inc., 1981). 
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bureaucracy as my study of the Dixie Mission seeks to do.39 Similarly, although many of the 
studies of World War II code breaking analyze examples from the Pacific War, they tended to 
address questions about the justification for massive Cold War investments in technical 
collection infrastructure and evaluating the use of cryptological capabilities for strategic 
purposes.40  
Although scholarship on the 1940s origins of the U.S. national security regime is well-
developed, historians are only beginning to apply valuable new tools for international and 
cultural history to these questions, and the literature notably lacks research on the relationships 
between U.S. intelligence officials operating in non-Western countries prior to the Cold War and 
other U.S. officials, including lateral colleagues in base areas and senior U.S. decisionmakers. 
Scholars in the past two decades who have investigated the activities of U.S. intelligence officers 
in foreign countries during and immediately after World War II have generally used their 
empirical research to answer questions other than those about the bureaucratic development of 
the U.S. national security regime. The few studies that have investigated the activities of U.S. 
intelligence officers in foreign countries beyond Europe in the 1940s have frequently focused on 
placing U.S. intelligence operations in a broader context of academic debates about Western 
imperialism and postwar decolonization, particularly as these issues affected the origins of the 
Cold War. The best example of this type of analysis is Intelligence and the War Against Japan: 
Britain, American, and the Politics of Secret Service (2000) in which historian Richard J. Aldrich 
                                                                
39 Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982); Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1982); and Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-
1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
 
40 For example, see John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the 
Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995) and Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: 
Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992). 
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compares the respective attitudes of British and American policymakers toward imperialism and 
decolonialism and how these views directly shaped Allied intelligence operations in Asia during 
War II, particularly in China.41 Although this line of inquiry is fascinating and significant, it is so 
far largely unconnected to the major academic debates about the origins of administrative 
vulnerabilities to intelligence failures that are motivating security studies scholars such as Amy 
Zegart, Richard Betts, and Paul Pillar. An important new trend in qualitative empirical studies of 
U.S. intelligence operations in non-Western countries in the 1940s is the impulse to connect this 
historical analysis to current issues in intelligence reform and foreign policy. For example, Hugh 
Wilford’s groundbreaking recent study of the CIA’s first Arabists, America’s Great Game: The 
CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, systematically examines the 
genealogy of U.S. intelligence officials’ perceptions toward the Middle East, starting with 
positive, if patronizing, views in World War II and morphing into today’s counterterrorism 
efforts.42   
Other studies that address U.S. intelligence personnel in China in the 1940s have tended 
to focus specifically on one branch of government, aiming to determine the role of the 
organization’s intelligence activities in China in U.S.-China relations or the specific history of 
the respective organizations rather than taking a more holistic view of bureaucratic behavior 
required to tie the empirical example of China into current debates in the broader field of 
twentieth century U.S. intelligence history. The most comprehensive among these studies, by far, 
                                                                
41 Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America, and the Politics of Secret Service 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). NB: Aldrich uses the term “secret service” not in reference to the 
U.S. executive branch agency but as a catch-all term to include all intelligence operations, whether collection-
focused or covert actions. 
 
42 Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East 
(New York: Basic Books, 2013). 
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is Maochun Yu’s OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (1996).43 Yu’s book is the first serious 
scholarly effort to disentangle the deeply politicized and contradictory historical records about 
OSS operations in China, a challenged he shouldered based on his startling realization that 
“nearly fifty years after the demise of OSS, not a single manuscript length OSS/China history has 
been written based on original archives.”44 Similar to Yu’s research in her focus on a single U.S. 
agency, Hannah Gurman has recently studied the role of China-based career diplomats in the 
U.S. State Department in debates within the U.S. government about Communism and loyalty.45 
My research builds on these studies to analyze how intelligence officials in different agencies 
cooperated or competed during U.S. intelligence activities in the Communist areas of China in 
the 1940s. As a result, this study forms a bridge between research on the history of U.S.-China 
relations in World War II and U.S. intelligence history, particularly with regard to key questions 
in the institutional and administrative history of the U.S. national security regime created by the 
Truman Administration in the aftermath of World War II. 
Theory and Method 
Historical analysis of how U.S. intelligence officials responded to the CCP in the 1940s 
can reveal the genealogy of lasting bureaucratic norms that influenced U.S. strategic culture and 
the development of its intelligence community. Such research facilitates drawing broader 
conclusions about the role of U.S. officials stationed abroad in shaping America’s post-World 
War II strategic environment and the origins of the intelligence community that became so 
                                                                
43 Yu, OSS in China. 
 
44 Yu, OSS in China, xv. 
 
45 See for example, Hannah Gurman, “‘Learn to Write Well’: The China Hands and the Communist-ificiation of 
Diplomatic Reporting,” Journal of Contemporary History, 45(2): 2010, 430-453. 
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important to U.S. strategic policy during the Cold War. Better understanding of the complex 
process by which the individuals in the U.S. government collected, analyzed, and used 
information to inform foreign policy in the 1940s can illuminate the history of procedural 
sources of “intelligence failures” that became more frequent for the U.S. government in the 
second half of the twentieth century and evaluate whether the concept of adaptation failure, as 
identified by Amy Zegart, could be a phenomenon that is culturally intrinsic to the U.S. 
intelligence community. 
In deconstructing the process by which U.S. officials collected information on and 
interacted with CCP leaders in the 1940s, I have relied on theoretical assumptions about the 
influence of culture on strategic decisionmaking informed by the work of cultural historians and 
qualitative social scientists, particularly since the 1990s. This study thus joins the growing body 
of interdisciplinary scholarship that challenges the framework of structural realism for analyzing 
international relations. In this view, realism, which holds that states operate strictly based on 
their interest in gaining and keeping power, is insufficient as an explanation for strategic 
behavior because it assumes that states’ interests are obvious, rational, and agreed upon by all 
actors.46  The cultural approach to international relations does not necessarily deny the logic of 
realism, but it complicates and modifies the basic concept by arguing that the process by which 
the people who act on behalf of state governments determine their values and interests is itself 
contingent on a variety of conscious and subconscious factors, particularly culture. Moreover, 
culture itself takes more than one form, and multiple cultures (i.e., national, strategic, 
institutional) may influence the actions of individual U.S. officials.  
                                                                
46 Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: 
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Scholars frequently lament the difficulty of defining the term culture because the concept 
is abstract, pervasive, and varies across methodological disciplines within the humanities and 
social sciences.47 Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist known for his studies of human behavior 
through the lens of culture, defined the concept as a “system of inherited conceptions expressed 
in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes towards life.”48 Expanding it to cover the behavior of women as 
well, Geertz’s definition generally captures the assumptions about culture shaping my research 
design. Historian Alistair Johnston further specified that culture “consists of shared decision 
rules, recipes, standard operating procedures, and decision routines that impose a degree of 
order” upon individuals.49  
It is important to note that the definitions from Geertz and Johnston can apply to virtually 
any defined group of people, whether the group is large, such as an ethnicity, or small, such as an 
office or team. However, since the concept of culture always refers to a set of collective 
assumptions shared across a group of individuals, it is equally important to emphasize, as 
Johnston has done that “cultural patterns and behavioral patterns are not the same thing.”50 
Culture may influence and serve as a guide to behavior, but it alone does not determine 
individual behavior. Moreover, individuals may operate under the influence of multiple 
“cultures” when they make decisions, meaning that understanding how individuals prioritize 
                                                                
47 Alistair Johnston, author of Cultural Realism, one of the most influential books on strategic culture, memorably 
described the realm of cultural analysis as “a conceptual and methodological morass where definitions of culture are 
as numerous as the researchers of culture,” before spending several pages determining his working definition. 
Cultural Realism, 33. 
 
48 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89. 
 
49 Johnston, 35. 
 
50 Johnston, 35. 
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cultural influences will potentially reveal considerable insight into collective decisionmaking 
processes, such as those required for international relations. 
The concept of culture, broadly defined, operates in my project on two distinct, but 
overlapping levels: the level of strategic culture and the level of institutional or organizational 
culture.51 Consistent with the use of the term in studies by Johnston and others, strategic culture 
in this study refers to collective influences that exist at the level of state decisionmaking (i.e., the 
U.S. president or executive branch secretaries), and institutional culture to refer to collective 
influences within groups, teams, organizations, or bureaucracies. My research recognizes that 
political actors in China and in the United States labored under the influence of distinct strategic 
cultures in the 1940s, informed by their respective domestic and foreign interests, and that these 
cultures shaped their perceptions of one another as well as their bilateral diplomatic relationship.   
In addition to the influence of U.S. strategic culture, U.S. officials charged with 
collecting intelligence on the CCP in the 1940s contended with multiple—sometimes 
competing—and shifting institutional cultures based on the organizations to which they were 
tied. For example, Colonel Barrett, first head of the Dixie Mission, was connected to the broad 
U.S. diplomatic mission in China, the U.S. Army, the Army’s G-2 intelligence division, the 
Dixie Mission, and General Stilwell’s personal cohort network—all institutions that developed 
their own norms, procedures, and values that could influence the actions and loyalty of 
constituent individuals. Social scientists have found that just as shared beliefs and norms operate 
at the level of civilizations, cultures can also develop within smaller groups of people bound 
together by the common interest of their circumstances or a shared mission, such as is the case 
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within government agencies or political parties.52 Research on organizational theory and 
institutional culture originally developed based on corporate interest in scientific improvements 
to business leadership, but scholars have gradually found that the implications of the findings 
extend into other forms of organizations beyond business, particularly to government 
bureaucracies. In particular, Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp have demonstrated that 
in the case of government offices or agencies, vested interests in authority and budgetary 
resources can shape institutional culture and put agencies in direct competition and decrease 
efficiency.53 Although the research of Halperin and Clapp did not focus specifically on 
intelligence agencies, their findings that institutional culture can affect strategic decision making 
argues for the relevance of historical analysis of institutional culture of early U.S. intelligence 
organizations to ongoing debates about intelligence reform and the evolution of the postwar U.S. 
national security regime.   
Understanding how institutional and strategic culture interacted during World War II to 
create norms that were codified in the National Security Act of 1947, which created the so-called 
“U.S. intelligence community” as the intelligence agencies are collectively known today, is a 
primary objective of this study. Thus, documents produced by U.S. intelligence officials while 
serving in China during World War II become particularly interesting in terms of the intersection 
of strategic and institutional culture and its effects on foreign relations, especially the records of 
the Dixie Mission members, who simultaneously influenced and were influenced by several 
                                                                
52 Many volumes have been written to identify and describe the characteristics of institutional culture. In terms of 
national security and foreign relations institutional culture, useful sources include Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla 
A. Clapp, eds. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
2006) and Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006). For studies of 
organizations in general and corporate culture, see Ralph H. Kilmann, Mary J. Saxton et al, eds., Gaining Control of 
the Corporate Culture, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985). 
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institutional cultures. This study takes advantage of the vast collection of declassified official 
documents and preserved personal papers of participants in the Dixie Mission and their chief 
correspondents within the U.S. government bureaucracy (both lateral colleagues and superiors) 
to analyze the bureaucratic procedures applied and improvised to meet the demands for strategic 
intelligence on and potential covert engagement with the CCP in the 1940s.  
This study traces the evolution of U.S. intelligence practices in Communist areas in 
China during World War II by comparing the official documentary records of the intelligence 
officials from various U.S. organizations who comprised the Dixie Mission. Analyzing the 
differences in the way each organization reacts to and discusses various issues in intelligence 
practice that arise from this specific mission yields important insight into the evolution of the 
institutional cultures of the agencies involved and the bureaucratic norms they developed 
collectively to meet the intelligence demands placed upon them by the White House and strategic 
decision makers. The inclusion in my research of personal papers of Dixie Mission participants, 
some contemporary and others in the form of later memoirs and interviews, as well as primary 
and secondary source research on the attitudes of the CCP leaders who interacted with U.S. 
officials in China during this period helps further contextualize the development of U.S. 
intelligence practices in China. The results have important implications for understanding how 
practices that U.S. intelligence officials developed and perfected during World War II shaped the 
formal establishment of the postwar U.S. intelligence regime. 
Organization of this study 
The study is divided into four chronological chapters plus a conclusion. Chapter 1 argues 
that prior to WWII, the U.S. had not developed administrative structures to support the collection 
and dissemination of foreign intelligence sufficiently sophisticated to cope with its interests in 
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China, particularly as those interests expanded following the Pearl Harbor attack. Chapter 1 
addresses the time period leading up to the dispatch of the Dixie Mission, including U.S.-China 
relations prior to and immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack and includes an overview of the 
U.S. intelligence capabilities and administration prior to World War II. This chapter 
demonstrates how U.S. military engagement with the Chinese central government under the 
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, which occurred as a result of the U.S. alliance with China in 
fighting the Japanese, encouraged General Joseph Stilwell and other U.S. officials in China of 
the need for U.S. intelligence officers to interact directly with the leaders of the CCP. Stilwell’s 
efforts led to the establishment of the Dixie Mission in July 1944. 
Chapter 2 traces the arrival of the Dixie Mission in Yan’an and its first few months in 
operation—a period when the group probably had the most potential for successfully achieving 
its intelligence objectives. As an ad hoc response to the realization by policymakers that their 
significant intelligence gap on the CCP was affecting U.S. interests in China and the overall 
strategic interests of the United States in the war against Japan, the Dixie Mission possessed 
many characteristics that should have helped it achieve its goals, but external factors meant slow 
progress. Moreover, the mission suffered from a lack of clear boundaries between activities 
designed to collect intelligence information and operational activities designed to intervene 
directly in the military outcome of the war.  
In the absence of any real norms or precedents for their situation with regard to 
intelligence activities, Dixie Mission members interpreted contradictory orders and ambiguous 
interagency oversight as a mandate to find ways to cooperate with and support the CCP role in 
fighting the Japanese. Chapter 3 explores the extent to which this approach raised the 
expectations of the Dixie Mission’s CCP hosts regarding the support they might receive from the 
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United States and encouraged the Dixie Mission participants to take actions toward cooperating 
with CCP forces that angered senior U.S. leaders and alienated Chinese leaders in the CCP and 
GMD, resulting in lasting effects on U.S.-China relations. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of 
personnel changes among high-level U.S. leaders in China, such as Stilwell and Gauss, from 
September 1944 to the explosion of anger in the U.S. Embassy over the Dixie Mission’s role in 
plans to fund or supply the CCP guerrillas in January 1945.  
The fourth chapter reflects upon the final stage of the Dixie Mission from January 1945 
to the departure of the last American plane from Yan’an in March 1947 as U.S.-China relations 
deteriorate under the guidance of Ambassador Patrick Hurley, General Albert Wedemeyer, 
General George Marshall, and President Truman. Even when they demonstrated the potential for 
providing information that could be vital to U.S. interests in China, the Dixie Mission 
participants experienced severe constraints on their ability to continue collecting and 
disseminating important information from Yan’an and north China because their actions with 
regard to supporting the military activities of the CCP had been so controversial and so 
threatening to higher level U.S. leaders in China. The particularities of the Dixie Mission 
situation also made it easy for policymakers in the Truman Administration who were designing 
the postwar U.S. intelligence regime to disregard the Mission’s experience as an instance of 
alarming Communist sympathy within the U.S. government ranks instead of perceiving it as a 
cautionary tale of the risks of combining intelligence collection with covert military operations. 
Nonetheless, the top U.S leaders maintained the American presence at Yan’an as an outlet for 
observation of increasingly tense relations with the CCP leaders and for military and political 
liaison activity with the CCP.  
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Finally, a brief concluding chapter integrates the study’s findings into an analysis of the 
process by which the National Security Act of 1947 was conceptualized and enacted, 
establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. The case of American intelligence collection about 
the CCP in the 1940s showcases vulnerabilities inherent in the bureaucratic process of the U.S. 
national security regime by 1950, including some that were inadvertently preserved in the design 
of the national security regime formally established by the National Security Act of 1947 based 
on intelligence successes in the European theater. By illustrating the development of flawed 
bureaucratic procedures that were built into the postwar U.S. national security regime, this study 
has implications for understanding the structural causes of so-called “intelligence failures” that 
have plagued the U.S. intelligence community since the late 1940s.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Old-Fashioned Intelligence Practices Meet Modern Warfare in China 
 
“We, the unwilling, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the 
ungrateful. We have done so much for so long with so little, we are now qualified 
to do anything with nothing.” — Verses found in the official files of a U.S. 
military intelligence officer, undated file circa World War II.1  
 
Although clearly intended as a joke, the verse quoted above could have described the 
work of far too many U.S. intelligence officials during World War II. Between 1940 and 1950, 
officials in America’s military and diplomatic organizations tasked with intelligence duties 
personally experienced the brunt of the growing pains as U.S. intelligence capabilities expanded. 
Today several important components comprise the so-called U.S. intelligence community: a 
variety of government agencies focused on national security, several of which are largely 
independent from the budgetary concerns of the military or civilian executive branch 
departments and concentrated solely on intelligence; a system of norms and regulations that 
govern interagency coordination and communication; and a cadre of expert personnel. When the 
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, none of these components were operational in their 
present form. U.S. policymakers tasked with finding ways to cooperate with China in the fight 
against the Japanese experienced the shortcomings of the U.S. national security regime 
particularly intensely. 
                                                                
1 From the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Papers of Forrest McCluney, Box 8: Printed Materials, Folder 7. 
The folder holding the poem is labeled “Army Chair Force song,” applying a euphemistic joke term for the U.S. 
officials who served as intelligence officers for the Army Air Force during World War II. 
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As policymakers at the highest levels of the American government attempted to negotiate 
a division of labor and appropriate roles and functions for intelligence officers in the early 1940s, 
they frequently made choices that instigated unproductive competition or duplication between 
offices and personnel and sidelined the expertise of officials who had been posted in China for 
decades. The decentralized structure of the U.S. national security bureaucracy limited 
opportunities for the community of Americans stationed in China to offer objective advice as 
Washington DC-based policymakers created agreements with the Chinese during and after 
World War II, including some agreements that complicated operations in support of U.S. 
interests in China.2 As this and later chapters together will demonstrate, the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure for collecting and internalizing foreign intelligence information had significant 
implications for the ability of American leaders to craft U.S. foreign policy toward China in the 
1940s. The inability for top policymakers to receive and absorb timely and objective intelligence 
information about China’s domestic politics affected U.S. strategic decisions about Asia, 
potentially prolonging unproductive policies.  
Well before the Pearl Harbor attack, the need for intelligence on China was particularly 
dire as U.S. policy in East Asia shifted over the 1930s from an isolationist policy to financial and 
material support for China through the Lend-Lease program and finally to actual military aid by 
1941. The entire policy shift was orchestrated by top U.S. policymakers who had little first-hand 
knowledge of Chinese politics and who were relying on what advice they could glean from a 
small, insular cadre of American experts who had spent years in China. As of 1941, few 
                                                                
2 For example, see the detailed explanation of the process by which U.S. officials negotiated a treaty for intelligence 
operations in China in the early 1940s in Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1996), 77-170. 
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normalized communication channels existed between the principals and the mid-level 
bureaucrats responsible for monitoring developments in China that affected U.S. interests.  
Lack of centralized U.S. intelligence prior to the Second World War 
Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the official U.S. entrance into World War II, the 
U.S. government had no independent agency dedicated to the collection and dissemination of 
strategic foreign intelligence, and many policymakers had opposed the creation of one. As the 
Japanese occupation of China and the spread of European fascism challenged U.S. foreign policy 
decision makers throughout the late 1930s, American intelligence collection and analysis were 
performed by various agencies within the U.S. executive branch, namely the State and War 
Departments, the Army, and the Navy.3 The United States also relied heavily on intelligence 
shared by the British, who had developed a modern national intelligence capability. U.S. leaders 
had been reluctant to foster American intelligence capabilities due to a long history of concern 
that support for “shadow warfare,” as strategic foreign intelligence was often called, would 
present a conflict of interest with liberal values and protections of civil liberties. The U.S. 
government in the 1930s lacked both any close counterpart to its current intelligence community 
and a discrete legal framework providing oversight and institutional boundaries.  
Within the dozen government agencies that had responsibility or need for foreign 
intelligence, offices, branches, or in some cases, individuals, were tasked with the collection of 
                                                                
3 The best summaries of U.S. intelligence practices prior to World War II appear in studies seeking to explain how 
World War II forced changes on the process, and particularly in studies of the creation of the OSS. The key studies 
on this topic include Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983) and R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972). Both historians based these respective studies on some of the 
first documents about the creation of the OSS and CIA to be declassified and they remain the most important 
baseline explanations of these events that offer explanations of the systems OSS replaced. Studies that describe the 
epic debates about national security bureaucracy that occurred in the 1940s also illuminate the pre-war U.S. 
intelligence regime (or lack thereof). For instance, see Jeffrey Dowart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security 
Partnership, 1909-1949 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1991). 
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information in the field and its dissemination within the government ranks, typically as one duty 
among their broader job descriptions. For example, the State Department’s diplomats posted to 
embassies and consulates throughout the world would compose reports based on local contacts 
they met and news they overheard. They cabled reports back to the department headquarters. 
Senior State Department officials occasionally distilled important reports and shared them with 
the White House. Similarly, the Army, Navy, and War Department would dispatch military 
attachés to help staff U.S. embassies and consulates, making contact with local counterparts, 
monitoring situations that could affect the security of U.S. interests abroad, and composing 
reports on their observations for colleagues and superiors at their respective headquarters. The 
Army and Navy both maintained branches focused on intelligence, in the form of the Military 
Intelligence Division (MID) or G-2 and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), respectively. 
These branches were focused on the type of intelligence the Army and Navy needed most, which 
tended to be tactical and operational intelligence rather than strategic intelligence.4 Peripheral to 
its main criminal justice responsibilities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintained a 
branch responsible for domestic intelligence.  
The role of U.S. military attachés in intelligence collection in 1930s China 
Understanding the role and situation of military attachés in China in the 1930s is 
particularly important for understanding the history of U.S. intelligence collection in China in the 
1940s, so much of which occurred at the direction of the Army’s G-2 and the Navy’s ONI or by 
                                                                
4 Tactical and operational intelligence focuses on issues important to the successful use of military force including 
intelligence regarding geography, weather conditions, appropriate military targets, and the strength and capabilities 
of opponents. Strategic intelligence typically refers to non-public foreign information that influences geopolitics and 
foreign policy, such as leadership intentions, political stability, economic affairs, and social issues within a foreign 
country. For current basic definitions of foreign intelligence, Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 
6th Edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 1-14. 
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personnel who had formerly been employed by those offices prior to being transferred or loaned 
to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The attaché’s duties and 
functions changed surprisingly little over the course of the twentieth century. By definition, a 
military attaché is a military officer posted abroad and based in the embassy of his or her 
sponsoring country to serve as an overt intelligence officer, making contact with local 
counterparts, tracking intentions and resources of the host country and informing his or her 
sponsoring government about information learned that could have strategic significance. The 
attaché typically relies on all available sources, including reports and gossip from contacts in the 
host country, observations of host country events and exercises, review of host country mass 
media, and any other relevant information that can be collected. In the 1930s, U.S. attachés in 
China reported information through Army, Navy, and War Department channels via the 
communications systems available at the U.S. Embassy (i.e., mostly via diplomatic mail pouch 
physically transported by official couriers).  
Consistent with its inward-focused foreign policy and general lack of interest in 
comprehensive foreign intelligence collection, the U.S. government did not send its first attachés 
abroad until 1894, to Japan and Mexico, respectively.5 The practice slowly expanded, and by the 
beginning of World War I, 23 army and 8 naval attachés were posted to U.S. embassies around 
the world—a significant increase by percentage but still a small global footprint. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, the attaché position tended to be held by officers of Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel 
rank. The position lacked prestige and rarely led to promotions, particularly for those who served 
in posts beyond Europe. According to historian John Hart, who recorded the memoirs of the first 
                                                                
5 For further on the traditional role of the U.S. military attaché and the history of the position, see Alfred Vagts, The 
Military Attaché (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
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commanding officer of the U.S. Observer Mission to Yan’an, Colonel David D. Barrett, prior to 
World War II, serving as an attaché “was commonly viewed as an escape from the army, and 
many in the army believed people to be chosen for it based on their good looks and social 
graces.”6 In the first few decades of the twentieth century, Asian posts were among the few that 
did not require applicants to be independently wealthy because the cost of living was sufficiently 
low that officers could live on their salaries.7  
Deficiencies in intelligence data and procedures become apparent 
Although U.S. diplomats and attachés were reporting non-public information about 
foreign affairs to their sponsoring agencies within the executive branch that could be used for 
strategic planning, few regularized direct channels existed to convey the information to the 
White House or other relevant principals or agencies. Beyond the conversations that occurred at 
the White House, such as in cabinet meetings or informal meetings convened by the President, 
his aides, or his top officials, norms for communication between U.S. government agencies on 
matters of strategic intelligence and national security were often highly personalized (depending 
on the leadership at the time), malleable, and at times either caustic or nonexistent. Rather than 
collaborating on intelligence matters, the government agencies who were performing ad hoc 
intelligence-gathering duties tended to see each other as competition. Although U.S. foreign 
policy, defense, and military officials were ostensibly working toward the same goal of 
protecting American domestic and foreign interests, they also operated out of a sense of loyalty 
                                                                
6 John N. Hart, The Making of an Army “Old China Hand”: A Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies, Center for China Studies, 1985), 4. 
 
7 Hart, The Making of an Army “Old China Hand,” 5. 
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to and pride in their own agencies and offices that was reinforced by the eternal competition for 
budgetary resources that exists within all bureaucratic governments.8 
Although developing a collaborative modern national intelligence regime had not been a 
priority for top U.S. officials in the early twentieth century, executive branch departments and 
the military branches had recognized the value of developing personnel with the expertise 
required to understand foreign affairs. Relatively few American officials in the 1930s focused 
full-time on the collection, processing, or analysis of strategic foreign intelligence, but many 
officials had developed extensive skills in these areas as the world changed in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. For example, the second chapter of this study describes the network of 
U.S. officials who served in China in the 1920s and 1930s in the military and diplomatic 
positions. Although they represented the U.S. government’s policies and cultural values of the 
time, they also developed considerable expertise in Chinese language, culture, and politics. Many 
of them had also lived in China as children of missionary parents. Similar small networks of 
American experts also existed in other parts of the non-Western world, such as the Middle East 
and Latin America.9  
By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the changing global security environment had 
convinced some U.S. policymakers of the necessity to develop a more robust capacity for the 
collection and dissemination of strategic foreign intelligence, potentially including the creation 
of a new a strategic intelligence organization, but the politics and bureaucratic infighting that 
creating the new systems entailed frequently thwarted efforts to include expertise in field 
                                                                
8 Conflicts between the Army and Navy were particularly legendary. For further details, see Jeffrey Dowart, 
Eberstadt and Forrestal. 
 
9 For a detailed study of American officials’ interest in and expertise on the Middle East prior to World War II, see 
“Part I: Pre-game, 1916-1947” in Hugh Wilford, America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping 
of the Modern Middle East (New York, Basic Books, 2013). 
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operations and intelligence that already existed in the burgeoning U.S. intelligence community. 
Meanwhile, the quickly changing global security landscape required new participation from top 
U.S. leaders in strategic decisions about unfamiliar far-flung regions where U.S. interests were 
expanding, such as the Middle East and East Asia. The United States thus faced strategic 
problems related to intelligence gaps worldwide. World War II, and the Pearl Harbor bombing in 
particular, highlighted the inadequacy and inefficiency of the U.S. intelligence practices of the 
1930s, in which no officials pursued intelligence as a full-time job and agencies and 
organizations routinely failed to communicate necessary intelligence information to each other in 
a timely manner (if they communicated at all).10  
The challenge of Roosevelt’s personalized leadership style 
Compounding the problem of systemic intelligence gaps facing the United States on the 
brink of World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s leadership style and highly 
personalized approach to foreign affairs did not facilitate the creation of a cooperative and 
symbiotic U.S. intelligence bureaucracy. In the absence of a designated intelligence service and 
distrustful of status quo executive branch organizations, particularly the State Department, 
Roosevelt tended to bypass advice from within his bureaucracy and rely instead on a few key 
advisors and personal contacts. He regularly appointed such individuals to serve as his personal 
representatives or liaisons, bypassing the executive branch organizational protocols.11 This type 
                                                                
10 William R. Corson wrote one of the most effective and detailed analyses of Pearl Harbor as an example of an 
early U.S. intelligence gap that led to a significant and dramatic intelligence failure. See William R. Corson, The 
Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), 150-165. 
 
11 The characteristics of Roosevelt’s leadership style are well known and well studied. Joseph E. Persico’s 
Roosevelt’s Secret War (New York: Random House, 2001) is an excellent detailed study of the effects of 
Roosevelt’s leadership on U.S. intelligence practices during his presidency. Christopher Andrew covers some of the 
same ground more succinctly in his chapter on Roosevelt in his book, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret 
Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). For 
discussion of Roosevelt’s leadership style as it pertained to China, see Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 
1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 99, and Robert Messer, “Roosevelt, Truman, and China: 
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of personalized approach to leadership has strengths and weaknesses. The main strengths are 
often speed and decisiveness in statecraft—two characteristics that were associated with FDR, to 
be sure. However, the value placed on high-profile outsiders to perform tasks for which those 
within government bureaucracies have been developing expertise through years of work can also 
be demoralizing for the workforce. Moreover, this leadership style can encourage excessive 
competition within the bureaucracy for the President’s attention, and because interagency 
communication is not necessarily valued under this type of leadership, duplication of efforts is 
common.  
These drawbacks can have significant negative effects on intelligence work because the 
leader may not be receiving all the relevant information, and other decision makers who have a 
stake in statecraft may not be aware of all the information that the top leader knows. Bradley F. 
Smith cited this phenomenon as one reason FDR particularly enjoyed using emissaries. 
According to Smith, “In both domestic and foreign affairs, Roosevelt delighted in skirting 
regular channels and establishing himself as the only person who had all the information on a 
given issue.”12 Biographers and historians have long recognized a tendency toward a 
personalized approach to leadership in FDR’s actions and have noted its downsides. According 
to E. J. Kahn, Jr. writing in the 1970s about American bureaucrats in China in the 1940s, 
Roosevelt’s intention in sending his special emissaries to deal with difficult foreign affairs 
situations that emerged was “presumably to cut through red tape” but the ersatz ambassadors 
typically “ended up ensnarling all existing lines of communication.”13  
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One notable special emissary dispatched by FDR who assumed an important role in the 
Roosevelt administration as well as the history of U.S. intelligence was General William 
Donovan. Nicknamed “Wild Bill,” Donovan was a decorated general in the U.S. Army whom 
Roosevelt had designated as a special emissary to Great Britain and the Mediterranean region in 
1940 and early 1941 to observe the political and security situation there, confer with counterparts 
regarding events, and report back to the White House with recommendations for actions the 
United States should take.14 FDR and Donovan were former classmates when both studied at 
Columbia Law School.15 However, they were not known to be friends, and they represented 
slightly different cohorts in the American political landscape. Donovan was an Irish Catholic 
Republican who had made a fortune as a corporate lawyer on Wall Street before joining the 
Army to contribute to the U.S. efforts in World War I.16 Donovan also had political ambitions 
and had achieved a notable career in state politics in the Republican Party in his native New 
York as well as a position as assistant attorney general under Calvin Coolidge.17 FDR’s choice of 
Donovan for the emissary work in Europe was ultimately political, after Donovan’s name was 
suggested for the task by FDR’s new Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, who was also a 
Republican. FDR chose to work with Donovan to appease the new Navy Secretary.18 Donovan’s 
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observations and recommendations encouraged the United States to provide aid to Britain, which 
ultimately helped the American ally withstand the first volleys of the blitzkrieg in August 1940.  
Donovan’s conversations in London with various intelligence officers and policymakers 
convinced him that the U.S. plan to rely on Great Britain for its strategic intelligence on events in 
Europe was completely inadequate. Although it is now clear that the British probably 
exaggerated their threat assessments to encourage the flow of much needed U.S. aid, Donovan 
quickly and accurately determined that Hitler was a much more significant threat than most in 
the American government realized. He also assessed that relying on the British to independently 
gather all the necessary intelligence and share it with the United States was a risky proposition. 
In a memo to FDR on June 10, 1941, Donovan wrote “Although we are facing imminent peril, 
we are lacking an effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such 
information as we might obtain (or in some cases have obtained), relative to the intention of 
political enemies…Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that 
we set up a central enemy intelligence organization.”19 Based on Donovan’s assessments, FDR 
asked Donovan to develop a plan for a sophisticated new wartime intelligence service for the 
United States. The new agency would be modeled on the British example, such as the UK’s 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and their Special Operations Executive, but it would 
serve American interests. 
On July 11, 1941, Roosevelt created the first U.S. strategic foreign intelligence 
organization since the Revolutionary War, known as the Coordinator of Information (COI), and 
he placed General Donovan in charge of it. The COI was a direct precursor to the more famous 
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OSS. Notably, FDR made this decision without any formal review process or consultation with 
those already responsible for intelligence duties within the government. Historian Maochun Yu, 
author of the most comprehensive history of OSS activities in China, has suggested that this 
example of FDR’s unilateral and personalized decision-making style had far-reaching 
consequences for the development of U.S. intelligence practices.20 Consistent with Yu’s 
assertions, subsequent chapters in this study will offer further detailed empirical evidence that 
the creation of COI and its successor independent intelligence agencies alienated expert 
individuals and circumvented norms of effective status quo U.S. intelligence practices while 
codifying several of the unproductive characteristics of pre-World War II American intelligence 
activity, such as interagency competition. This phenomenon was particularly pronounced in the 
U.S. intelligence efforts in the 1940s vis-à-vis the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
The COI operated for less than a year before its duties were split into two separate 
agencies: the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 
June 1942. OWI officially handled public diplomacy for the United States, known in some 
circles as “white” propaganda. These activities were made separate and distinct from other more 
covert forms of “black” propaganda that the OSS was assigned to handle, along with a variety of 
other activities involved in the collection, processing, and dissemination of strategic foreign 
intelligence deemed necessary for supporting the U.S. national security and war efforts. 
Specifically, FDR tasked OSS to collect and analyze strategic information the military required 
for fighting the war and to conduct special operations that were not assigned to other agencies. 
Donovan became the first director of the OSS. The divisions of labor between it and the military 
were somewhat murky and became frequent matters of contention.  
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Donovan believed that the American government bureaucracy lacked talent, speed, and 
creativity. He sought to correct the problem by hiring a collection of diverse experts and 
empowering them to enact their creative ideas for winning the war. Many OSS personnel were 
civilians. In fact, one of Donovan’s most celebrated ideas to improve U.S. intelligence collection 
was to involve new blood in government work, and he famously raided the Ivy League and the 
top Wall Street firms to staff his new agency. In addition to many borrowed military officers, the 
OSS workforce included actors, lawyers, professors, and socialites that Donovan recruited to do 
whatever unconventional tasks were necessary to win the war. Donovan once described the OSS 
as “an unusual experiment” designed “to determine whether a group of Americans constituting a 
cross-section of racial origins, abilities, temperaments, and talents could meet and risk an 
encounter with the long-established and well-trained enemy organizations.”21  
Donovan’s work force initially included around 600 people, but the OSS had ballooned to 
include approximately 13,000 men and women at its peak size in late 1944. The personnel pool 
included many officers who came from academia and returned to university campuses after the 
war, such as William L. Langer, who served as the head of the OSS Research and Analysis 
(R&A) branch and later became President of Harvard University. OSS officers went on to 
luminary careers in other fields as well. Notable OSS veterans include Supreme Court Justice 
Arthur Goldberg, diplomat and the first African-American Nobel Peace Prize recipient Ralph 
Bunche, film director John Ford, and Boston Red Sox player Moe Berg. Most relevant to this 
study, Julia Child served as a capable and valued OSS file clerk in the China Burma India (CBI) 
Theater of Battle, prior to gaining notoriety as a television chef and cookbook author in the 
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1960s. Donovan envisioned his nimble new organization as supplanting and replacing some of 
the diplomatic and military personnel who were performing strategic intelligence activity within 
a calcified and old-fashioned bureaucracy.  
The “China hands” 
When it came to U.S. intelligence on China in the 1940s, Donovan’s goal of infusing the 
status quo with fresh personnel was overly simplistic and undervalued the skills of the 
individuals who had been serving the U.S. government in China throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century. Prior to the creation of the COI, U.S. personnel based in China comprised a 
small, close-knit cohort of capable experts. Journalists and scholars alike have often referred to 
the cadre of U.S. officials based in China in the late 1930s and early 1940s who had cultivated 
knowledge of Chinese language, culture, and politics prior to World War II collectively as “the 
China hands.” The term “China hand,” a loose translation of a similar Chinese term, was coined 
much earlier in Sino-American relations as a pejorative way to denote Americans who had 
learned limited amounts of Chinese language and customs to exploit the Chinese for business 
purposes.22 As American interests in China increased in the 1930s and 1940s, observers in the 
West adopted the term to distinguish Americans who had knowledge of Chinese language and 
culture from the multitudes who did not.  
By the mid-1940s, U.S. policymakers used the term China hands to refer specifically to 
U.S. military and diplomatic officials representing the U.S. government in China who had 
knowledge of Chinese language and culture. These China hands were mostly low and mid-level 
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officials with few normalized channels for reporting information directly up the policymaking 
hierarchy to the White House and Cabinet-level. The historiography of U.S.-China relations has 
alternately romanticized and vilified them over the years. Some American political observers and 
historians in the postwar period have applied the China hand label in a derogatory sense because 
the advice expert U.S. officials in China provided in the mid- to late 1940s was controversial, 
particularly when it came to charitable views of Chinese Communists or negative views of 
Chinese Nationalists.    
Understanding who the so-called China hands were and the role they played in U.S. 
operations in China is crucial to understanding the early history of U.S. intelligence collection on 
the CCP and how operations to that end both influenced and were influenced by the development 
of the modern U.S. national intelligence regime in the 1940s. Empirical examination of the 
activities of the China hands who had specific intelligence responsibilities related to the CCP in 
the 1940s suggests that the cohort was not nearly as influential or effective at shaping U.S. policy 
on China as either their detractors or supporters among historians and politicians have argued. In 
fact, the China hands’ inability to influence policy and vulnerability to cognitive analytic biases 
such as groupthink demonstrates intrinsic problems in the way in which the United States was 
pursuing intelligence reform throughout the 1940s. This argument is fully consistent with the 
view held by both historical opponents and proponents of the China hands that officials were a 
small cohort of professionals who had much in common, including the shared experience of 
being Americans living and working in China—not a particularly easy lifestyle choice at the 
time.  
The China hands of World War II are notable for their sense of informal group cohesion 
and their collective dedication to their professional responsibility to use their expertise to serve 
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U.S. interests, even in the face of discouraging political pressure. According to veteran New 
Yorker columnist E.J. Kahn who wrote a book attempting to restore some prestige to the 
historical reputation of the China hands: 
“There was no single star, no [George] Kennan, among them; they considered 
themselves, and probably were, a collective elite, with a shared pride comparable 
to that often found among United States Marines, and a shared élan stemming 
from their shared concern for intellectual inquiry, from their deep immersion into 
and understanding of Chinese ethnocentricity, and from the peculiar challenge of 
the problems that faced them in their work. And further, they had in common a 
shared awareness of how challenging it had been merely to get where they were; 
it was generally conceded that it took a minimum of about ten years in China 
before anyone could rightly be termed, in the non pejorative sense, an Old China 
Hand.”23  
 
Although this quote displays a slightly exaggerated sense of admiration for the officials, 
the archival records, including personal papers of China hands and their families as well as the 
official government documents that they and their Washington-based colleagues produced, are 
largely consistent with Kahn’s basic view. Generally speaking, U.S. officials working in China 
before 1940 knew each other and formed a fairly small expatriate community in a few of China’s 
large cities. Some officials formed lifelong friendships. Collections of their personal papers 
reveal decades of voluminous correspondence between John Service, John Davies, Frank “Pinky 
Dorn,” Raymond Ludden, David Barrett, and others. Alongside reports culled from their work in 
China and legal documents tracing their persecution in the 1950s, the personal papers also 
preserve a lifetime of each others’ wedding invitations, birth announcements, holiday cards and 
finally programs and speech notes from funerals attended.24  
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Beyond the importance of their relationships with each other, the China hands had 
extensive knowledge about China and various experiential ties to Chinese culture that 
undoubtedly influenced their behavior in their jobs, in both positive and negative ways. Several 
of the U.S. officials who were dubbed “China hands” in the 1940s had childhood and family ties 
to China. For example, Foreign Service officer John S. Service worked as a diplomat in China 
for nearly a decade before his assignment as the senior political observer in the Dixie Mission. 
Service was born in China to American missionary parents who directed the Chengdu branch of 
the YMCA.25 He spoke several dialects of Chinese and had spent most of his life in China by the 
time the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Foreign Service officers serving in China were “special 
among specialists” and China was “the only spot on Earth where career diplomats were not 
normally assigned to consulates unless they spoke the local language,” according to Kahn.26  
Other China hands in the 1940s had developed their expertise through military service. A 
sizable cohort of U.S. military attachés to China in the 1930s and 1940s had served in the 15th 
U.S. Infantry Regiment, which was based in Tianjin, China from 1912 to 1938. In 1927, Colonel 
Barrett, who later became the first commanding officer of the Dixie Mission in Yan’an, had 
served in the 15th. At the time, the executive officer of the unit was George Marshall, then a Lt. 
Colonel. The 15th’s Second Battalion was commanded by Joseph W. Stilwell, then a Major. 
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Marshall, Stilwell, and Barrett would later play highly visible and significant roles in advising 
and implementing U.S. strategic policy in China in the 1940s.27   
The existence of the China hands cohort did not overcome the fact that intelligence had 
no natural place in the established workflow of statecraft in the early 1940s. No matter what their 
reports said, the China hands found it extremely difficult to penetrate the Washington 
bureaucracy or reach those in President Roosevelt’s administration who were in a position to 
shape China policy. In a telling example, even reports from General Stilwell often went unread, 
though Stilwell had served as attaché in China and wrote reports detailing the intentions of the 
Japanese in the 1930s that assessed the level of threat to U.S. interests to be serious. In his book 
about the CBI campaign, Frank Dorn, who served as aide-de-camp to General Stilwell for many 
years, recorded Stilwell’s reaction in early 1942 to a conversation with a G-2 staff officer in a 
meeting in Washington DC. According to Dorn, the officer said, “You know, General Stilwell, 
we’re just getting around to studying your reports on China. How right you were in your 
conclusions.” Dorn writes, “The general turned to me with a sigh: “My God, Dorn, some of those 
reports are six years old. No wonder we’re in this mess now.”28 
The gradual shift in U.S. policy toward support of China 
In the decade preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a dramatic shift occurred in 
U.S. policymakers’ attitudes toward strategic interests in East Asia that indicated the increasing 
need for the United States to develop modern national intelligence practices. Prior to the 
Japanese attack in 1941, the U.S. government observed Japan’s aggression in China with 
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sympathy and concern, but the dominant tendency in American foreign policy of the 1930s ruled 
out military intervention. Japan’s initial invasion of northern China in 1931 occurred when the 
intensifying Great Depression preoccupied U.S. officials. The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine in 
January 1932 clarified that the United States would not recognize any territory that Japan or 
other aggressors seized, particularly in Manchuria, but then-President Hoover failed to support 
Stimson’s efforts to back U.S. opposition to Japanese aggression with military force—a policy 
that changed little until the 1940s.29  
President Franklin Roosevelt and his advisors concluded that the United States was not 
responsible for the security of China, particularly during such an extensive domestic economic 
crisis that had global implications. Thus, the United States did not commit troops or resources at 
the time to aid China.30 U.S. State Department officials based in China and Washington 
continued to closely monitor Sino-Japanese relations in the mid-1930s, but the United States 
maintained a consistent policy toward China without any major developments for the next five 
years until Japanese aggression in China increased dramatically in 1937. 
On July 7, 1937, a Japanese military maneuver at Marco Polo Bridge near a major 
railway serving Beijing sparked a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops. Although 
diplomatic negotiations attempted to resolve the situation without resorting to further military 
action, the incident significantly escalated tensions between China and Japan and thus attracted 
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international diplomatic attention, particularly from the U.S. government.31 As American and 
other foreign diplomats in China and Japan worked throughout early July 1937 to mediate an 
agreement between the two Asian nations that could defuse the mounting hostility, Chinese 
Nationalist Party leader and Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his best German-
trained troops near Shanghai in eastern China for a major offensive. Officials at the U.S. 
embassy in Nanjing—the Chinese capital city at the time—were aware of Chiang’s plans, having 
received reports from local informers and press correspondents.32 U.S. officials recognized that 
China stood on the brink of full-scale war with Japan. 
Nonetheless, Secretary of State Cordell Hull definitively reiterated the American policy 
of noninterference in a press statement delivered on July 16. Hull recognized that there “can be 
no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or 
rights or obligations of this country,” but emphasized the U.S. commitment to “revitalizing and 
strengthening” international law, meaning that it would not intervene beyond diplomatic efforts 
in international conflicts between sovereign states such as China and Japan.33 The United States 
simply lacked the political will at that point in time to ally with China against the Japanese. 
Given that most American people had only an abstract understanding of China’s political 
situation and the nature of its conflict with Japan, the public initially put little pressure on the 
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government to intervene. Meanwhile, some U.S. diplomatic officials in the 1930s viewed 
Japan—despite its flaws—as the best hope of becoming a “stabilizing influence” for the region.34 
U.S. perceives a threat to its interests in Asia from Japan 
From 1938 to 1940, American officials gradually began to take a more favorable view of 
supporting China as they observed Japanese behavior and reassessed Japan’s intentions. Several 
factors encouraged American political will to shift toward a new China policy. First, emerging 
reports of the atrocities in Nanjing and other Chinese cities disgusted Americans and stoked 
public sympathy for China. Second, the violence of the Japanese occupation began to impinge 
directly on short and long-term U.S. interests in the region. U.S. China policy in the 1930s 
focused on protecting American businesses operating there. To that end, small numbers of U.S. 
Navy ships and U.S. Marines had long patrolled certain Chinese rivers and harbors to ensure the 
security of American merchant vessels. In December 1937, Japanese forces attacked and sunk 
the U.S. Navy gunboat Panay, which was guarding merchant vessels on the Yangtze River. 
Japan’s destruction of the Panay in central China made a particularly strong impression on U.S. 
government officials. 
However, the U.S. government’s initial reaction to the Panay incident was restrained. 
Although American diplomats immediately doubted whether the incident was accidental as 
Japanese diplomats claimed, U.S. officials chose to resolve the issue diplomatically, rather than 
responding with force. Furthermore, the United States withdrew other navy gunboats operating 
in the area to avoid additional conflicts.35 As time passed, U.S. officials began to view the 
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sinking of the Panay as both deliberate and one of a growing number of examples demonstrating 
Japan’s vision of a Pan-Asian empire—an empire that did not include the influence of the United 
States or the “Open Door” trade privileges in China to which the United States had become 
accustomed.36  
Throughout 1938, U.S. officials in the State, Treasury, and War Departments and the 
various military branch offices expressed increasing concern about Japanese actions in China, 
but they could not agree on the best course of action. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
developed a controversial proposal to provide economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in 1938, 
which set off considerable bureaucratic bickering.37 Officials from the State and War 
Departments and the military were unsure that economic aid would help the Chinese forces, and 
some officials had already started questioning Chiang’s military and governance practices—
skepticism that would only increase with time. Conversely, Morgenthau was concerned about the 
rising threat to global economic security that he perceived from Nazi and Japanese ambitions if 
the Japanese were able to dominate China.  
Against this divisive backdrop, the combination of two external factors finally 
determined the outcome of debates over U.S. China policy. First, the Japanese released a 
declaration in November 1938 specifying a “new order” for East Asia that would render the 
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Open Door policy moot.38 This declaration, taken together with the growing body of reporting 
from American diplomats and military attachés in Asia in the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
informed a consensus among U.S. officials who did not always agree on Asia policy that Japan’s 
ambitions were a serious threat to the future of U.S. and European interests in East Asia. This 
realization elevated support for China to a top priority of U.S. policy in Asia. Second, officials 
throughout the U.S. government became aware that the Chinese were receiving Soviet aid. 
Concern emerged within the U.S. government that such aid would shift Chinese loyalties toward 
the Soviets.39 
From 1939 to 1941, these realizations had increasing influence over the willingness of the 
United States to provide economic aid to China, which it did via Chiang’s Nationalist Party-led 
government. The United States had delivered a cache of military equipment and supplies worth 
$45 million to Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in fall 1941.40 By December 1941, China was regularly 
receiving supplies and weapons as part of the Lend-Lease policy, General Claire Chennault was 
commanding a unit of airmen—the Flying Tigers—making initial air assaults on behalf of the 
Chinese, and American military advisors were beginning to assist Chinese forces.41  
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Initial U.S. WWII strategy in China 
By the beginning of 1942, the decade of transformation in U.S. policy in China from 
isolation to use of force was complete. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 
removed the remaining hesitance on the part of the U.S. government about aligning with the 
Chinese forces to fight Japan. However, because the war in Europe required so many American 
troops and resources, U.S. officials were still reluctant to deploy extensive American ground 
forces to China, preferring to provide support to Chinese forces in the form of training, funding, 
weapons, and air support. U.S. foreign policy advisors began seeking opportunities to cooperate 
with counterparts in the coalition army commanded by Chiang Kai-shek. Although U.S. 
diplomats in China throughout the 1930s had collected reports and examples of Chiang’s 
corruption and doubts had already surfaced in bureaucratic channels about his priorities and 
authority, U.S. strategic interests in China initially superseded these reservations. 
The U.S. government tasked numerous officials to focus intently on pursuing U.S. 
strategic goals in Asia in the 1930s and early 1940s, even after Pearl Harbor, but U.S. concerns 
in Asia unquestionably took second place to activities on the European front. British and 
American leaders articulated this fact particularly succinctly at the Arcadia Conference in 1942, 
when Allied forces summarized their grand strategy for the war as “Europe First, Asia 
Second.”42 The Allies counted on the Chinese forces to resist the Japanese until the war in 
Europe was complete, at which point they would discuss increasing U.S. and British support and 
intervention in China.43  
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U.S. officials also perceived China as part of a broad campaign to encircle the Japanese 
forces, strangling their ability to expand further. U.S. war planners feared that if Japanese 
occupiers successfully overwhelmed or co-opted Chinese forces, it would severely damage the 
U.S. ability to bring its forces to bear in other parts of the war. Moreover, the complete defeat of 
China by Japan would free the 600,000 Japanese troops fighting there to pursue Allied targets 
elsewhere.44 The Allies’ grand strategy envisioned a “cordon of defense” with one “anchor” in 
Australia and the other in India and Myanmar; American airpower and Chinese forces would 
expel the Japanese military from China while European allies protected India, Australia, and 
those parts of Southeast Asia not under Japanese control.45 Allied leaders strategized that 
assisting the Chinese in mounting a strong, continuous defensive position would weaken 
Japanese forces overall. 
Beyond the immediate interests related to the shared Chinese and American goal of 
defeating the Japanese, U.S. officials also determined that assisting China served specific long-
term U.S. foreign policy interests. The United States wanted a stable, productive China that 
could continue to be a lucrative trade partner and provide a capitalist buffer zone between the 
Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. American corporations, including some with ties to the 
Roosevelt family and other American elites, took an interest in China as a potential market. 
According to historian Robert L. Messer, “Whenever the subject of China arose, Roosevelt 
reference his family history in the China trade including how his maternal grandfather Warren 
Delano made millions “helping civilize the country with railroads, steamships, and telegraph 
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lines.”46 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when considering China, most 
Americans had reactions similar to Roosevelt’s: when they thought of China at all, they 
considered it to be one big potential market, both for American products and American religious 
and political thought. This assumption consistently influenced U.S. policy toward China in the 
1930s and early 1940s, even though the Chinese markets are only now beginning to meet the 
potential consumer demand most American corporations imagined.47 
A second long-term interest of the United States in China that intensified as World War II 
progressed was American concern over the Sino-Soviet relationship. The long-term American 
vision for China to become a source of economic and political stability in Asia that the United 
States could lean upon would not be possible if China became part of, or closely aligned with, 
the Soviet Union, an increasing fear for U.S. officials in the 1930s an 1940s. China’s two most 
significant vulnerabilities to the Soviet Union that U.S. officials identified in the early 1940s 
were the possibility of the Soviet invasion of Japanese-held territory in northern China and the 
continuation or escalation of Soviet engagement in Chinese politics.48 As World War II 
continued, U.S. policymakers became more concerned about the potential for partnership 
between the Soviet Union and CCP than about Soviet aid to the Nationalist Party. However, it is 
important to note the extent of Soviet aid and military support that both the Nationalists and the 
CCP received after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in China’s 1911 national political 
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revolution. The Soviet Union had exerted influence in Chinese politics throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, hoping China would become a Soviet ally, if not another Communist state.49  
Starting in the 1920s, the Soviet Union provided financial and advisory support not only 
to China’s Communist Party but also to the Nationalist party, which had originally been founded 
by Sun Yatsen with the goal of transforming post-imperial China into a modern nation-state. 
Soviet leaders determined that encouraging China’s political transition toward nationhood was a 
sound first step toward fostering the possibility of socialism there.50 To this end, the Soviet 
Union in the 1920s provided the Nationalist Party with funding to develop and train a modern, 
professionalized military at the Whampoa Military Academy, which Chiang Kai-shek led prior 
to succeeding Sun Yatsen as head of the Nationalist Party.51 The Nationalist continued receiving 
Soviet military aid until 1927, when Chiang supervised a brutal crackdown on the Chinese 
Communists. 
The Soviet Union did not agree to continue providing aid to the Nationalist-led 
government of China until 1937, after the CCP and the Nationalists reunited in a fragile United 
Front against Japan.52 According to statistics compiled from Russian and Chinese sources by 
historian Maochun Yu, by the end of 1941, the Soviets had provided China with almost 1,000 
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aircraft; 10,000 machine guns; 50,000 rifles; 2,000 trucks; and loans totaling $250 million.53 
More significantly, Stalin recognized that a major weakness in China’s war effort against the 
Japanese was the lack of industrial capacity that prevented it from making its own weapons, 
armor, and ammunition. Thus, Stalin began a program in 1937 to build manufacturing facilities 
for combat aircraft in China using Soviet-supplied engine blocks, and he instigated the 
development of oil fields in China to help fuel China’s industrialization.54 To the extent that U.S. 
officials became aware of these aid programs at the time, they became a lingering source of 
concern in the context of U.S. policy toward China. 
The Pearl Harbor attack eliminated remaining inertia about the United States entering 
World War II, and U.S. officials began to implement an official alliance with China against the 
Japanese in the first months of 1942. 
The U.S. struggle to collect wartime intelligence in China  
As U.S. policy in East Asia made the shift from isolationism to an alliance with China, 
the need for strategic intelligence on China and Japan intensified. Despite the policymakers’ 
increasing interest in improving intelligence collection in East Asia, the changes made to the 
administrative process of intelligence collection initially did little to solve the problem of 
increasing the flow of information to those who needed it. Instead, most reforms served to 
exacerbate turf wars that had been brewing between old and new agencies competing for 
intelligence opportunities, budgetary resources, and Roosevelt’s attention. The competition 
between agencies over who would collect intelligence in China and how absorbed attention of 
the bureaucratic managers in Washington that might otherwise have been spent determining how 
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to effectively utilize the expertise that existing personnel based in the region had developed 
about China and Japan. Instead, the interagency bickering had the effect of sidelining many 
talented U.S. government experts on China, limiting the free exchange of the intelligence that 
was collected, and irritating those in the Chinese central government who could have shared 
some of the necessary strategic and tactical information on Japanese activities that the United 
States desired.  
Due to the rapid change in U.S. strategic priorities in East Asia, China quickly became an 
important battleground in the friction within the executive branch agencies and U.S. military 
about intelligence reform in 1941. Historian Maochun Yu has argued persuasively that U.S. 
intelligence actions in China precipitated some of the most important and intense interagency 
conflicts of the World War II era, which had pivotal implications for the U.S. intelligence 
reforms that occurred throughout the 1940s and ultimately established today’s U.S. intelligence 
community. Yu demonstrates that Roosevelt’s creation of the COI and OSS was the catalyst for a 
new, intense struggle for bureaucratic power and relevance within executive branch agencies, 
emphasizing “the very first battleground was over control of intelligence gathering in China.”55  
In a revealing example of the competitive behavior to which Yu is referring, on the same 
day that Roosevelt established the COI (July 11, 1941), the G-2 under George Marshall officially 
established an American military intelligence mission in China. Known as the Magruder mission, 
after Brigadier General John Magruder who was chosen to lead it, the mission was a deliberate 
attempt to pre-empt COI intelligence operations in China using Army personnel. Brigadier 
General Sherman Miles, head of the G-2 and known rival of General Donovan, told Magruder 
the purpose of his mission was to “advise the Chinese government in all military matters, 
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particularly in the use of Lease Lend credits or Lease Lend material which they may receive 
from us,” and “keep the Chinese Government informed as to such military plans or progress 
made here as we may want them to have” such that “when we get into this war actively, the 
mission will be the liaison for strategic planning and cooperation with our ally, China.”56  
Magruder arrived in China in October, 1941, and began serving as the official U.S. 
intelligence liaison with the Nationalist-led Chinese government, a role in which he remained 
until he was supplanted by General Joseph Stilwell in 1942.57 Magruder, an Army intelligence 
officer who spoke Chinese and had served several tours in China including a stint as attaché 
(1926-1930), made contacts with Chiang Kai-shek and China’s notorious and powerful 
intelligence director Tai Li.58 Both the Navy’s ONI and the nascent COI requested the ability to 
post personnel to the Magruder mission, but G-2 headquarters denied these requests. The 
Chinese government’s first U.S. intelligence contacts were Army G-2 intelligence officers. 
Magruder began dispatching a daily intelligence summary on December 13, 1941, only days 
after the beginning of the U.S. Pacific War.59 
Effective foreign intelligence operations typically require the support and resources 
provided by intelligence liaison relationships. Cut off from such relationships in China by the 
Army, Donovan and ONI leaders both sought other opportunities to get a foothold in China 
intelligence collection in 1941. Initial COI operations in East Asia flopped spectacularly, 
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alienating both General MacArthur in the Pacific and officials in the State Department, such as 
Stanley Hornbeck, State’s chief policy advisor on East Asia at the time, and Ambassador 
Clarence Gauss, who served in the U.S. Embassy in China (then located in China’s wartime 
capital of Chongqing).60  
Understanding the general importance of China, and specifically southwest China, to the 
U.S. supply chain in the Pacific War is important to understanding the history of U.S. 
intelligence operations in Communist areas because the CCP operated in many of the areas in 
western China that were considered “behind Japanese lines” and critical to the operation of the 
United States supply chain. Collecting weather intelligence and monitoring these areas to protect 
the U.S. supplies and information became an important intelligence task as the war progressed. 
With Japanese forces dominating the major land routes to China through Southeast Asia until 
1944, U.S. airpower became the best way to transport aid and resources into China. Over the 
course of the war, U.S. planes carried an enormous amount of equipment to China from India in 
a route to which Allied officials referred as “The Hump,” due to the tall mountains on the China-
Burma border that U.S. planes had to cross. The delivery of the peak tonnage over the Hump 
took place between 1943 and 1944.61 After 1944, the opening of the Ledo Road connected older 
roads through Burma to create the route that became known as the Stilwell Road to China.62 
Both routes allowed the United States to transport materiel and intelligence in and out of China. 
                                                                
60 General MacArthur had been opposed to the creation of OSS and he banned them from operating in the South 
Pacific region under his command. R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History, 250-1. 
 
61 John D. Plating, The Hump: America’s Strategy for Keeping China in World War II (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2011), 5-12. 
 
62 Plating, The Hump, 2. 
 
64 
 
In the interagency turf wars that occurred in the early 1940s over who would collect 
intelligence in China and how, OSS and ONI became unlikely allies, and they tended to seek 
connections with Nationalist officials such as Tai Li to focus on technical intelligence collection, 
such as radio. General Chennault and the Army Air Force intelligence officers, who valued 
technical intelligence collection, were supportive of the Navy and OSS intelligence plans 
believing they would yield tactical information about the Japanese positions that would be useful 
for bombings and Hump missions. Conversely, officials from the Army and State Department 
opposed the OSS/ONI willingness to ingratiate themselves with the Nationalist Party leadership. 
Although they were hardly friends with each other, General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss 
opposed the OSS and ONI officers more than they despised each other, and they often teamed up 
to undermine or supersede OSS/ONI intelligence plans in China. In 1942, Donovan faced 
“rapidly rising hostility toward COI from the State Department and the army theater commander 
in China,” according to Yu.63 At the beginning of 1942, the United States was facing a new war 
in East Asia in partnership with an unfamiliar ally in the form of Chiang Kai-shek and supported 
by a national intelligence community that was undersized and unprepared for the task it faced.  
Implementing U.S. Pacific War Strategy with China 
Based on short- and long-term American strategic interests in China during World War II 
as described above, the United States took two key steps between 1941 and 1944 to support 
China’s fight against Japan and ensure that China stayed in the war while the Allies continued to 
focus on Europe. First, the United States continued delivering substantial American aid to China, 
in the form of money, goods, and training. Second, the U.S. partnered with Generalissimo 
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Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Nationalist Party who was recognized by most of the world 
as China’s President and head of state at the time.  
The official entry of the United States into the Pacific War in December 1941 opened the 
door for a larger and more sustained aid relationship with China. Chiang Kai-shek asked for a 
$500 million loan from the United States to help his troops continue fighting to repel the 
Japanese advance into Chinese territory.64 After some debate and misgivings by the Secretaries 
of Treasury and State, who feared—with some valid justification—that corruption of the 
Nationalist regime would siphon off meaningful percentages of the aid dollars, Congress 
approved a $500 million aid package for China’s Nationalist-led government in March 1942.65 
The aid package was substantial, to be sure, but the money was only a tiny fraction of the global 
Lend-Lease disbursements received by other allies, such as Great Britain. Between 1941 and 
1945, aid to China comprised an average of 2 percent of the total U.S. Lend-Lease budget. 
Consistent with the stated U.S. priorities and interests in the global war, the aid distributed to 
China in 1941 represented about 1.5 percent of the money distributed globally.66 
Roosevelt partners with Chiang Kai-shek 
Although the United States had some qualms about Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions and 
encountered many frustrations and difficulties with him during their alliance in 1940s, the initial 
decision for the United States to partner with Chiang was fairly obvious. Chiang appealed to 
Roosevelt and other U.S. policymakers who were seeking an appropriate counterpart for 
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themselves in a traditional diplomatic paradigm in which top leaders and monarchs engaged in 
personalized negotiations on behalf of their nation-states that followed the norms of polite 
interpersonal relations in Western high society.  
Moreover, Chiang and his family went to considerable lengths to encourage a 
personalized diplomatic relationship with the Roosevelt administration and to lobby for their 
cause in Washington DC. Chiang and his wife, Song Meiling, who was also known simply as 
Madame Chiang, appealed to American politicians in the 1930s and 1940s. Madam Chiang, a 
Christian who spoke English, having been educated in the United States, was the sister-in-law of 
Sun Yatsen. Chiang’s brother-in-law, T.V. Song, headed the front company in the United States 
that used Lend Lease funds to purchase military supplies on behalf of China. Song recruited 
high-ranking bureaucrats and elite businessmen, whom he paid well, to help his company and 
encourage American policymakers to support the Chinese cause, and the Nationalist Party in 
particular.67 Personal experiences with Chiang and his extended family as well as the image the 
Nationalist leaders cultivated with Americans made strong impressions on U.S. policymakers all 
the way up to the White House. FDR based his respect for Chiang in part on an exaggerated view 
of the Generalissmo’s accomplishments. Roosevelt once explained to General George Marshall 
that he admired Chiang’s ability to unify China under his leadership and establish “in a very 
short time throughout China what it took us [the United States] a couple of centuries to attain.”68 
Roosevelt’s description of early twentieth-century Chinese politics was charitable (if not 
downright “fictional” as Foreign Service officer John Davies described it in his memoirs).69 It 
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was true, however, that few viable alternative Chinese partners for the United States existed in 
the 1940s beyond Chiang Kai-shek. By 1941, the Nationalists under Chiang’s leadership had 
emerged as the political leaders of China, even if they had not completely consolidated power 
over China before the Japanese invasion. Chiang’s position as head of the Nationalist Party 
provided a solid foundation for his claim to authority over the entire mainland. The Nationalists 
had inherited and gained control of the levers of political power in China left behind by the 
collapsed Qing regime and China’s 1911 political revolution. To the extent that basic central 
government services such as taxation, maintenance of infrastructure, administration of basic 
public education, and the cultivation of a national civic sensibility were occurring in China 
during the initial decades of the twentieth century, the Nationalist government was responsible. 
The Nationalist government had been controlling most major cities in China, including political 
and commercial urban capitals on China’s north and eastern corridors, whereas opposition 
forces, to the extent that they existed, tended to exert power only in hinterlands, far from 
railroads, ports, and urban infrastructure that were important resources that the Chinese and 
Japanese were struggling over.70  
The most powerful opposing minority party in China that had not been co-opted or 
absorbed by the Nationalist government was the CCP, which made an unlikely initial ally for the 
United States and not only due to their Communist ideology. The CCP had been severely 
weakened when Chiang had identified it as a threat to his party’s political power in the 1920s. 
Chiang and the Nationalists had invested massive amounts of energy and resources into 
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persecuting the CCP throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, and their efforts had been highly 
effective in limiting its membership and political authority in the 1930s. By 1941, the CCP had 
approximately one million members, many of who were isolated into the CCP headquarters base 
camp at Yan’an in rural Shaanxi province or operating in decentralized guerrilla units to fight the 
Japanese from behind the battle lines. In addition to the economic and geographic constraints 
inherent to being based at Yan’an, the Nationalist Army had encircled the CCP base area, 
limiting the ability of individuals such as foreign correspondents or American government 
officials to have contact with the CCP leaders throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s.71  
For his part, Chiang probably viewed partnering with the United States as a necessary 
evil that both enhanced his personal prestige and credibility, potentially bringing China’s voice 
into global diplomatic forums, and reinforced the U.S. intentions to continue financial and 
materiel aid on which his troops had come to rely. After more than a decade of armed conflict, 
with Japan and rivals in China, Chiang’s resources were depleted, making him eager to recruit 
allies in the West, despite the potential harms of teaming up with world powers that many in 
China saw as perpetrators of the humiliation that was one factor motivating China’s revolution 
and shaping domestic politics in the early decades of the twentieth century. Both the United 
States and the British agreed to help China. Neither arrangement was perfect, but Chiang 
preferred the Americans to the British, whose global footprint came into conflict with the anti-
imperialist agenda of the Chinese revolution. In terms of understanding the U.S.-China alliance 
from Chiang’s perspective, historian Rana Mitter has noted that the two sides looked at China’s 
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role in the fight against the Japanese through “almost entirely different lenses.” Whereas the 
United States and the British viewed China as a weakened nation in need of rescuing support, the 
Chinese saw themselves as “the first and most consistent foe of Axis aggression” that “deserved 
to be treated as an equal power.”72 This mismatch in perspectives underscored much of the 
friction that surfaced in the relationship throughout the 1940s.  
For the United States, and particularly for General George Marshall, partnering with 
Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Japanese meant finding ways to support Chinese troops without 
deploying large numbers of U.S. troops to participate in the fighting. U.S. commanders were 
firmly against the idea of sending Western troops to fight the Japanese in China out of concern 
that it would detract from their primary focus, which was fighting in Europe. In her seminal book 
on Stilwell and the American alliance with China, Tuchman explained: 
“The hope of a strong China as one of the four cornerstones of the postwar peace 
had formed Roosevelt’s policy from the beginning and dictated the effort to 
sustain China through the war. Military strategy ran parallel. It intended that 
China’s manpower, not America’s should fight on the mainland; it needed 
China’s territory as a base of present air, and future ground, operations; above all, 
it depended on China’s continued resistance to hold down a million Japanese 
troops on the mainland. Otherwise they might be released against the American’s 
perilous progress from island to island across the Pacific.”73 
 
Nonetheless, Marshall thought it prudent to make a dramatic gesture that would 
demonstrate the extent to which the United States stood in solidarity with the Chinese against 
Japan’s invasion. Rather than issuing Chiang a blank check for U.S. military aid, Marshall 
believed Roosevelt should make America’s help contingent upon Chiang’s acceptance of U.S. 
military advisors. Upon Marshall’s recommendation, FDR persuaded Chiang to allow him to 
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appoint an American to serve as Chiang’s official chief of staff, advising the generalissimo on 
strategy, troop training, logistics, and resource allocation.74 President Roosevelt negotiated an 
agreement between China, Britain, and the United States in early 1942 that kept Chiang Kai-shek 
in charge of China’s war efforts but also agreed to assign him an American aide to assist with 
decision making and logistics.75  
Stilwell in charge 
In March 1942, Joseph Wallace Stilwell, then age 60 and newly promoted to the rank of 
Lieutenant General, arrived in Chongqing to take the position and serve simultaneously as the 
commander of the U.S. CBI theater. Stilwell had graduated from the United States Military 
Academy at West Point in 1904 and started his military career serving as an intelligence officer 
in World War I. Stilwell was distinguished among U.S. military officers for his knowledge of 
Chinese, which he studied for many years while serving in the 15th Infantry regiment in the 
1920s and as U.S. military attaché in China from 1935 to 1938. In the latter position in 
particular, Stilwell had observed the intensifying Japanese aggression in China.76 
Stilwell was a divisive figure, loyal colleagues and subordinates admired him as ardently 
as rivals despised him. Historian Rana Mitter takes a critical view of Stilwell, arguing that he 
“had a particular way of viewing the world, and anything that ran counter to the assumptions that 
shaped that view was dismissed as irrelevant, or worse, maliciously intended to undermine him,” 
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which “suggested severe limitations on his skills as a military commander.”77 Foreign Service 
officer John Paton Davies, Jr., who worked closely with Stilwell during the war and who counted 
himself among Stilwell’s supporters suggested that “Stilwell’s unwillingness to dissemble, to 
conceal his low opinion of pomposity, hypocrisy, and the sacrifice of military considerations to 
political expediency aroused the resentment of those he held in contempt.”78 Stilwell’s lifelong 
tendency to speak his mind in an acerbic and direct fashion when teaching cadets at West Point 
following World War I earned him the nickname “Vinegar Joe,” which stuck with him 
throughout his career, as did his sharp tongue.79 However, Stilwell’s sharp and succinct style of 
speech was not a reflection of his lack of intellect or education. Davies emphasized that Stilwell 
“was often an abusive vulgarian in his speech and writing. And yet—he was also a man who had 
a discriminating command of the English language and who possessed refined perceptions and 
tastes.”80 The combination of refinement and vulgarity Stilwell exhibited is apparent from his 
personal motto, in Latin, as recorded by Tuchman: “Illegitimati non carborundum, which he 
translated as “Don’t let the bastards grind you down.”81 
Stilwell’s orders in 1942 were to design and lead reforms of the Chinese forces that 
would make them effective in battle against the Japanese army. Knowing the air route over the 
Himalayas into China from India was precarious and expensive, Stilwell’s strategy focused on 
securing a land-based route for supplies through Southeast Asia. To accomplish his aims, 
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Stilwell needed to “enable the Chinese ground forces to fight efficiently; to so train, arm, and 
equip the Chinese soldier, and assure his pay, food, and medical care, as to create an effective 
military arm.”82 General Marshall had placed Stilwell in charge of American forces in China and 
Southeast Asia, but he also specified that “General Stilwell himself will always be under the 
command of the Generalissimo,” ultimately placing Stilwell in a difficult position to accomplish 
his task in China.83 The relationship between Stilwell and Chiang began cordially, with mutual 
respect exhibited, but Chiang was careful to demonstrate his authority to Stilwell. As Mitter 
explained, “Chiang was content to allow the Americans the gesture of appointing Stilwell to 
show the closeness between the U.S. and China, but he had no intention of actually ceding 
command to a Westerner.”84 
Within days of Stilwell’s arrival in Chongqing in March 1942, the first COI officer 
dispatched to collect intelligence in China also arrived. COI had sent Esson Gale to recruit 
Korean exiles living in Chongqing to participate in the collection of secret intelligence and 
sabotage throughout East Asia in a plan modeled after standard British intelligence practices at 
the time. Gale, chairman of the Department of Far Eastern Studies at the University of California 
at Berkley prior to joining COI, was part of Donovan’s R&A branch and had no previous 
intelligence experience.85 Gale’s orders were to work circumvent State Department and G-2 
personnel already operating in the region and to work directly with the British intelligence 
officers based at the British Embassy in Chongqing. The plan reflected COI’s lack of awareness 
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of the situation in China, where seasoned G-2 officials and Foreign Service officers had 
cultivated their own social networks and norms and where Chiang Kai-shek and his intelligence 
director Tai Li harbored deep distrust for the British diplomats and intelligence officers. Upon 
arrival in Chongqing, Gale demonstrated poor discretion, flaunting his connections to the British 
intelligence officers and establishing an office for himself at the Jialing Hotel in Chongqing, 
where most foreign correspondents and other foreign observers stayed in Chongqing. Word of 
Gale’s intentions quickly spread, stroking vehement reactions from U.S. and Chinese officials 
alike.86 Chinese intelligence director Tai Li was among the most infuriated. The episode was one 
among many catalysts that prompted Tai Li to require the British intelligence officers to leave 
Chongqing. By April, the Gale mission was also scuttled. Having attempted and failed to 
establish intelligence operations in China unilaterally and facing the loss of British officers who 
could mentor his newly recruited personnel, Donovan had little choice but to partner with 
Stilwell. 
The Problem of the Fragile United Front 
Although in the early stages of the war, President Roosevelt was convinced that the 
measures the United States took would help achieve the main objectives of the United States, 
many within the U.S. government did not share the President’s optimism on the alliance with 
China. What historian Michael Schaller called “centers of opposition” developed vis-à-vis 
Roosevelt’s wartime China policy within the U.S. Departments of War, State, Treasury, and 
Navy as well as the new OSS.87 As Schaller explained: “The most significant contradictions and 
strains in China policy developed between the President and his aides, who in Washington took a 
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broad, long-term view of events, and the military and diplomatic officers stationed in China, who 
faced the realities of the political and military battlefield.88  
As the war intensified in China, the U.S. officials in China who understood China’s 
domestic political context soon faced the arduous task of explaining to colleagues and superiors 
in Washington who had little familiarity with China, including President Roosevelt, that enmity 
between the Nationalists and CCP was more extensive and more significant to anti-Japanese war 
efforts that the United States had factored into its plans. In the early months of 1941, to the 
extent that they were familiar with Chinese politics, many U.S. officials involved in war 
planning found the idea of Nationalist and CCP forces cooperating to defeat the Japanese to be 
both plausible and sensible, but it soon became clear that the fundamental enmity between the 
two parties was affecting Chinese strategic decision making. Although they initially 
underestimated and misunderstood the depth of the Nationalist-CCP conflict, U.S. officials soon 
found themselves in the middle of the decades-old unresolved debate between the Nationalists 
and CCP on the appropriate form a post-dynastic Chinese state should take.  
Political debates in China that were erupting into violent conflict throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s had their roots in early twentieth-century events. Following the collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty—China’s last dynasty—in the revolution of 1911, Sun Yatsen founded China’s 
Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, of which Chiang Kai-shek eventually became top leader. 
Sun’s top priority was to develop a political system that enabled China to modernize. He 
encouraged Chinese people to view themselves as citizens of a Chinese nation and urged them to 
embrace international ideas.89 Although they agreed with the basic principles of the 1911 
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revolution, the Chinese political parties and movements that had emerged by the time Sun died in 
1925 responded to Sun’s mandate for China to modernize with a variety of political ideologies, 
including anarchism and communism. 
The Nationalist Party, the Guomindang (GMD) or Kuomintang (KMT) in Chinese, 
established the Republic of China based on a modified version of liberalism.90 The Republic’s 
leaders inherited some of the administrative vestiges of late Qing imperial bureaucracy, which, 
though crumbling, included traditional levers of state power such as conventional military forces 
and a dysfunctional system for collecting taxes from China’s populous but poor countryside via a 
network of local officials. Dominance of these traditional measures of political power offered the 
Nationalists legitimacy with some elements of the Chinese population, but most experts now 
argue that the party’s popularity was uneven, transitory, and far from consolidated statewide.91 
Chiang faced significant opposition to unifying China under one Republican government 
throughout the 1920s from various local warlords who had accumulated political and military 
power in the waning days of the Qing dynasty. Chiang’s authority was strongest in the urban 
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areas, particularly in the eastern portions of China—the same areas that Japan sought to occupy 
in the 1930s. 
Conversely, the CCP had struggled to recruit broad support for their socialist ideology in 
urban areas from the time of the party’s founding in 1921 until it established its base at Yan’an in 
1935. In the first several years after its founding, the CCP was an extremely decentralized group 
that consisted mostly of Chinese intellectuals from a spectrum of philosophical persuasions, 
including anarchists, who had a variety of creative visions for how the Chinese people should 
take responsibility for their own governance, and other radicals who espoused several competing 
interpretations of Marxist-Leninism.92 The early CCP leaders envisioned themselves potentially 
coexisting with other Chinese political parties in a coalition government, which they gradually 
hoped to steer toward socialist policy. They maintained the expectation of a multiparty coalition 
governing China until well into their 1945-1949 civil war with the Nationalists, and preserved 
the impulse in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China.93 
In the first few years after the CCP’s foundation, Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist 
leaders did not consider the Communists to be a serious threat because they assessed the CCP to 
be merely a small and disorganized collection of intellectuals—initial impressions that were 
somewhat warranted at the time. In his landmark study of the CCP organizational history from 
1920 to 1927, Hans Van de Ven assessed that the early CCP leaders disagreed on how best to 
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apply the principles of communism in the Chinese context.94 In particular, they debated the 
necessity of the proletariat as a catalyst for a Chinese Communist revolution because China’s 
population was mostly agrarian, in contrast to the urban workers who had supported Russia’s 
Bolshevik revolution. At the heart of this debate was a question of mobilizing urban versus rural 
revolution. The Leninist model of socialist revolution required urban workers to form the 
proletariat that led the revolution. In this model, the Communist Party would serve as a guide for 
the urban workers in organized protest, using violence if necessary, maintaining a close 
relationship between political and military activity.95 This ideal appeared highly impractical in 
China, where the CCP met with little success organizing and coordinating labor movements in 
major cities because factories tended to be run by powerful foreign capitalists who made 
formidable opponents for the inexperienced Chinese Communists and the predominately non-
partisan populations of Chinese urban workers.96 
By the mid-1920s, having suffered the violent repression of several labor uprisings at the 
hand of the Nationalist-led government that sought to maintain order in China’s cities and retain 
foreign direct investment in China’s urban factories, the CCP began to shift their efforts to 
mobilizing peasants. This policy change was still a matter of considerable disagreement within 
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the party in the mid-1920s. By 1927, as the Nationalists’ increasing power threatened CCP goals, 
most CCP leaders had moved their attention away from the question of if the party should 
mobilize peasants to the question of how to go about it, but these issues continued to produce 
friction between party leaders well into the 1930s. 
With these internal ideological conflicts as a backdrop, foremost among the external 
factors exacerbating the CCP’s struggle for political survival by mid-1927 was the deterioration 
of the alliance that the Soviet Comintern had encouraged the CCP to negotiate with the Chinese 
Nationalist Party in 1923—referred to in the CCP’s official historiography as “the first United 
Front.” At the time, the Nationalists needed resources to continue wresting control of governance 
in China away from local warlords and unifying it under one national government. The 
Nationalist Party agreed to cooperate with the Communists in exchange for much needed Soviet 
aid.97 Although the Soviets ultimately sought to assist China in transitioning to a socialist regime, 
preferably under the leadership of the CCP, they saw the unification of China under one political 
administration as a key step toward this goal.98 With Soviet support, a small number of early 
CCP members served in Nationalist military units when they embarked upon the Northern 
Expedition unification campaign in 1926.99 The Expedition intended to unify China by force 
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when necessary. In the meantime, the CCP followed a policy of “opportunism” or seizing 
serendipitous opportunities that arose to advance socialist goals by providing aid and political 
education to the Chinese population.100 Prior to 1927, the CCP had not planned to use 
independent military force to bring about their rise to power.101 Instead, they intended to leverage 
their cooperation in the Northern Expedition to increase their political power.  
With Comintern and CCP help, the Nationalists had garnered considerable political 
strength by 1927, successfully defeating or assimilating several regional warlords. Early 
successes in this campaign disrupted the internal politics of the Nationalist Party by making the 
alliance with the CCP less desirable.102 CCP activities to educate the Chinese population about 
socialism and stir up interest in CCP land reform policies also began to irritate Nationalist 
leaders. Debate over the arrangement and other leadership conflicts culminated in the Nationalist 
party’s division into two factions in April 1927. The faction that soon became dominant, under 
the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, not only sought to end the alliance with the CCP, but also 
attempted to eliminate the CCP entirely through a violent attack on Communists in Shanghai on 
April 12. Chiang’s campaign killed or wounded many CCP members and forced others into 
hiding in Shanghai and elsewhere in eastern China. So ended the First United Front. 
CCP members regrouped, militarized, and began attempting attacks on the Nationalists. 
At first they tried to foment uprisings in urban areas, such as the uprising at Nanchang that 
occurred on August 1, 1927, which the CCP today remembers as the founding event of its armed 
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forces. When several similar uprisings failed to gain traction in 1927 and 1928, the remaining 
party members retreated to base areas they established in rural southeastern China. From 1927 to 
1933, the CCP developed several independent “soviets”—self-contained base camps run on a 
socialist governance model.103  Some historians have suggested that the survival of these CCP 
bases was less a factor of their success as an experiment in socialist governance and more 
reflective of Chiang’s distraction by the combination of mop-up exercises still going on against 
warlords and Japan’s 1931 invasion.104  
Regardless of the other military demands placed upon him, Chiang made five attempts to 
encircle and destroy the CCP. The final and most successful attempt by Chiang to destroy the 
CCP base areas was a brutal crackdown launched in 1933 that made remaining in south China 
untenable for many of the surviving members of the CCP. In 1934, as many as 200,000 members 
of the CCP’s Red Army set out on the Long March—a notorious retreat of the main contingent 
of the CCP’s army from southeastern China on a journey of 8,000 miles through southern China 
and up through its center to Yan’an.105  
The CCP forces consisted of several decentralized armies at this point, and in 1935, the 
main Red Army arrived in Yan’an, the town in rural northwest China where the members of the 
U.S. Army Observer Mission would meet them almost a decade later. Several smaller armies 
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loyal to the party took different routes than the main Chinese Red Army contingent, and thus 
arrived in Yan’an as late as 1936. CCP leaders had no destination in mind at the outset, but 
simply kept going until they found a place where they could successfully defend themselves 
from Chiang Kai-shek; the place happened to be Yan’an. Along the way, many of the initial 
participants either deserted or succumbed to the extreme nature of the grueling trek, which the 
main contingent completed in just over one year. Others lost their lives in battle with troops loyal 
to Chiang Kai-shek.  
By all accounts, Yan’an in 1935 was not a particularly nice place. The town is located in 
one of the poorest areas of central China. Frequent droughts ruled out most lucrative agriculture 
in the dusty brown countryside of Shaanxi Province, and there was little infrastructure when the 
CCP arrived there in October 1935.106 Fewer than 50,000 Red Army troops had survived the 
Long March to settle in Yan’an and recuperate alongside the CCP leadership.107 After 1935, the 
CCP remained in the area until the late 1940s. They immediately began planning how to 
mobilize the Chinese public to support their cause and fight Japanese aggression where they 
could. The CCP leaders publicized their eagerness to form a new united front with the 
Nationalists against the Japanese throughout 1935 and 1936.108  
Although the conflict that set off full-scale war between the Chinese and Japanese did not 
occur until 1937, throughout the 1930s, Japanese attacks had been gradually escalating to the 
point where they had prevented Chiang Kai-shek from continuing to attack the CCP after its 
arrival in Yan’an until late in 1936. By December 1936, Chiang traveled to Xi’an, the major city 
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closest to Yan’an, to meet with a local warlord who was aligned with the Nationalist Party but 
was trying to persuade Chiang to cooperate with the CCP to conserve resources and combine 
efforts against the Japanese. The warlord unexpectedly betrayed Chiang, enabling the CCP to 
surround the room where the Nationalist Party leader was staying. After Chiang injured his spine 
attempting escape out a window in his pajamas, Chiang’s CCP captors managed to detain him, 
surprising and humiliating him. For several days while the episode unfolded, it appeared to 
outside observers that Chiang’s captors might, in fact, intend to execute him—a prospect that 
caused great fear on the part of the American government.109 Ultimately, the Soviet Comintern 
advisors to the CCP encouraged the Communists not to harm Chiang, which they argued would 
actually weaken China’s fight against Japan. Instead, the CCP released him on the condition of 
his commitment to end the undeclared civil war against the CCP and work with them to fight the 
Japanese occupation.110 This so-called “Xi’an Incident” was the basis of the new anti-Japanese 
CCP-GMD United Front—a shaky foundation to be sure. 
The second so-called United Front between the CCP and Nationalists was largely a 
matter of convenience and survival for the two parties involved and was less genuine than the 
first had been. Colonel Barrett, who served as an army intelligence officer and attaché in China 
for years before he became the first head of the U.S. Army Observer Mission to the CCP base in 
Yan’an where he had regular personal contact with the CCP’s top leadership noted that the 
specific terms of the United Front arrangement were never written down, as far as U.S. 
intelligence officers (and their CCP contacts) knew. According to Barrett, “In general, both sides 
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agreed to put aside, temporarily at least, their differences in order to concentrate on resistance to 
Japan, in which the Communists were willing to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as their leader.”111 
The National Government forces absorbed three Communist divisions (approximately 45,000 
troops) into what became known as the Eighth Route Army, under the command of Chiang Kai-
shek. As Barrett explained, “This arrangement left large numbers of Communist forces still 
unrecognized and receiving no support from the National Government. On their own, however, 
the Communists still continued to maintain and expand these forces as the opportunity arose.”112 
The ability of the Communists to continue developing their military skills and strength with so 
few resources at their disposal was the quality that attracted the interest of some U.S. officials in 
the 1940s, as later chapters will attest. 
Early Setbacks in the China-Burma India Campaign  
Few top-level U.S. officials fully recognized the deficiency in the U.S. government’s 
understanding of and connections with the CCP as critical to strategic planning of American 
intervention in China until Stilwell’s military operations with the Chinese were well underway. 
By the summer of 1942, the United States had committed substantial economic resources and 
personnel to assisting the Chinese in the China-Burma-India Campaign (hereafter, CBI), but the 
results were a major disappointment. Stilwell and the American forces were encountering two 
primary problems in cooperating with their Chinese Nationalist allies: Chinese troops and their 
leadership tended to shy away from battle and refused to take offensive positions against the 
Japanese, and Chiang Kai-shek proved himself to be a recalcitrant partner for Stilwell as the 
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latter began to doubt the Chinese war fighting capabilities and commitment to the cause and raise 
questions about the personal corruption of the Generalissimo.  
Stilwell’s concern that Chinese ground troops would not engage the enemy was well 
known and shared by many other informed observers. Stilwell diagnosed the problem with 
achieving his mission of preparing Chinese troops to fight was not with the troops but with their 
leadership, all the way up to the Generalissimo himself. Barrett quoted Stilwell as saying, “The 
Chinese soldier is excellent material, wasted and betrayed by stupid leadership.”113 Stilwell had 
clashed with Chiang over the retreat of Chinese troops from a battle with the Japanese over one 
of the major supply lines through Indochina that would allow whichever army controlling it to 
transport materiel and personnel to the front lines. 
Stilwell wanted the Chinese to stand and fight, despite being outnumbered, while Chiang 
thought retreat was the wiser course of action. The issue was the first major disagreement 
between Stilwell and the Generalissimo. According to Mitter, it “set the tone, only a few months 
into the global war, for a shared Western understanding of the Chinese war effort. Western 
officers (primarily Americans, and Stilwell above all) were seen as making an ever more futile 
effort to motivate China to fight—against the wishes of a corrupt and unwilling leader, Chiang 
Kai-shek. Chiang understood this very well.”114 Concerned about the lack of progress the U.S. 
CBI mission was making in training and motivating the Chinese troops, Davies wrote a detailed 
report on his observations in China and dispatched back to colleagues at the State Department in 
1943. He wrote, “It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that all he [Stilwell] has to do to 
make China an aggressive factor in the war against Japan is to place lend-lease arms in Chinese 
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hands and in consultation with the Generalissimo issue orders for the attack.” In fact, Davies 
explained, Stilwell’s only options were to “argue, plead and bargain” with the Generalissimo.115 
In a remarkable example of the downsides to his personalized approach to diplomacy, 
Roosevelt initially trusted his own impressions and conversations with Chiang and his family 
over the opinions of his advisors and subordinates, even if the latter had extensive expertise on 
the issues. Roosevelt learned of Stilwell’s carrot-and-stick approach to dealing with Chiang and 
became angry. According to Davies, the president informed Marshall in 1943 that when it came 
to working with Chiang, “stern bargaining was “exactly the wrong approach in dealing with 
Generalissimo Chiang.” This was because, being a Chinese, the Gimo could not be expected “to 
use the same methods that we do.” Davies and other “China hands” at the time bristled at this 
perception because, as Davies explained, “The fact of the matter, of course, was that being a 
Chinese, Chiang was from childhood habituated to bargaining—and maintained himself in such 
power as he possessed domestically through bargaining.”116 When it came to motivating Chiang, 
Stilwell’s options were limited. 
Meanwhile, as the war intensified, U.S. officials were recognizing the inadequacy of the 
intelligence they were receiving. U.S. officials tasked with intelligence collection in China felt 
pressure to rectify the problem quickly not only because the information was essential to fighting 
the Pacific War but also because the organization that successfully collected actionable 
intelligence in China would have an edge over all the rest in the ongoing competition over 
intelligence responsibilities, resources and staff in Washington DC.  
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Donovan’s early operations in China suffered from several key problems that made it 
difficult for COI operations to achieve their aims. First, Donovan faced difficulties recruiting a 
solid staff of Americans who had deep expertise on China but who were not already part of other 
government agencies. In European operations, American scholars of European history and 
culture had served an important role in advising the plans for intelligence activity and in 
processing and analyzing the information collected. As Yu noted, “In the case of China, 
however, there was no developed scholarship sophisticated enough to forge an integrated and 
holistic strategic evaluation for Donovan’s agency.”117 Second, philosophically, Donovan and 
Roosevelt had imagined the COI to base its norms and procedures on the British example. This 
approach had negative effects in China, where British intelligence officers were having 
extremely limited success penetrating the fog of Chinese politics and the British were disliked 
and distrusted by Chiang Kai-shek and the rest of the deeply anti-imperialist-leaning Nationalist 
Party. Modeling their tactics upon British intelligence methods and teaming up with British 
intelligence officers in China was a mistake for Donovan’s personnel.118 Indeed, in 1942, 
Nationalist Party intelligence director Tai Li had expelled all British intelligence officers from 
China upon learning that they were coordinating elaborate intelligence operations within China 
without his knowledge or consent. 
After learning of several attempts by OSS officers to follow in the British footsteps and 
organize intelligence operations completely independently of their Chinese hosts, Tai Li firmly 
required an agreement from the United States to share plans and responsibilities for intelligence 
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operations in China. Via formal treaty signed in July 1943, Roosevelt and Chiang negotiated the 
creation of the Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization, known as SACO. 
The SACO Treaty between the U.S. and Chinese governments, prevented intelligence collection 
by U.S. officials in China without the awareness and express permission of Chiang Kai-shek. 
This agreement restrained the ability of most U.S. government agencies, particularly the OSS, to 
collect the information needed to inform strategy for defeating Japan in China.  
The treaty terms specified that an American military official would be appointed 
coordinate intelligence efforts in the East Asian region. Stilwell, who viewed the SACO 
document as limiting the opportunities for the United States to achieve its goals in China, 
strategically ceded the appointed position to OSS and ONI. Admiral Milton Miles, a Naval 
Academy graduate who had a China background from his service patrolling the Yangtze River 
from 1922-1927, assumed the role of intelligence coordinator for SACO. Miles worked closely 
with Tai Li to implement joint “guerrilla training, espionage, sabotage, and radio interception,” 
with the Chinese supplying “manpower and facilities,” while arms and equipment would come 
from the United States.119  
Recognizing the intrinsic drawbacks to requiring Tai Li’s approval for all intelligence 
work, Donovan and Stilwell attempted to develop legal ways to work around SACO. 
Significantly, Stilwell granted Miles the responsibility for overseeing the actions of OSS in 
China. Miles held deep distrust for U.S. officials who had previous experience in China and 
insisted that these “old China hands” be banned from participating in OSS activities in China and 
SACO. Miles’ opinion on the matter was influential in some circles in Washington DC, almost 
certainly to the detriment of the U.S. intelligence objectives in China at the time. Although many 
                                                                
119 R. Harris Smith, OSS: Secret History, 252. 
 
88 
 
China experts on his staff opposed the SACO agreement, Donovan favored maintaining it 
because he thought it gave his agency a window of opportunity in China that otherwise would be 
closed due to the administrative power of his rival agencies. According to Yu: 
“thanks to the murky command structure set up by Stilwell and Miles, Donovan 
was able to maneuver between SACO and the army for survival and expansion. 
Although OSS would try to break away from Miles’s control, Donovan never 
wanted to leave the SACO structure entirely, for it was a perfect umbrella 
protecting OSS from the army’s encroachment. Yet when SACO became too 
stifling to Donovan, he could easily claim his allegiance to the theater 
commander.”120 
 
Stilwell also found ways to work around SACO and obtain the intelligence he needed 
without Tai Li’s interference. Stilwell typically relied upon John Davies, who Ambassador Gauss 
had loaned to Stilwell’s CBI command staff. Davies was born in China and raised in Chengdu, 
Sichuan. The son of a Baptist missionary who was fluent in several dialects of Chinese and 
educated mostly at American-run schools in China, Davies joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 
1931, where he served various U.S. outposts in China prior to World War II.121 
As the war progressed, it became more difficult for Stilwell and other U.S. officials to 
cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek and effectively implement the elements of the broader U.S. 
Pacific War strategy in the CBI Theater. By 1943 and 1944, American diplomats and attachés in 
Asia were suggesting that friction between the CCP and the Nationalist Party was distracting 
Chinese attention and resources away from the Japanese target. Many U.S. officials believed that 
Chiang hoped to rely on American air power to win the war and was behaving in ways that 
would conserve his own military resources. They claimed that he effectively intended to wait out 
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the end of the war against the Japanese so that he could use his forces and materiel to fight the 
civil war that he felt was inevitable with the CCP over which party would ultimately control 
China.122  
U.S. officials in China reported numerous examples of such thinking to their counterparts 
in Washington. In one example, U.S. Embassy officials reported information that a Nationalist 
Party blockade preventing visitors to Yan’an in the winter of 1943-44 had tied up 400,000 of 
Chiang’s best troops.123 In a telegram sent a few weeks later in January 1944, U.S. Ambassador 
to China Clarence C. Gauss described the problem explicitly: “The presence of Chinese 
Communist forces in north China, whose positions are expanded as the Central Government 
abandons them, constitutes a barrier to Central Government penetration northward; and the 
Chungking [Nationalist] forces are unwilling to use their scanty military resources against the 
Japanese when they feel the Communist problem still exists, many military and civil officials 
stating that the Japanese are the secondary enemy and the Communists the primary one.”124 In 
light of such examples, the U.S. foreign policy advisors observing Nationalist-led conventional 
Chinese forces were reluctantly calling leadership attention to the KMT’s problems maintaining 
political authority. Some became curious about the activities of the CCP guerrillas, who were 
running successful operations against the Japanese, though they were outnumbered and operating 
with almost no resources. 
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The U.S. intelligence gap on the CCP 
Learning about the CCP prior to 1944 was no easy enterprise for U.S. officials in any 
agency prior to the dispatch of the Dixie Mission in 1944. As a result of the Generalissimo’s 
tight blockade around the CCP base area, the Communist lands were “largely a terra incognita” 
for foreigners, according to David Barrett.125 From 1937 to 1944, the U.S. government lacked 
any regular, reliable official contact with the CCP. Foreign Service Officers based in China 
relied mostly on secondhand information they learned from local contacts to inform their 
assessments.126 In the United States before 1945, “when most people thought of China, they 
thought of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, his attractive wife, and the Flying Tigers.”127 Davies 
expressed similar sentiments in correspondence with FDR’s aid Harry Hopkins in 1943: “The 
Generalissimo is probably the only Chinese who shares the popular American misconception that 
Chiang Kai-shek is China.”128 Except for the close circle of experts in the U.S. Departments of 
State and War and the U.S. military who followed China for a living, most American officials in 
the 1930s and 1940s, like most of the American public, found that understanding the intricacies 
of Chinese domestic political conflicts was simply beyond their scope of interest or familiarity. 
Prior to 1943, most U.S. officials either lacked interest in engaging the CCP or found it 
too difficult for several formidable reasons. First, as previously explained, the United States, and 
most of the rest of the world, recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of China. Moreover, the 
CCP was a small party that did not appear to outside observers to present a serious political 
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threat to their Nationalist opponents. Nationalist efforts to combat the CCP had been highly 
effective, particularly in the CCP’s early years, when the Communists attempted to base their 
movement upon strategies that had worked in the Soviet Union, which required fomenting 
rebellion among China’s urban working population. Urban workers were a much smaller fraction 
of the total politicized population of China than Russian urban workers had comprised prior to 
the Soviet revolution. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists had consolidated 
political power in the cities where they were fighting the CCP. By the time the initial CCP 
leaders collectively recognized that their urban strategy was failing, Chiang and the Nationalists 
had decimated the Communist Party and pushed the remainder into small communes in China’s 
southeast. Chiang’s final assault to wipe out the communes in 1935 prompted the famous Long 
March, whereby the remaining CCP members who were sufficiently dedicated to their cause 
moved, often on foot, 6,000 miles to their base area at Yan’an.  
The Americans who were able to interact with the CCP in the 1930s were mostly 
journalists. Shewmaker and others have written about the tendency of American journalists in 
China in the mid-1930s who sought out the CCP to be left-leaning and possessed of a 
romanticized image of the Communist cause, which they then transmitted back to the United 
States in their reporting. This bias had the dual effect of attracting limited curiosity and sympathy 
from American readers and encouraging U.S. officials to avoid taking many of the reports 
seriously. For example, Earl Browder, Anna Louise Strong, and Vincent Sheehan were all 
American journalists who individually visited Chinese Communists—often at great personal 
risk—in the mid-1930s and wrote books about their experiences for American audiences.129 
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Rather than convey descriptive details about the Chinese Communists or their base camp, the 
books by these journalists focused on the nobility of the Chinese Communist cause and how it 
extended the project of the Comintern. The accounts were often sympathetic to the Communists 
to the point of appearing to be propaganda. The lack of any alternate information emerging about 
the CCP to corroborate or contradict the tone of these reports made it easier for many U.S. 
officials to dismiss the CCP’s importance within Chinese domestic politics, thus underestimating 
the implications of partisan conflict for the anti-Japanese war. 
From 1936 to 1938, the CCP maintained a poorly publicized policy of welcoming foreign 
visitors, at least those brave and fortunate enough to evade the Nationalist efforts to isolate the 
CCP base areas. Few foreigners took up the CCP invitation. Among those who visited in that 
period, two people were extremely important for the future of U.S relations with the CCP 
because their reporting began to alert both American officials and the American public to their 
ignorance about Chinese Communism and hinted that learning more about the CCP might prove 
useful to crafting East Asia policy that preserved U.S. interests. The first such visitor to the CCP 
base area, Edgar Snow, was important for producing reporting on the CCP that reached 
mainstream American audiences. Snow and his wife Helen Foster Snow (who published her own 
observations under the pseudonym Nym Wales) visited the CCP’s top leaders beginning in 1936. 
Many Americans learned for the first time about Chinese Communism by seeing Snow’s photo-
essays in Life magazine.130 Snow followed the magazine articles a few months later with the 
publication of his book, Red Star Over China, which describes his conversations with Mao 
Zedong.  
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Red Star Over China appeared only a short time after the dramatic events in Nanjing took 
place in December 1937, when American public interest in China’s political situation was 
gradually increasing. In the book, as he did in the Life articles, Snow portrays the CCP leaders as 
brave and committed nationalists, willing to endure tremendous personal strain on behalf of their 
country but who also happened to adhere to socialist ideology. Consider the following quote 
Snow collected, which he attributed to Mao: 
“For a people being deprived of its national freedom, the revolutionary task is not 
immediate Socialism, but the struggle for independence. We cannot even discuss 
Communism if we are robbed of a country in which to practice it.”131  
 
Comments such as this appealed to American values and willingness to root for those 
who they perceived to be underdogs. Although the sympathetic impulse would not last, Snow’s 
work gave many Americans a positive first impression of the Chinese Communist movement. 
The work of Snow and other journalists had broad public exposure and probably helped shape 
the first impressions of many U.S. government bureaucrats regarding the CCP. However, 
journalism was no substitute for actual intelligence reporting. Intelligence reporting on the CCP 
in the late 1930s was rare and subject to the same decentralized and informal procedural norms 
as all U.S. strategic intelligence at the time.  
In the absence of a more formalized process for intelligence dissemination, one of 
Roosevelt’s main sources of information on the CCP was Evans Fordyce Carlson, a U.S. Marine 
who had visited Yan’an in the late 1930s. He received much less popular attention than Snow, 
but his reports of meetings with CCP members found an influential audience within the U.S. 
government and the White House. Carlson was a U.S. Marine who served as a language and 
intelligence officer in Shanghai in the mid-1930s, and he became the first American military 
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observer to study the CCP’s Red Army in 1937.132 Inspired by reading a manuscript version of 
Red Star Over China, Carlson became interested in visiting the Red Army leaders to learn about 
how the Japanese were defending against the CCP’s guerrilla war tactics.133 Carlson negotiated 
with Mao, Chiang, and the U.S. government to make the visit happen, and he arrived in Shaanxi 
in November 1937. 
Carlson was a charismatic, scholarly, and very religious person who identified with the 
egalitarian aspects of the socialist ideology explained to him by the CCP leaders he met. He 
found his CCP hosts to be cordial, and he soon became friends with General Zhu De, the 
commander in chief of the Red Army. The CCP made an extremely positive impression on 
Carlson and he conveyed his praise in many detailed reports about what he observed and learned 
during his visit that he transmitted back to audiences in the U.S. government and later published 
them in various media. 
Rather than reaching the White House, Carlson’s observations might have easily fallen in 
the morass of U.S. government documents streaming into the Washington bureaucracies if it 
were not for one serendipitous fact: Carlson had served for a brief time in 1935 as second-in-
command of President Roosevelt’s military guard at Warm Springs, Georgia.134 Roosevelt took 
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an interest in Carlson’s China experiences. Prior to Carlson’s departure for China in July 1937, 
he met with Roosevelt, and the President requested that Carlson personally write him to inform 
him about Carlson’s observations of the CCP; Roosevelt also asked that the correspondence be 
kept confidential, which it was.135 Roosevelt apparently read the letters closely and used them to 
inform his own impressions of Chinese domestic politics.136 It is impossible to know for sure, but 
Carlson’s positive portrayal of the CCP appears to have influenced Roosevelt’s receptivity to the 
idea of the Dixie Mission when his advisors began proposing it in 1943. 
After Carlson’s visit to Yan’an, U.S. government officials had only brief and sporadic 
visits with CCP officials, and few desired increased contact until the CBI Campaign was 
underway. At that point, determined to deepen American understanding of China’s domestic 
political landscape as a means of furthering the U.S. strategy against Japan, U.S. officials in 
China such as John Davies became more interested in making contact with the CCP in 1942 and 
1943. By this time, several of the factors that had prevented the U.S. from seeking more regular 
contact with and information about the CCP had changed. U.S. officials became aware that CCP 
guerrilla units deep in China were having success defeating Japanese units and seriously 
disrupting Japanese supply chains whereas many of the Nationalist-led conventional and 
guerrilla military engagements were less successful. As John Service noted, “whether one liked 
the Communists or not they were doing a better job than the Kuomintang.”137 For U.S. officials, 
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successfully defeating Japan took top priority and superseded their misgivings about Chinese 
Communist ideology and the CCP’s ultimate political goals for China. Learning more about the 
CCP and the Communist leaders’ intentions also was becoming essential to understanding 
Chiang Kai-shek’s behavior and priorities. 
A contingent of officials within the U.S. Embassy began advocating sending staff to 
Yan’an. Although many of the “China hands” supported the idea, counterparts in Washington, 
particularly those with little expertise on China, opposed any American engagement with 
Communists.138 According to Barrett, “What deeply concerned Americans was the feeling that 
China’s effort, and the war effort in general, would benefit if all of China’s strength could be 
directed against the Japanese, instead of a part of it being devoted to containing, and sometimes 
fighting, the Chinese Communists.”139 The first memo to General Donovan suggesting that a 
U.S. mission to the CCP base area would be helpful was written by Foreign Service officer John 
Service in January 1943. In his memo, Service suggested that the United States send one or two 
Foreign Service officers with expertise on China to “combine moderately long-term residence at 
Yenan or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area.”140 Distracted by the 
Casablanca Conference and dubious of Service’s recommendation, Washington officials ignored 
the memo. 
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Embassy staff sent several similar memos throughout 1943 and into early 1944 and 
almost all of them received no response.141 Finally, in early 1944, one memo stirred action. 
Davies, who served as a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in China starting in February 1942, 
and who worked as political advisor to Stilwell at that time, also became a particularly strong 
advocate of the need for U.S. officials to begin collecting their own intelligence about the 
Chinese Communists. In December 1943, Davies wrote a memo to Stilwell and the Department 
of State identifying several reasons for U.S. observers to visit Yan’an.142 Davies’s memo 
reminded his superiors that Carlson was the only U.S. official to visit the CCP base, but the 
Communists had extended an open invitation to American observers. However, Davies 
anticipated the invitation could expire, particularly if the CCP’s lack of contact with the United 
States led them to become more dependent on the Soviet Union. Recognizing that most U.S. 
intelligence on the CCP was second-hand or worse, Davies then wrote: 
“In Communist China there is: (1) a base of military operations in an near Japan’s 
largest military concentration and second largest industrial base, (2) perhaps the 
most abundant supply of intelligence on the Japanese enemy available to us 
anywhere, (3) the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese 
regime in China, (4) the greatest single challenge in China to the Chiang Kai-shek 
government, (5) the area which Russia will enter if it attacks Japan, and (6) the 
foundation for a rapprochement between a new China and the Soviet Union.”143  
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On this basis, he advocated that the U.S. government negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek to send a 
group of American military and political observers to meet the Chinese Communists at Yan’an 
and report back regarding their capabilities. 
According to Davies’s posthumous memoir, he deliberately kept his January 1944 memo 
brief so that it could easily be shown to President Roosevelt.144 He also attached a draft of 
correspondence that he recommended the White House send directly to Chiang Kai-shek. This 
approach finally penetrated the Washington foreign policy bureaucracy. Roosevelt did see 
Davies’ memo and within days he set in motion negotiations with a very reluctant Chiang Kai-
shek to allow the American observers’ visit. Chiang Kai-shek, who strongly opposed U.S. 
contact with his CCP opponents, prevented the mission by withholding his approval of the 
required personnel transfers that would have to occur in China. It would take several more 
months before Chiang agreed (or, as Davies put it, consent “was extracted” from Chiang during 
the visit of U.S. Vice President Wallace to China in June and July 1944, where he and Chiang 
met face-to-face).145 According to OSS official Charles Stelle who was one of the first 
participants in the U.S. Army Observers Mission to Yan’an, FDR sent a letter for Chiang that 
Wallace hand delivered, requesting a military mission “in such terms that the Generalissimo 
found it impolite to refuse.”146 By late July 1944, the first members of the U.S. Army Observers 
Mission were on their way to Yan’an. 
The summer of 1944 marked a turning point in the U.S. engagement in China for several 
reasons. The summer began as the tide was turning in the war in Europe, opening the door for the 
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president and U.S. policymakers in Washington to begin focusing more on the Pacific War. 
Meanwhile, U.S. officials who had been focused on China and the CBI Theater since the Pearl 
Harbor attacks were becoming frustrated. Officials such as U.S. Ambassador to China Clarence 
Gauss, General Stilwell, and John Davies recognized that their plans and strategies were failing 
and they lacked the necessary intelligence to determine and implement policy adjustments that 
might alter the outcomes of their actions. Reforms to U.S. intelligence practices designed to help 
the war effort, particularly the creation of the OSS and its early missions, had proven successful 
in Europe but had been embarrassing failures in China. Admitting the intelligence gap on the 
Chinese Communist efforts was an essential first step toward recalculating how China could 
effectively fit in with U.S. plans to defeat the Japanese in Asia, but the question remained 
whether the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy in 1944 could adapt to fill the gap in time. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Struggling to gain a foothold under the best circumstances 
 
“We are mighty glad to be here, at last” — First words of U.S. Army Colonel 
David D. Barrett to Chinese Communist leaders gathered to greet the first U.S. 
plane to arrive in Yan’an, China in 1944.1 
 
It was not a long flight from the U.S. airbase in Xi’an, where the Americans briefly 
stopped, north to Yan’an, the town in Shaanxi Province’s dusty loess hills where the leaders of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had established their headquarters. Prior to the afternoon of 
July 22, 1944, however, no U.S. military plane had ever made the trip, and the route put the 
Army Air Force C-47 and its escort of three smaller fighter planes at risk of attack by Japanese 
enemies.2 As the plane approached its destination, pilot Captain Jack Champion carefully 
scanned the arid landscape for landmarks to guide the plane to the rudimentary airfield the 
Standard Oil Company had left behind before the CCP had completed its Long March and 
adopted the area as its base in the 1930s.  
Champion soon caught a clear view of the prominent pagoda that stood on a hilltop near 
the airfield. Far below, a crowd had gathered to welcome the plane. Without a control tower to 
assist the plane in landing, bystanders signaled to Champion where to land. All ten passengers 
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aboard the C-47 had fastened their seat belts. It was too late to back out now. Once on the 
ground, those on board the plane would be the first American officials to stay at the CCP base. 
Champion had directed his passengers to don parachutes in case the Japanese forces knew of 
their flight plan and intended to shoot them down. 
The C-47’s landing gear touched down on the dusty ground. After a perfect landing, the 
plane was in the process of rolling to a stop when the passengers felt it lurch sharply to the left. 
They immediately heard an extremely loud blow, like a sledgehammer, to the outside of the 
pilot’s cockpit.  
The Americans scrambled out of the plane to discover that the landing gear on the plane’s 
left side had fallen into a cavity that ultimately proved to be an old grave. Captain Champion had 
not expected to find such an unusual obstacle located on a space used as an airfield, and it had 
been hidden from view before impact. The wheel’s collapse into the hollow grave had caused a 
propeller to hit the ground hard and bend back, slicing up through the skin of the plane’s fuselage 
and causing the loud sound the group had heard. The incoming propeller had gashed the pilot’s 
arm and narrowly missed injuring him more seriously—potentially fatally. The CCP’s honor 
guard, assembled to greet the American guests, stared in stunned silence as the first members of 
the controversial U.S. Army Observer Group, referred to by the Americans informally as the 
“Dixie Mission” because it operated in rebel territory, surveyed the damage to their only means 
of transportation home.  
Under other circumstances, an arrival with one wheel in a grave might have appeared 
inauspicious—a bad omen for the start of a diplomatic relationship. However, the permutations 
of war and politics that had led these Americans and their Chinese hosts to meet had evidently 
hardened them to such trivial impressions, and once all parties were declared safe and relatively 
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uninjured, the incident caused only mild embarrassment on both sides. This inelegant beginning 
to the official relationship between U.S. government personnel and CCP leaders could serve as a 
metaphor for the tone of relations between the individual American observers and their CCP 
hosts that persisted for the first few months of the Dixie Mission as both sides attempted to form 
a cordial and productive relationship in the face of a variety of negative external influences that 
seemed to be trying to prevent it. Despite the positive and resigned attitude of the highly capable 
participants on both sides, the results of the Observer Group’s initial weeks in Yan’an reveal that 
even the best efforts of the highly-qualified original Dixie participants were insufficient to 
achieve the group’s goals. Extremely difficult operating conditions in the Yan’an area coupled 
with the consequences of the general immaturity of U.S. intelligence collection practices 
impeded the collection and dissemination of timely intelligence information from the time the 
American officials arrived in Yan’an.  
The Dixie Mission enjoyed its best possible chances for fulfilling its intelligence 
collection requirements in the period from its arrival in July to around the time that General 
Joseph Stilwell was recalled from China in October 1944. In this initial period, the Mission 
enjoyed several advantages that did not last through the years that the U.S. government 
maintained a presence in Yan’an.3 First, an interagency network of dedicated individuals within 
the government, including General Stilwell and John Davies, had lobbied for the creation of the 
observer group in Yan’an and continued to support it and participate in it. The network of 
Americans initially assigned to the Dixie Mission included several individuals who had close 
personal relationships that preceded the mission, sometimes by decades, and enhanced their 
willingness to bridge institutional gaps when they became obstacles. Moreover, the composition 
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of the Dixie Mission was unique because it combined civilian and military officials from 
different organizations tasked with intelligence-related duties.  
Second, the personnel originally dispatched to staff the Dixie Mission had considerable 
linguistic and cultural expertise about China, as did a few of their colleagues based in the U.S. 
Embassy in China, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater headquarters offices in Asia, and 
executive branch offices in Washington D.C. who served both as managers of the Dixie Mission 
intelligence collection process and consumers of its results.4 In addition to helping establish their 
credibility with their Chinese Communist Party hosts, the collective expertise of the first Dixie 
participants gave them an advantage in quickly ascertaining the situation of the CCP, 
corroborating their observations, and attempting to explain their findings to their audience of 
U.S. policymakers and military leadership.  
Third, the importance of the war mission fostered incentives for cooperation between the 
CCP and the U.S. officials as well as between officials from U.S. agencies that normally had 
incentives to compete. The shared strategic goal of defeating the Japanese and ending the 
Japanese occupation of China also gave the United States government and Chinese Communist 
Party common ground and deemphasized their substantial ideological differences. Finally, the 
CCP leadership genuinely appreciated the recognition and maintained an open, optimistic 
attitude about U.S.-China relations at the time. Over the term of the mission, each of these 
advantages either disappeared or severely deteriorated. 
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Despite their advantages, the first Dixie Mission participants found progress to be 
painstakingly slow and wracked with administrative and physical challenges that they could not 
entirely overcome. Difficult living conditions at Yan’an and bad weather stalled momentum on 
initial operations. Geographic and logistical concerns due to Yan’an’s remote location slowed 
communications on which field intelligence collectors typically rely, and the delays significantly 
affected the Americans’ success with intelligence operations. The extent to which interagency 
communications within the U.S. government and practices for the collection and dissemination 
of foreign intelligence lacked maturity compounded the Dixie Mission’s early challenges.  
The historical record for the first months of the Dixie Mission reveals a variety of 
attempts by U.S. personnel to collaborate with each other and their CCP hosts to create novel 
approaches to intelligence collection and embrace the most updated technological means of 
intelligence collection possible at the time despite their remote locale and challenging conditions. 
The Dixie Mission’s original members labored under the pressure of several competing 
priorities. First, they had a mandate to appease their various managers, who were intent on 
carving out jurisdiction for their respective organizations in the developing U.S. intelligence 
community. They also needed to make progress on the missions assigned to them by their 
sponsoring organizations, which was necessary for their individual future career prospects. 
Finally, maintaining cordial and collegial relationships with each other was essential both for 
making progress on the larger mission of the U.S. government in China and as a matter of 
survival in their situation far from American support and supply chains. Based on the initial 
Dixie Mission participants’ field reports and later writings, several interagency squabbles carried 
over from their respective organizations emerged among the initial Dixie Mission participants in 
their early weeks in Yan’an. The conflicts were not necessarily universal, permanent, or 
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personal, and many of the men appear to have bonded over the difficulty of their objectives and 
the remote conditions in which they lived.5  
Dixie Mission participants encountered some of the most overwhelming challenges to 
their progress when they began to present plans to and request resources from U.S. counterparts 
beyond Yan’an. By the end of the Mission’s first few weeks, the feasibility of Dixie’s assigned 
tasks came into sharper focus. Reports describe Dixie’s OSS and military intelligence officers 
gathering what intelligence they could about both the Japanese and the CCP leaders, establishing 
a radio base, learning about guerrilla paramilitary operations, collecting and disseminating 
weather information when their radio capabilities permitted, and assisting downed allied airmen 
in China. Similarly, the Mission’s political officers began churning out reports about the 
substance of their conversations with CCP leaders. The early reports reflected optimism about 
the opportunities to complete the Dixie Mission’s assigned tasks and assessment of the great 
potential for intelligence collection the area holds for U.S. officers, but the enthusiasm waned as 
the officers in the field began to receive responses and contradictory guidance from 
headquarters-based American counterparts and superiors.  
Translating initial orders into action 
As events leading up to the creation of the American Observer Group in Yan’an reveal, 
the United States entered an alliance with China during World War II reluctantly and with 
considerable naiveté about key aspects of Chinese domestic politics. The creation of the Dixie 
Mission responded to a growing dissatisfaction among U.S. officials involved in U.S.-China 
relations during the war with their relationship with their primary counterpart, Generalissimo 
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Chiang Kai-shek. Chief among these officials were General Joseph Stilwell and his close aides, 
such as loaned Foreign Service officer John Paton Davies, who often receives credit for 
designing the Dixie Mission and lobbying for its establishment despite vehement opposition 
from U.S. allies in Chiang’s Chinese government.6 Based on U.S. concerns about the lack of 
detailed knowledge about the capabilities of troops fighting the Japanese in Communist-held 
areas in north China, the most important goal of the mission to Yan’an was to determine the 
appropriate role—if any—for the CCP in the collective Allied plan to defeat the Japanese. 
Nonetheless, official documents are fairly ambiguous about how Dixie personnel were expected 
to accomplish their aims.  
Initial Dixie Mission Commanding Officer Colonel David D. Barrett received orders 
dated July 21, 1944 in the form of a laundry list of intelligence topics that bureaucrats and 
policymakers expected Barrett and his mission to collect. The list included the enemy order of 
battle for land and air; information on the “strength, composition, disposition, equipment, 
training and combat efficiency of the Communist forces”; utilization and expansion of 
Communist intelligence organizations in enemy and occupied territory; a complete directory of 
Communist officials; locations of enemy air fields and air defense in North China as well as 
maps displaying the current areas under Communist control; target and weather intelligence; 
information about bomb damage; economic intelligence; naval intelligence (although Yan’an 
was nowhere near an ocean); and an assessment of both the potential contribution of the 
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Communists to the war effort. The orders specified that Barrett should determine the “most 
effective means of assisting the Communists to increase the value of their war effort.”7 
Information about the Chinese Communists themselves would be considered strategic 
foreign intelligence reporting to the policymakers who comprised the Dixie Mission’s audience 
within the U.S. bureaucracy, and such information was intended to be gathered fairly overtly by 
the participants of the Dixie Mission who were living in the Communist headquarters area, 
traveling to CCP base areas, interviewing CCP leaders, and observing CCP missions.8 One other 
motive behind the Dixie Mission not mentioned in the orders was tapping into the CCP’s 
intelligence on Chiang Kai-shek’s forces. U.S. military leaders tasked with planning war efforts 
in cooperation with Chinese troops reportedly found it extremely difficult to obtain information 
on troop strength of the Chinese forces from their supposed ally, Chiang Kai-shek. The OSS, in 
particular, sought contact with the CCP in hope of negotiating some intelligence sharing 
opportunities that could provide the U.S. generals with the information on Chiang’s troops that 
they desired.9 
As a forward-deployed, interagency intelligence mission, the U.S. Army Observer 
Mission in Yan’an (the official name for the Dixie Mission) was among the first of its kind that 
the U.S. government established. The Dixie Mission followed a pattern similar to other 
                                                                
7 Order of battle is a term commonly used by military leaders, intelligence officers, and policymakers to refer to the 
organization, structure, and strength of a military force. Depending on the military force being analyzed, order of 
battle may include information such as leadership hierarchies, troop counts, base locations, and details about the 
quantity and capability of weapons. 
 
8 Covert intelligence operations are those for which the sponsoring party can plausibly deny its involvement. 
Clandestine operations are those that are kept secret. Overt intelligence activities typically involve overseas liaison 
relationships between representatives of government agencies with responsibility for national security, such as 
military attachés and diplomats, who use their positions at embassies and consulates to meet with foreign 
counterparts and collect information that may not be available outside the host country. 
 
9 Yu, OSS in China, 158. 
 
108 
 
American liaison groups that the U.S. Army Ground Forces positioned throughout China in the 
early 1940s. The groups were a response to American foreign policy in China, particularly prior 
to 1941, which focused on supporting Chinese resistance of Japanese aggression without 
deploying large numbers of American troops to perform combat missions. Colonel Henry M. 
Spengler published an article in Military Review in 1947 meant to educate broader military 
audiences about American actions in China so lessons learned could be applied in future wars.10 
According to Spengler, American military leaders and policymakers determined that the Chinese 
Army needed to receive support in the form of American military equipment, which required 
American personnel on hand in China “so that training (particularly in American weapons), and 
combat and logistic operations might be continuously supervised and observed, and advice given 
to the [Chinese] unit commanders.”11 American military personnel were available in China only 
to act as advisors. As a rule, the groups were comprised of approximately 25 American officers 
and soldiers, including a commanding officer, representatives from various relevant military 
divisions, a group medical officer, clerks, and radio operators. The Dixie Mission mirrored the 
composition of such Army observer groups in China; however, in addition to including 
representatives from relevant divisions of the U.S. Army, such as the Army Air Corps Weather 
division and Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS), it also included representatives of American 
intelligence organizations, such as undercover OSS personnel. 
The design and marketing of the Dixie Mission as a type of U.S. Army liaison mission 
with which the Nationalist-dominated Chinese bureaucracy of 1944 was familiar did not render it 
more palatable to Chiang Kai-shek or his intelligence chief Tai Li. The latter served as head 
                                                                
10 The United States Army frequently applied the model in early Cold War engagements, particularly in Vietnam. 
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administrator of the SACO joint intelligence agreement between the United States and China 
regarding America’s wartime intelligence activities in China, which resisted all contact between 
American intelligence personnel and Chinese Communist leaders and guerillas. Establishing the 
Dixie Mission under Army auspices and following the model of other liaison missions that had 
supported Chinese Army efforts and provided aid in the form of equipment and expertise 
probably appeared to Chiang as though Stilwell was thumbing his nose at the SACO agreement. 
Such behavior would have been consistent with Stilwell’s stubborn personality and the fact that 
Army rivals from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and OSS’s Donovan had negotiated 
SACO. Moreover, the Nationalist leaders were loath to see American support, in the form of 
even the smallest recognition let alone equipment or funding, directed toward their Communist 
foes. However, given the direct intervention of President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace 
in insisting that Chiang allow the mission to Yan’an to proceed, Chiang had little leeway to 
balk.12 Establishing the Dixie Mission under Army auspices may have allowed the Chinese 
government to save face publicly by obscuring the mission’s intelligence purposes and 
deemphasizing the degree to which the mission served to circumvent the SACO agreement, 
though it is highly likely that Chiang and Tai Li had full awareness of U.S. plans and actions at 
Yan’an through their own extremely capable intelligence practices.  
Similar to many subsequent U.S. field intelligence operations, the Dixie Mission was 
designed to perform a variety of operational activities in order to achieve its intelligence-
gathering goals. Early Dixie participants pursued various activities considered the staples of 
overt intelligence collection: observing and talking with CCP leaders; gathering foreign language 
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newspapers, pamphlets, and propaganda; debriefing captured Japanese soldiers; and examining 
and copying documentary materials that the CCP had seized from the Japanese. In addition to 
operations surrounding the physical collection of intelligence that comprised Dixie’s core goal, 
the group members anticipated the need to increase technical capabilities in the CCP areas to 
enable the extraction and dissemination of intelligence information after it was collected. For 
example, the first Dixie participants were required to assess existing CCP radio capabilities, 
determine what equipment was needed, procure and install the equipment, and train either 
American or Chinese personnel (or both) to operate the new equipment. The Dixie Mission 
would also perform such strategic activities as helping to support and debrief Allied pilots who 
had been shot down in China and rescued by the CCP and assisting the CCP with developing 
propaganda aimed at the Japanese. Those who conceptualized the Dixie Mission also expected 
Yan’an to become an important outpost for gathering and disseminating weather information on 
such issues as cloud cover, temperatures and barometer readings that influenced the planning of 
military operations in China, from aerial bombing and target scouting in areas occupied by Japan 
to logistical missions designed to move personnel, supplies, or communications throughout the 
theater of battle.13  
Expert personnel assembled for the Dixie Mission 
Problems the Dixie Mission encountered completing their orders from July to October 
1944 rarely reflected a lack of skilled staff. On the contrary, the U.S. personnel who comprised 
the initial participants in the Dixie Mission boasted the most expertise on Chinese culture, 
language, politics, and history of any Americans who cycled through the Mission’s staff during 
                                                                
13 For further details on the strategic significance of weather information from China for the long-term planning of 
attacks during World War II, see Yu, OSS in China, 53. 
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the three years that it was operational in Yan’an. Many of them also had experience in military 
and political intelligence roles in field conditions in China. Rather than partisan politics and 
ideological concerns about Communism affecting staffing decisions as occurred in the later 
months of the mission, Davies and Stilwell selected the U.S. personnel initially posted to Yan’an 
based on their language ability and level of understanding of China in addition to their functional 
skills as intelligence collectors. Considered by many to be a “China hand” himself, General 
Stilwell had placed a high value on area expertise, particularly for intelligence officers serving in 
the China theater.14  
Many officials who met this qualification had already worked with Stilwell in China 
during the war or prior to it—a reality that reflects both the small number of American officials 
working on China in the 1930s and 1940s and Stilwell’s tendency to sponsor a cohort of capable 
protégés serving as his subordinates. Many had previously worked with each other, sometimes 
for many years. As such, the group included a small collection of dedicated and professional 
“China hands” (as they were known by others in the government) who formed credible contacts 
for CCP leaders. By selecting officials for Yan’an who did not require Chinese translators, CBI 
Theater commanders also sought to avoid the need for Chiang Kai-shek’s “liaison officers” to 
accompany the mission as translators. Their initial communications convey an eagerness and 
earnestness of purpose that did not persist within the mission as it progressed beyond 1945.  
As in other military outposts, particularly those in remote areas such as Yan’an, Dixie’s 
American personnel answered to a commanding officer, a U.S. Army officer who served as head 
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of the mission. The Dixie Mission’s commanding officer was typically a colonel with a career 
background in the G-2 or elsewhere in the Army General Staff. The commanding officer set the 
tone for the unit. He held responsibility for approving all major operational plans that affected 
Dixie personnel and the overall objectives of the mission. He was also responsible for 
implementing the standard operating procedures and basic rules of the unit as well as assigning 
certain basic responsibilities and dispersing certain resources among the personnel. For example, 
the commanding officer and his staff would determine housing assignments and how office 
space and operational equipment would be used.  
The officer chosen as the Dixie Mission’s first commander, Army Colonel Barrett, had 
the right combination of language ability, credibility with Chinese counterparts, and the right 
connections and credentials within Army intelligence channels, particularly with Stilwell. Barrett 
was 52 years old when he arrived in Yan’an to head the observer mission in 1944, and the 
majority of his 27-year career in the U.S. Army up to that point had been spent in China.15 
Barrett had served in the attaché’s office in the U.S. Embassy in China throughout the 1930s. He 
had first served under Stilwell in Tianjin at the headquarters of the 15th Infantry Regiment where 
George Marshall, then a Lt. Colonel was the executive officer.16 After officer training in 
Georgia, Barrett served in Tianjin as the regimental intelligence staff officer (S-2) for the 15th 
from 1931-1934.17  
Barrett’s career progression was somewhat unique compared to other army attachés and 
intelligence officers in the 1930s. Unlike Stilwell, Marshall, and many of their peers, Barrett’s 
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path to the officer role did not begin at West Point. He left a position teaching high school in his 
home state of Colorado to join the Army during World War I.18 Throughout the 1930s, Barrett 
was a part of the group of close-knit American experts on China who worked in the U.S. 
government either as military officials or diplomats. These individuals had been responsible for 
most intelligence collection on China and some policy advising prior to World War II as well as 
the establishment of the OSS.  
Barrett’s experience in Tianjin began a career-long connection with both China and 
Stilwell for Barrett, who served again under Vinegar Joe as deputy attaché in Beijing during the 
Japanese invasion of China.19 In that position, Barrett became well known among elite China 
watchers in the West for his role in observing and documenting the Marco Polo Bridge incident, 
in which violence between Japan and China sharply escalated outside Beijing on July 7, 1937.20 
He officially became U.S. attaché to China in 1942 and served in that capacity until fall 1943. By 
then, Barrett’s former boss Stilwell had a much more important role as head of the American 
military command in China. 
Consistent with the G-2’s basic initial criteria for Dixie Mission personnel, Barrett was 
fluent in Chinese, which he learned when he joined the army. Both Barrett and Stilwell had 
learned Chinese in the Military Intelligence Division training program. Barrett started studying 
in Beijing in 1924, so he had accrued two decades of experience and practice with the language 
                                                                
18 E.J. Kahn, Jr. The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 
1975), 75. 
 
19 Future general Maxwell Taylor also served as junior officer (while a captain) in the U.S. attaché’s office with 
Barrett, where he reportedly enjoyed a good working relationship with Stilwell and earned his superior’s respect. 
Hart, The Making of an Army “Old China Hand,” 22. 
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by the time he relocated to Yan’an to head the Dixie Mission.21 When asked about the value of 
learning Chinese for his career, Barrett once said “no man can study the Chinese language and 
learn it…without at the same time coming to understand the Chinese.”22 Barrett had learned 
Chinese from Manchu elites who had relocated to northern California after the Chinese 
revolution and sought work as language tutors. The tutors used Chinese literary and strategic 
classics to teach Barrett, exposing him to the canon of great Chinese literature and philosophy.  
Throughout his career in China, Barrett’s ability to comprehend these classical Chinese 
materials and recall them in appropriate settings during conversations and correspondence in 
China earned him credibility with and respect from Chinese counterparts, who recognized him as 
a well-educated intellectual. According to John Hart, who wrote a biography of Barrett based on 
extensive interviews and correspondence with his subject, “many years later Chinese who had 
known Barrett would still instantly identify him as ‘that foreigner who could quote from the 
Chinese classics.’”23 The deep understanding of the security issues and politics of China in the 
early decades of the twentieth century that Barrett had cultivated while in frequent contact with 
North China warlords during his work in the attaché’s office added to his credibility with 
Chinese counterparts.24  
Barrett often described feeling a special personal connection to China. He talked about 
hoping that he could become a general and then retire from the Army, spending the rest of his 
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life in China.25 Little in Barrett’s life tied him to living in the United States. Barrett’s American 
wife died in 1939 in Beijing where they were living, and he never remarried.26 Journalist 
Theodore White, who traveled extensively in China in the 1930s and 1940s once described 
Barrett as “the very prototype of a regular Army colonel whose personality was adorned by a 
warm humanity and an overwhelmingly infectious humor.”27 White describes a notable quality 
Barrett possessed that made him particularly valuable to Stilwell as the initial Dixie Mission 
Commanding Officer:  
“The Communists loved him; his round jokes in flawless and fluent Chinese 
destroyed much of their imaginary picture of calculating American imperialism. 
Barrett’s reports on the Communists were honest, hardheaded military 
assessments; a soldier himself, he recognized the Communists as effective 
fighting men; sound allies against a common enemy. They felt his respect and 
reciprocated it.”28  
 
As the commanding officer of a forward-deployed mission, Barrett was the Dixie 
Mission’s ultimate authority in the field, but he answered to a variety of other managers and 
superiors beyond Yan’an. When the Dixie Mission launched in July 1944, Barrett served under 
such officers as Colonel Joseph Dickey, head of the Army’s G-2 contingent at CBI Headquarters 
in Chongqing, and both Barrett and Dickey answered to General Stilwell, the commanding 
officer of the CBI Theater. 
Subordinate to Barrett, the initial roster of the Dixie Mission contained a diverse 
collection of officials from numerous agencies of the American government intended to meet the 
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challenge of satisfying the demands placed on the mission and also because no intelligence 
organization wanted to miss out on the opportunity to have personnel at Yan’an or be forced to 
receive their intelligence second-hand from a rival organization. As of August 1944, the Dixie 
Mission included 18 officials from 5 U.S. government agencies.29 Dixie’s initial personnel were 
mostly military officers. Commanding officer Colonel Barrett represented the Army and, more 
specifically, the G-2 intelligence division of the Army. Other Army personnel present included 
two officers and a non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the Army Air Corps—two infantry 
officers, and an officer from the Army Medical Corps. One navy intelligence officer was also 
part of Dixie’s original contingent.  
The OSS had a fairly significant presence in the initial Dixie Mission personnel with five 
of the first 18 Dixie Mission participants working for OSS under various military covers, 
including the Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS) and Army 
Signal Corps.30 The OSS contingent included Captain Charles Stelle, from the Research and 
Analysis (R&A) branch, and Captain John Colling, from the Secret Intelligence (SI) branch, who 
reportedly arrived “with a big package of R&D toys” to facilitate cutting-edge technical 
collection from the field location.31 The other three OSS officials on the first plane to Yan’an 
were radio operators sent to install and operate sensitive radio equipment and potentially help 
train CCP counterparts on how to work the equipment themselves. OSS officer Major Ray 
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Cromley, who specialized in collecting and analyzing enemy order of battle intelligence, also 
arrived on one of the first several planes to Dixie. 
Civilians who were initially part of the Dixie Mission included John S. Service and 
Raymond P. Ludden, from the State Department, and Japanese-American George I. Nakamura, 
who was appointed by the G-2 to serve as a Japanese language officer, assisting in developing 
the Japanese order of battle, according to Stelle’s detailed reports.32 These men all served under 
Dixie’s commanding officer, but they also answered to the various other organizations that had 
loaned them to the mission.  
Positive first impressions 
Reports of the first interactions between the original Dixie Mission personnel and the 
CCP leadership at Yan’an unanimously describe warm reactions on both sides and some surprise 
on the part of the Americans at the cordial reception they received. Barrett and Service met 
directly with CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, General Zhou Enlai, Chief of Staff of the CCP Army 
(then the 18th Group Army) Ye Jianying, and CCP General Zhu De upon arrival and developed a 
plan for working together to accomplish the Dixie Mission orders. The Americans promised 
training in intelligence practices, the use of sophisticated radio and weather equipment, and 
potentially expanded military support in exchange for CCP cooperation with their efforts.  
The first task of the Dixie personnel was to become acquainted with the CCP. The CCP 
leaders apparently relished providing assistance. On the evening of Dixie’s arrival, the CCP 
leaders hosted the delegation at a dinner and social gathering whose guests included the wives 
and children of the CCP leadership as well as foreign journalists and experts who were visiting 
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Yan’an. Following standard CCP protocol for hosting such dignitaries, the CCP hosts seated 
Barrett between Mao Zedong and General Zhu De.33 As the highest-ranking representative of the 
U.S. diplomatic mission to China, John Service was seated to Mao’s other side. The honor of this 
treatment did not pass unnoticed by the Americans, who had attended many Chinese banquets in 
their careers in China. Service described Mao’s sense of humor being on display at the dinner 
during various personal remarks the CCP leader made to Service over dinner. Service interpreted 
Mao’s attitude toward the Americans as one of genuine enthusiasm, and he recorded Mao’s 
questions about the relationship of the U.S. State Department with the Yan’an mission, 
specifically inquiring if the United States might consider establishing a consulate at Yan’an and 
voicing concern that American recognition of the CCP would end with the war against Japan, 
leaving the CCP vulnerable to Guomindang (GMD) attacks and civil war.34  
The first day of the mission also included more serious meetings. According to the first 
official report Colonel Barrett made after his arrival in Yan’an, the CCP leaders learned for the 
first time of the Dixie Mission’s intention to “investigate the needs of the Communist forces in 
arms and equipment” from Barrett and Service in meetings on the day the Americans arrived. 
Prior correspondence between CCP leaders and their Chinese Army (Nationalist Party) contacts 
had led them to believe the purposes of the mission were exclusively “air-ground aid and the 
collection of enemy intelligence.”35 Although Barrett repeatedly emphasized in early meetings 
with Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying that he could make no definite commitments that any American 
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materiel aid would be supplied, the CCP leaders were reportedly delighted to discover that the 
American observers even intended to submit recommendations on the CCP needs. The CCP 
leaders’ positive response was reflected in a written memorandum to Barrett from CCP General 
Zhu De on July 25, 1944 advising Barrett (and the U.S. government) of the CCP’s intention to 
fully cooperate with the American intelligence efforts in Yan’an and describing his orders to 
subordinates to brief their American counterparts on the relevant subjects on which they were 
already well informed and begin working together to learn about additional areas of strategic 
interest.36 The CCP leaders specifically agreed to work with the Americans on the following 
topics: weather; target analysis; enemy and puppet order of battle; air intelligence; 
communications; medicine and surgery problems; use and expansion of Communist Intelligence 
Net; Air Ground Air Service; naval intelligence and the organization, training, and equipment of 
Communist Chinese forces. No end date for the Dixie Mission had been set, and based on his 
meetings in the first week, Barrett recommended that the delegation remain in Yan’an at least 
through August 1944.37  
In separate communications that occurred in OSS channels, OSS’s Charles Stelle 
confirmed Barrett’s assessment that the Communist leaders appeared extremely eager to answer 
the Americans’ questions. According to Stelle, the CCP leaders’ “efforts to put their best foot 
forward, and our desire to avoid the duplications inherent in numerous individual interviews 
resulted in a somewhat formal and time consuming “indoctrination.” For a period of several 
weeks the major part of our time was taken up by what amounted to a series of lectures, with 
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interpreters, by a succession of Communist leaders.” The Americans heard from such CCP 
dignitaries as the General Ye Jianying and Peng Dehuai, then the vice commander of the CCP 
troops. Representative leaders from various CCP base areas established behind Japanese lines 
each described the history of their area as well as the political, economic, and military challenges 
the each base faced.38  
Although the Americans tended to have different views about how to best work with the 
CCP to achieve their operational goals in Yan’an, often depending on their respective sponsoring 
organizations, separate reports from the initial Dixie crew in this period reveal a broad consensus 
about the CCP capabilities and challenges. Notably, the reports universally express a positive 
view of the CCP activities in the fight against the Japanese and reveal respect—if begrudging—
for the CCP’s unique guerrilla capabilities. Barrett’s first report, submitted a few days after the 
team’s arrival in Yan’an, reflects cautious optimism for the mission based on his positive 
impression of its Chinese hosts. He wrote, “To sum up, both military and civil officials are 
apparently doing everything in their power to cooperate with and assist the section. In this they 
are displaying a degree of initiative and planning ability, which I have never before encountered 
in China. From present indications, the Section should be able to accomplish results 
commensurate with the effort which has been expended in getting it despatched to Yenan.”39  
Initial reports of the various Dixie Mission members also describe satisfaction with their 
verification of information that the CCP initially shared. Stelle declared the CCP leaders to be 
“convincing” and emphasized, “according to all the independent checks we have been able to 
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secure, they avoided exaggeration of their capabilities and accomplishments.”40 OSS officers 
used the opinions of several independent foreign observers of the CCP to corroborate the 
intelligence received from CCP leaders and counterparts. These observers included an American 
pilot who had been shot down in Shanxi province and received aid from the CCP guerrillas. 
Because the pilot had passed through several base areas, he was in a position to verify details 
provided to the Dixie Mission by the CCP regarding base area staff organization and basic 
positions in the countryside. Two other groups of American airmen who were rescued by the 
CCP in other areas were able to confirm, and even extend, the territory held by the CCP 
guerrillas on a map. The Dixie Mission members also conferred regularly with Michael Lindsay, 
a British scholar who moved to Yan’an in 1944 to learn about the CCP and help with China’s 
war efforts against the Japanese.41 Stelle described Lindsay as a “relatively objective observer” 
despite “his long connection with the Communists.”42 The observations of the Dixie Mission 
members were also generally consistent with information from the few other Americans who had 
been operating in rural north China in 1944 and who had been in any position to observe CCP 
actions and report on them to the OSS and G-2 in Chongqing. Stelle and the OSS officers in 
Dixie were sufficiently confident in their corroboration of CCP information to recommend that 
the mission to Yan’an be made a permanent outpost for intelligence collection in China.  
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Progress stymied by physical conditions and bureaucratic snafus  
The first few months of the Dixie Mission emphasize an aspect of intelligence operations 
that historians often find easy to overlook: mundane logistical aspects of field conditions can 
significantly affect progress on intelligence collection. Performing intelligence missions in field 
conditions in World War II, such as those encountered in rural north China in 1944, often 
required personnel to spend considerable time on logistical issues, down to such banal matters as 
acquiring typewriters, carbon paper, and envelopes, which generally had to be flown over the 
Himalayan “Hump” from India to Xi’an and then into Yan’an by the 14th Air Force (under the 
leadership of Claire Chennault, rival and nemesis of Joseph Stilwell).43 Personnel had to dispatch 
any intelligence reports or material produced either via encoded radio transmissions, which were 
often reserved for brief and urgent messages, or physically transport the material to Rear Echelon 
base areas of the CBI leadership via the Hump mission planes before slowly proceeding to 
Washington DC via plane or ship.44  
Living conditions at Yan’an were challenging and put the Americans in close quarters 
with one another. By American standards, Yan’an was not a particularly pleasant place to live. 
Hot in the summer, cold and snowy in the winter, and muddy all spring and fall, Yan’an’s 
climate seemed miserable most of the time.45 The Dixie Mission established its quarters 
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approximately a half-mile from the city in caves dug out of a mud hillside—the most common 
type of housing in the area, where wood was scarce.46 Residents of the caves had no indoor 
plumbing or mechanical heat. Stewards provided potable boiled water in thermal bottles for 
washing and tea, and each cave room had a brazier to hold hot coals for heating, which emitted 
dangerous carbon monoxide fumes from which the Dixie medic, Melvin Casberg, reportedly had 
to rescue Barrett, Service, and Davies more than once. CCP canteens provided simple Chinese 
fare at mealtimes, with dinners followed by watermelon, tea, and cigarettes. American personnel 
posted to the Dixie Mission complained about these conditions regularly in their personal 
correspondence. 
Due to the nature of its forward-deployed field position in a remote area, officers posted 
to the Dixie Mission also assumed a wide variety of responsibilities, including some that their 
typical job duties did not include, such as secretarial and administrative work. The Dixie Mission 
never included women, much to the frustration of Dixie personnel, who had come to rely heavily 
on particular female secretaries and administrative clerks to assist with managing the extensive 
paperwork and specialized filing systems required in intelligence collection. OSS officer Ray 
Cromley sent several impassioned memos to his superiors in 1944 specifically requesting the 
assistance of his favorite female secretary. Cromley’s memo in late July noted that both the Red 
Cross and the British Army had female staff in the field, specifically emphasizing that the British 
secretaries were “of the clinging vine type who are not used to roughing it,” presumably unlike 
more adventurous American women. Cromley declared the lack of female secretaries to be “a 
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matter of saving men’s lives and winning the war more quickly.”47 Cromley’s request reflects 
sentiments shared by several other initial Dixie participants, but CBI and OSS superiors rejected 
all the requests out of a theater-wide rule that had been made forbidding women in areas deemed 
to be dangerous combat zones, which included all of mainland China.48  
OSS officers based at China theater headquarters in Chongqing echoed the concerns of 
Dixie Mission members such as Cromley about the absence of female file clerks and secretaries. 
Joseph Spencer, who served as the main representative for OSS R&A at CBI Headquarters in 
New Delhi in 1944 expressed these sentiments in a cable he sent in November 1944 to William 
Langer, OSS R&A branch chief in Washington. Spencer explained for the record that the “clerk 
problem here in China is very bad,” and that R&A personnel in the field were being pressed into 
service to perform administrative jobs with intelligence processing that were not a typical part of 
their job descriptions. According to Spencer, the extra work kept those officers from focusing on 
their actual jobs, which included such duties as developing and training human assets in the field, 
debriefing field contacts, and writing up reports based on raw intelligence information the field 
base collected through various means.49 Although Spencer was known by colleagues to be a 
pessimist, his outlook for the arrival of the mostly female administrative workforce was 
particularly grim: “I do not look for a full clearance on the problem of women coming to China 
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in the very near future, so long as the Japanese land drive in Kwangsi keeps moving along. There 
is still too much uncertainty in the whole thing.”50  
Spencer’s predictions proved accurate—no female employees of any branch of the U.S. 
government were ever deployed to Dixie, even after the Japanese surrender. The policy remained 
in place not only despite the protests of Dixie’s male officers who needed their administrative 
staffs, but also despite the regular presence at the Yan’an base over the years of numerous female 
foreign correspondents including American journalists Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong, 
not to mention the wives and families of the CCP leadership. It is impossible to tell for certain 
how requiring Dixie personnel, who had no particular clerical expertise, to serve as their own 
secretaries and clerks for the entire three years the mission was operating may have affected the 
amount of information the unit could collect, record, and disseminate, but it is easy to imagine 
that the absence of capable clerical professionals with expertise in intelligence filing systems had 
a negative effect on the Mission’s productivity. 
Dixie’s location had negative effects far beyond the availability of clerical personnel. The 
schedule called for weekly planes ferrying personnel, mail, and supplies, but weather and other 
hazards, some of them bureaucratic, often prevented the planes’ arrival in Yan’an, not only 
impeding the delivery of supplies and official correspondence that enabled Dixie’s intelligence 
activities but also delaying letters to and from home and much appreciated care packages. 
Delayed or canceled flights not only meant the lack of much-needed supplies and personnel but 
also significant interruptions in communications and the flow of intelligence. Most sensitive 
correspondence and collected intelligence, often in the form of captured foreign documents or 
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print media, had to be flown out of Dixie via American planes, particularly prior to the 
installation of sufficient radio equipment for the volume of intelligence activity. Even after the 
Mission improved radio capabilities from Yan’an, U.S. intelligence officials favored hard copy 
materials because it was easier to protect sensitive information in physical form and because a 
much greater volume of intelligence material could be conveyed via documents or microfilm.  
Delays related to disorganization, unprofessionalism, and inefficiency within the U.S. 
government regularly stalled Dixie’s progress. In one important example, correspondence in 
August 1944 between OSS officials based in China and Washington DC describes strained 
relations between the G-2, which ran the Dixie Mission, and the 14th Air Force, based at Xi’an.51 
Friction between General Stilwell, commander of ground troops in China, and the leader of the 
14th Air Force, Claire Chennault, a strong-willed general who curried favor with Chiang Kai-
shek, over the best way for the United States for support China had apparently trickled down to 
influence cooperation between Army and Army Air Force duties. Further complicating matters, 
the OSS officers included in the initial Dixie roster technically served under the administrative 
control of AGFRTS, part of the 14th Air Force, but they also answered to the Commanding 
Officer of Dixie, who was part of the Army’s G-2.52 The 14th Air Force base at Xi’an was a 
necessary stop for the transport of American supplies and people to Yan’an. After the first plane 
to Yan’an in July, Army flights were supposed to travel the route from Xi’an to Yan’an to drop 
off supplies and personnel and pick up correspondence and intelligence documents.53 However, 
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in the face of limited planes and resources available at Xi’an, the Dixie Mission ranked low 
among the 14th Air Force priorities in 1944. For the first few months, the Americans in Yan’an 
consequently suffered numerous repercussions in efficiency.  
Evidence also suggests that even when Dixie reports emerged from the field conditions 
and into the hands of U.S. officials operating out of the China-Burma-India (CBI) headquarters 
offices and the U.S. Embassy in China, the reports still often took considerable time to circulate 
to and around Washington DC, particularly between agencies. For example, despite the high 
interest in Washington in the Dixie Mission and the CCP and despite the fact that the President 
and Vice President themselves had to personally intervene to sponsor the mission, Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull did not receive a copy of Barrett’s initial report—dated July 27, 1944—until 
almost a full month later on August 25.54 Secretary Hull received earlier reporting about 
conditions at Yan’an from State Department personnel including John Service, Ray Ludden, and 
John Davies, but Barrett’s report was particularly important because he served as the 
commanding officer and was responsible for meeting most frequently with the highest CCP 
leaders including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Zhu De. 
Interpersonal conflicts a minor influence 
In such remote conditions, the Americans had incentives to foster cordial relations 
between themselves and with their Chinese hosts. Although individual agencies represented at 
Yan’an each had their own pet projects to pursue, the participants in the mission frequently 
collaborated with each other and with Chinese counterparts. In its first few months, the Dixie 
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Mission experienced personnel clashes and conflicts typical of any group of people in stressful 
conditions and simultaneously engaged in both a common purpose and a competition for limited 
resources. Official records provide only occasional hints at conflicts that arose between 
participants in the initial months of Dixie, and specific references to problems or hard feelings 
rarely surface outside of personal correspondence between Americans formerly stationed at 
Yan’an, sometimes not for years or decades later. Nonetheless, the conflicts recorded or alluded 
to in official reports from Yan’an at the time, personal letters of the participants at the time, and 
memoirs of the participants written later demonstrate that personal conflicts at the beginning of 
the mission were more infrequent than might have been expected for the unusual circumstances 
of their situation. 
When interpersonal problems did arise in Dixie’s first months, the protocols of leadership 
in conflict with the principles of secrecy and the desire for competition between the various 
organizations represented tended to exacerbate them. Because the mission existed under Army 
G-2 auspices, its Army Commanding Officer oversaw all communications to and from the post 
and held the ultimate responsibility for avoiding legal, diplomatic, or political debacles the 
mission’s activities could create and for deconflicting situations where duplication of efforts 
might occur or where a lack of clarity in jurisdiction existed between Dixie’s members. 
Participants in Dixie from military or Foreign Service backgrounds would have found the 
concept of order of command and channels of communication that ran through Barrett familiar 
and clear, but the OSS officers in Dixie frequently misunderstood or to some extent bristled at 
the idea of Army oversight on their work in north China. OSS China managers recognized from 
the outset the implications of having staff serve underneath an Army command. In early August 
1944, Joseph Spencer, OSS China officer based at CBI Headquarters in New Delhi explained to 
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the head of R&A division in Washington that results from Dixie “may take some time for us to 
receive” because communications all rested in Barrett’s hands, and Barrett presumably had a 
promotion at stake in the results of the Dixie Mission, which might make him more inclined to 
run a tight ship at Yan’an.55 According to Spencer, OSS had left relations with Barrett entirely in 
the hands of Charles Stelle in Yan’an. 
Stelle reportedly experienced friction with the G-2 over communication out of Dixie in 
the first few months on the job. He explained to OSS managers in October 1944 that the 
problems that he encountered encouraged him to travel to Kunming to secure radio equipment 
when he could have delegated the trip to a colleague because he wanted a chance to write a 
candid report of the activity at Yan’an without G-2 oversight, which he described as the problem 
of “channels.”56 As Stelle explained to Spencer, regular channels of communication for Dixie 
went via Barrett through the G-2 and Colonel Dickey, based at the CBI China Headquarters in 
Chongqing. From there, the G-2 would ferry information onward throughout the U.S. 
government organizations to which Dixie personnel had directed it. Stelle reported that he had 
not completely understood the seriousness of the channels of communication and had 
inadvertently breached the system by addressing a package full of duplicates of Chinese 
Communist publications OSS officers in Yan’an had gathered directly to OSS officers in 
Chongqing.  
The incident ended up earning Stelle only minor reprimands, but served as a warning to 
Stelle and his managers that “This mission is obviously an important one and Theater HQ as a 
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present constituted at least, is going to hang onto direct control.” Stelle noted that OSS must 
respect the boundaries set forth by the G-2 until OSS had a more established and secure presence 
in Yan’an, explaining, “It will probably pay for us to hew fairly close to this line until we have 
convinced G-2 that we are not going to run away with their baby.”57 Along similar lines, in an 
October letter to OSS’s head of SI branch operations in China John Coughlin Stelle summarized 
an attitude with which many of the non-Army participants in Dixie probably would have agreed: 
“It is my honest belief that we will get much further, much faster, not only in 
getting intelligence for war purposes, but also in promoting the interests of our 
own organization by a program of sincere collaboration in the Dixie Mission 
rather than by premature attempts to establish an independent operation. I believe 
that eventually the operation will be of such size that we will automatically be 
granted a considerable degree of autonomy--but I think we should let that take 
care of itself as the operation develops.”58  
 
Despite the many incentives that existed for the initial Dixie Mission members to 
cooperate, discord occasionally surfaced. G-2 and State Department officials who had followed 
political and military developments in China for years before the war often harbored resentment 
toward OSS officials in China who were assuming duties formerly in the realm of the army and 
diplomatic corps and frequently making clumsy efforts to expand U.S. intelligence collection 
efforts in China. In the case of the relationship between Service and Stelle, personality clashes 
exacerbated matters. In a personal letter to fellow diplomat John Davies describing conditions at 
Yan’an in early October 1944, Service described Stelle as the “most useless and lazy bastard that 
God ever created.”59 Stelle’s behavior in late September may have fed Service’s perceptions of 
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OSS personnel. Stelle’s reports describe his frustration at trying to work within the strict pecking 
order of an Army-run mission, and communications between Stelle and his OSS superiors in rear 
areas allude to—but never specify—a domestic personal problem of Stelle’s that affected his 
work.60 No evidence has surfaced that Service’s poor opinion of Stelle ever had direct and 
measurable influence on Dixie operations, a fact which speaks to the differences in tone of the 
Dixie Mission’s first few months, when it was run by a fairly tight-knit network of China experts 
and the later years of the mission when expertise and enthusiasm of its personnel waned 
considerably. 
A slow start in fall 1944 
Adding to logistical and administrative challenges the initial Dixie crew faced, the 
weather in north China in 1944 also proved unsupportive of the Dixie Mission’s early plans. 
Until well into fall 1944, wet and muddy weather conditions prevented American excursions into 
the remote areas of poor infrastructure beyond Yan’an where many CCP guerrillas were 
operating, which frustrated the eager Dixie participants and stymied their efforts to observe CCP 
field intelligence practices or the Japanese front lines first hand.61 Instead of undertaking field 
trips in August and September following the series of indoctrination lectures by the CCP, the 
Dixie participants paired up with CCP counterparts to form small committees where the 
Americans could learn more about the specific military and political intelligence capabilities at 
Yan’an. Committees formed on topics such as air intelligence, order of battle, communications, 
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and pilot rescue. The progress during this phase was reportedly disappointingly slow to the 
Americans, but Barrett and the CCP leaders had formed the committees deliberately to avoid 
duplication and encourage efficiency—62legitimate concerns given the interagency composition 
of the mission. 
The committee work offered the American officials a specific “warts-and-all” 
understanding of the possibilities for meeting the goals of their mission at Yan’an. Despite the 
positive outlook the initial Dixie Mission members reported with regard to the intelligence 
potential of a base at Yan’an, a consensus similarly emerges from their reports about the 
differences between the intelligence that interested American military leaders and policymakers 
and the intelligence that the CCP was already collecting. Dixie members identified several 
unique characteristics of the CCP base areas as a field for intelligence collection that influenced 
how they planned operations in CCP areas and how their plans were initially implemented.  
First, Dixie members became aware that the CCP controlled pockets of rural land 
throughout the Japanese-held areas in north China. Because the base areas were geographically 
separated and Japanese controlled transportation and communication lines often ran between the 
areas, each base tended to operate with considerable autonomy. In describing this situation, OSS 
officer Stelle emphasized the Dixie Mission’s ample evidence that the CCP headquarters at 
Yan’an controlled the base areas through party ideology and through the army’s organization, 
and “there is no question that its orders are obeyed” by the base areas.63 However, the 
decentralized nature of the CCP activities had precluded the development of the kind of staff 
organization that could serve as a direct counterpart to U.S. officials interested in intelligence 
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sharing. In fact, as Stelle noted, Yan’an’s intelligence interests had been focused on political 
news and anecdotes that could either be used to plan CCP force movements or in psychological 
operations of various types. In other words, in contrast to the American officials, whose 
intelligence requirements were broad and sought to connect Japanese movements and 
capabilities in North China with the larger Allied strategy in the broader China-Burma-India and 
Pacific War campaigns, circumstances often forced CCP guerrillas to focus on more localized 
and tactical intelligence. 
The Dixie members assessed the CCP’s intelligence capabilities to be strategically 
focused on supporting specific Communist guerrilla operations rather than any broader regional, 
global or more abstract political goals. OSS officers Stelle and Colling noted the relative 
sophistication of the CCP efforts to collect intelligence on the Japanese order of battle and 
capabilities, which directly affected how the guerrillas would design their operations. As Stelle 
explained, “as guerrilla fighters, they have not had to concern themselves with air strength, 
airfields and their defenses, naval and shipping movements, production and movement of 
strategic materials, or the locations of military and industrial installations.”64 Although the CCP’s 
focus on order of battle intelligence was a logical and strategic decision for the CCP given their 
overall situation and capabilities, it also meant that the CCP cadres were unfamiliar with many 
types of intelligence important to the Allied war planners and U.S. policymakers at the time, 
such as air, naval, and economic intelligence. The Dixie Mission members would need to 
sensitize the guerrillas to the relevance of this information, persuade them of the benefits of 
cooperation, and train them in collection methods if the U.S. government expected such 
information to be collected from Yan’an. 
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A third initial limitation on the intelligence capabilities of the CCP at Yan’an that the 
Dixie Mission members noticed was the Communists’ weak communication system. Many 
reports from the Dixie Mission members in the operation’s first months describe the poor state of 
the CCP radio equipment, the lack of skilled operators and regularized schedules for operation, 
and the risk that increasing the flow of information over the geographically wide spread radio 
network would overtax and collapse the rudimentary system. Replacing and augmenting the 
CCP’s communication capabilities quickly became a top priority of the Dixie Mission in 1944, 
and the issue of providing the CCP with radio technology, equipment, and expertise became one 
of the most significant issues shaping the outcome of the mission throughout its existence. 
Yan’an radio capabilities: A joint effort 
In the first few months of the Dixie Mission, American personnel posted to the Yan’an 
cooperated as well as they could in developing radio capabilities sufficient in functionality to 
support all other new intelligence collection activity. By the end of their first two weeks in 
Yan’an, most of the initial Dixie members had noted the deficiency of the CCP radio equipment 
and procedures, and their initial reports unanimously emphasized the importance of developing 
sufficiently sophisticated and powerful radio capabilities at Yan’an. In most cases, the success of 
other operations from Yan’an hinged upon radio capabilities. The remoteness of Yan’an and 
northern China from Allied base areas heightened the need for radio communications that could 
speed communication over long distances and minimize personnel travel through dangerous 
enemy areas. CCP guerrillas operating close to or behind the Japanese lines would utilize the 
radio network to report information from their respective positions, particularly weather 
information and news of Americans who had been shot down in north China. OSS plans also 
intended to rely on guerrillas using the radio network from remote areas to help administer 
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programs of intelligence agents throughout the region and to report updates to the order of battle 
for Japanese troops based on their observations from positions near Japanese troops.  
OSS officers in Yan’an initially took the lead on acquiring the right equipment and 
training local personnel to use it. Among all U.S. organizations with intelligence duties during 
WWII, the OSS operated with access to the most notoriously substantial and forthcoming 
budgetary resources secured by Donovan’s force of personality and personal relationship with 
President Roosevelt. Thus, the Dixie Mission personnel all looked to its OSS officers to see the 
Mission through resource shortages, including the issue of radio technology. Throughout the 
Dixie Mission, they used the codename YENSIG to refer to radio operations in Yan’an.  
The first American plane to Yan’an included OSS personnel trained in radio operations 
and carrying equipment the unit needed to begin establishing communications.65 OSS officer 
Charles Stelle traveled to Kunming in October 1944 with the overt purpose of retrieving 
additional radio equipment designated for Dixie and cooperating with personnel from the 
Chengdu-based Tenth Weather Squadron to transport it to Yan’an.66 Stelle successfully ferried 
some of the necessary components to Yan’an, but as of November, Yan’an was still waiting on 
hand-powered generators that could adapt the radio units to the lack of infrastructure in and 
around Yan’an, according to Stelle’s correspondence with his OSS managers.67 This detail might 
seem minor—a line in a memo in a stack of other memos on the desk of a busy OSS 
bureaucrat—but without these generator units, any information that the CCP guerrillas and 
Americans meeting them in the field were risking their lives to collect could not be reported in a 
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timely manner to the central leadership of the CCP, Chinese, or American militaries. In effect, 
the lack of a functional radio network would render much of the urgent intelligence collection 
activity from Yan’an irrelevant or obsolete before it could be reported. 
Acquiring the initial equipment for the radio base was only the beginning of the project. 
Establishing communications that could facilitate the Dixie Mission’s intelligence goals also 
required distributing basic radio and weather equipment throughout the CCP guerrillas’ area of 
operations and training them how to use it. Within days of Stelle’s departure for Kunming in 
October 1944, a party of American observers and CCP guides led on the American side by 
Foreign Service officer Raymond Ludden set out on a study tour of north China. The trip aimed 
to assess CCP military and intelligence capabilities and to equip guerrillas operating at and 
behind the Japanese lines to collect and report weather information. The Americans also brought 
along basic medical supplies to encourage goodwill and help the CCP guerrillas provide aid to 
downed American soldiers.68 The most vital and timely tasks that the Americans asked the CCP 
guerrillas to help perform required radio. Unfortunately, the guerrillas in remote areas would not 
immediately benefit from the additional equipment that Stelle acquired: the study-tour from 
Yan’an did not return until February 1945.  
The training programs also encountered unexpected obstacles. In addition to the technical 
training on how to operate American radio equipment and weather monitoring instruments, Dixie 
Mission personnel had to explain the context of how the information would be used. Although 
the CCP had advanced intelligence capabilities in some respects, collecting meteorological 
intelligence was all new. In his memoir, Barrett recalled one amusing miscommunication soon 
after the first radios and other equipment had been installed for a trial run at a CCP base area 
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outside Yan’an. Barrett wrote, “Along with radios, there had been sent out forms to be followed 
in submitting weather reports. Under one heading, types of clouds, such as “cumulus,” “cirrus,” 
and so on, were to be noted. In describing the clouds, this particular message read, “Not many, 
and yet not few (buduo ye bushao).”69  
Although the Americans assisted the CCP personnel in substantially improving radio 
capabilities in 1944, the capabilities lagged far behind the needed capacity for the volume of 
work being performed from Yan’an. Desperation and frustration feature strongly in a memo that 
the OSS radio technician sent his managers in Chongqing in late November requesting additional 
radio resources. The technician, Anton Remenih, noted that communicating via radio with 
Chongqing was becoming more difficult, and Dixie personnel could only perform about half of 
scheduled radio contacts as planned. Even when Yan’an could make contact, “efficient and rapid 
transfer of traffic from Yenan is almost invariably very difficult because of consistently heavy 
interference and high noise level in Chongqing”—a situation that only more powerful radio 
equipment was likely to resolve. According to Remenih, the situation meant that some 
communications, including messages containing important weather intelligence, stalled for as 
long as 36 hours before personnel at Yan’an could send them.70  
The challenge of developing effective radio capabilities sufficient to accomplish Dixie’s 
mission illustrates how basic administrative and logistical issues had drastic effects on the 
intelligence capabilities of the United States in field conditions during World War II. Factors that 
past historians have used to explain the failure of the Dixie Mission to achieve its purposes, such 
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as ideological differences between the American personnel and CCP counterparts or diplomatic 
and strategic disagreements between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell, had comparatively 
little influence on the procurement, distribution, and operation of appropriate radio equipment for 
the American outpost at Yan’an. Moreover, U.S. military leaders and policymakers could not 
even blame other agencies for the problem—all organizations participating in Dixie agreed on 
the need for radio capabilities at Yan’an, and developing the radio capacity was one issue on 
which the Dixie personnel continuously cooperated. Rather, the failure of the initial Dixie 
Mission personnel to quickly establish radio capabilities necessary to achieve their intelligence 
mission reflects administrative and physical conditions that U.S. government simply had not yet 
prepared to handle.  
Army personnel as capable intelligence collectors 
The Army personnel posted to Yan’an demonstrated their expertise in operating in China 
and in performing the collection of logistical military intelligence. Between July and October, 
1944, these projects included installing equipment and establishing protocols to gather weather 
intelligence from Yan’an and the surrounding areas and working with the Chinese Communist 
guerrillas to aid and rescue downed Allied airmen in or near Communist-held areas in China.  
The Dixie Mission’s determination to successfully establish new protocols for the 
collection of weather information from Yan’an was consistent with the great demand for weather 
intelligence from allied military officers operating in East Asia during World War II. Weather 
information was useful to military officers attempting to plan aerial bombings, troop 
deployments, and logistical transport during the war and for trying to anticipate the Japanese 
enemy’s actions to accomplish the same goals. Extreme weather events as well as simple cloud 
cover significantly affected military logistics in the 1940s. As early as 1937, only limited 
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weather intelligence for central and northern China was available to allied military planners 
because the occupying Japanese troops had forced many American and European observers to 
leave China or flee to far flung cities such as Chongqing.71 According to historian Carolle Carter, 
who wrote a detailed account of life at Yan’an for the Dixie Mission members based on 
interviews with many of the American participants in the 1970s and 1980s, weather information 
from Yan’an specifically was useful to the U.S. Army’s Twentieth Bomber Command because 
its pilots began long-distance bombing runs from Chengdu (in southwest China) all the way to 
Japan in June, 1944. The Twentieth Bomber Command also frequently ferried fuel from the CBI 
base in India that served as its headquarters to Chengdu to support the bombing missions.  
Weather information from Yan’an about conditions in central and northern China was 
vital to these operations. Because CCP guerrillas operated in small groups, often behind the 
Japanese lines in occupied areas to which Allied troops had no access, the Dixie Mission was in 
a unique position to provide weather intelligence of the utmost important to CBI logistical 
planning.72 In June 1944, OSS staff in China even recommended General Donovan use the issue 
of providing support for the Twentieth Bomber Command to help lobby the White House and 
cabinet-level leaders for the creation of the Dixie Mission, with the assumption that “secondary 
opportunities” for intelligence collection would exist for OSS once the outpost in Yan’an was 
established.73  
In the China-Burma-India campaign, the U.S. Army’s Tenth Weather Squadron was 
responsible for collecting and disseminating all relevant weather information throughout the 
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battle theater. The Squadron posted a steady stream of personnel to Dixie, including Major 
Charles Dole, who was dispatched with the first group of American officials to Yan’an and 
served there throughout the second half of 1944. Personnel from the Tenth Weather Squadron 
spent much of their time in Yan’an in 1944 assessing what equipment was needed to collect the 
necessary data, installing equipment, taking measurements and readings, and beginning to train 
Chinese Communist guerrillas who operated behind the Japanese front lines to record weather 
assessments and transmit their observations via radio at designated times. According to Carter, 
prior to the arrival of the Dixie Mission, the CCP had not organized a systematic program for 
acquiring and transmitting weather information, but the CCP fighters were eager to be trained 
and contribute information.74 Major Dole and several other Army Air Corps personnel who 
comprised the initial Dixie Mission roster began working with CCP counterparts to boost 
weather intelligence soon after the team’s arrival in July 1944. 
In addition to building systems for collecting weather data, initial Dixie Mission 
members worked with their CCP hosts during their first few months in Yan’an to rescue, assist, 
and debrief Allied airmen who had been shot down or captured by the Japanese in north and 
central China. The necessity of this mission intensified as the American long-distance bombing 
runs over China to Japanese-held areas increased in 1944 and 1945. Moreover, Carter noted that 
the Army began introducing the B-29 aircraft for these missions because they carried very large 
bomb loads, but the planes had serious problems that made them particularly susceptible to 
accidents and crashes.75 The Air Ground Aid Service (AGAS), the army organization responsible 
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for the rescue of downed American airmen, had assigned Lt. Henry C. Whittlesey to the initial 
crew of Dixie. Whittlesey, in cooperation with the Mission’s medical officer Melvin Casberg, 
was among the first of the initial Dixie contingent to venture into CCP guerrilla base areas 
beyond Yan’an when the weather cleared in fall 1944 as he sought to work with the CCP 
members to provide aid to rescue Americans who were behind the Japanese lines.  
The CCP guerrillas were reportedly eager for information on how they could best support 
Americans in distress with whom they came into contact.76 Former Dixie Mission members told 
Carter in interviews that AGAS officers posted to Yan’an sought information from the CCP 
guerrillas about the potential for escape from and evasion of Japanese troops so that they could 
inform the U.S. Army Air Corps fliers who were engaged in the bombing runs.77 The Army 
began instructing those involved in missions over north China to seek help from the CCP 
guerrillas if they were in distress. On the CCP side, Ye Jianying appointed a special committee 
of CCP members to cooperate with the AGAS mission and determine how the CCP and Dixie 
Mission members could best cooperate to facilitate rescue missions. 
Americans who had escaped or evaded Japanese capture in China served as an important 
source of intelligence for the Americans and CCP alike. Once rescued, all American evacuees 
that the CCP had helped went first to Yan’an, where they were debriefed, before the Americans 
stationed there arranged safe passage for them back to a rear base area. As intelligence officers, 
the Dixie Mission members were in an excellent position to gain valuable information from these 
individuals because they had already identified the gaps in American intelligence knowledge 
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about the Japanese capabilities and they also had the means of communicating information 
gathered back to CBI Headquarters colleagues where it was applied in planning future missions 
and preparing American personnel for long-range bombing missions. Other aspects of the 
American intelligence dissemination process, such as the processing and sharing of strategic and 
political intelligence, were slow and dysfunctional, as will be explained below, but the G-2 
officers posted in Yan’an and their management chain reportedly made use of AGAS 
information efficiently to protect American personnel as much as possible. 
Debriefing the escapees also yielded interesting candid intelligence about life in the CCP 
guerrilla areas. In one fascinating example, the initial Dixie participants interviewed First 
Lieutenant J. P. Baglio, who was rescued by CCP guerrillas in June 1944 and handed over to 
American counterparts at Yan’an for evacuation in July. John Service drilled Baglio for 
examples of the extent of banditry in the areas controlled by the CCP People’s Militia so the 
Americans could compare the bandit situation in north China with the rife and serious banditry 
problems that they had observed in areas held by Nationalist guerrillas elsewhere in China. To 
the great surprise off the Dixie members, Baglio had not observed or heard about any examples 
of bandits. Moreover, he reported that all the guerrillas he encountered appeared so dedicated to 
participating in war efforts that he could not imagine them having the time to participate in 
nefarious activities. Baglio’s report fed the positive initial impressions that Dixie’s political 
officers had formed of the CCP members, particularly compared to their experiences observing 
GMD troops.78  
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All parties recognized the great danger of the AGAS work. Indeed, Whittlesey became 
the only member of the Dixie Mission killed in action when Japanese snipers shot and killed him 
early in 1945, and he posthumously received the Distinguished Service Cross for his valor in 
assisting fellow soldiers in distress.79 Given the dangers of the rescue work, Whittlesey (and his 
AGAS replacements), Casberg, and OSS officer Cromley repeatedly requested medical supplies 
and gifts to offer the CCP guerrillas to continue building their goodwill and eagerness to 
participate.80 Unfortunately, these supplies were not forthcoming. 
Army officials posted to Yan’an in 1944 made an undisputed substantial contribution to 
establishing the area as an effective base for U.S. efforts to collect logistic and operational 
intelligence that directly supported U.S. military efforts in the Pacific War. However, in the 
pursuit of increasing access to strategic and political foreign intelligence in China, the Dixie 
Army officials’ superiors and managers in counterpart U.S. government organizations, 
particularly the OSS, tended to take for granted the efficiency with which these individuals 
accomplished these missions under conditions that were challenging at best.  
Japanese POWs at Yan’an and American psychological warfare efforts 
Americans in Yan’an in late 1944 found it extremely valuable to make contact with 
Japanese POWs that the CCP guerrillas had captured and were holding in Yan’an for two 
reasons. First, the Japanese POWs could be debriefed to inform psychological operations that the 
U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) sought to develop to encourage Japanese individuals to 
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surrender. Second, observing the Chinese Communists’ treatment of and attitudes about the 
captured Japanese soldiers yielded valuable intelligence about the practices and style of the 
Communists themselves.  
OWI was an agency formed around the same time as OSS and tasked with performing so-
called “white” intelligence operations, including overt psychological operations, propaganda, and 
activities that would now be called public diplomacy. It did not send any personnel with the 
initial members of the Dixie Mission.81 Upon learning of the presence of Japanese POWs at 
Yan’an and the potential ability to interview them, OWI dispatched F. McCracken Fisher, a OWI 
officer and “China hand” who was based at Chongqing, on a two-week trip to Yan’an in 
September 1944 to study the psychological warfare efforts of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army “to 
determine what could be learned from their experience and methods that could be used in our 
American psychological warfare effort against the Japanese, and to establish a source and 
channels for information about the Japanese army and conditions within Japan.”82  
Fisher reported that the CCP had achieved considerable successes in psychological 
warfare, which he attributed to several characteristics of the Communists’ approach and 
methods. He noted that the CCP leaders had a clear understanding of the nature of the war and 
their goals toward Japan and that they imparted this understanding to their troops, educating 
them thoroughly and “instilling the proper attitude toward the enemy.” Moreover, the CCP 
leaders had enlisted the captured or surrendered Japanese troops based at Yan’an in developing 
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the psychological operations themselves, federating them into an organization they called the 
Japanese People’s Emancipation League. Fisher also noted that the location of the Japanese 
troops in China at fixed garrison locations also populated by puppet Chinese troops and Chinese 
peasants made the garrisons easy targets for highly mobile CCP guerrillas on psychological 
warfare missions. Lastly, Fisher’s reports emphasized both the willingness of the CCP 
counterparts at Yan’an to share information with the Americans and the fact that they had 
important information to share about the “internal conditions of the Japanese Army in North 
China, especially as they affect the life and thinking of the ordinary soldier” as well as various 
captured Japanese documents, ranging from Japanese publications to actual Japanese military 
intelligence reports.83  
On the basis of Fisher’s reports, OWI dispatched its officer John K. Emmerson to become 
a part of the Dixie Mission in late October 1944. Originally from Colorado, Emmerson had 
joined the Foreign Service after earning a Master’s degree at New York University. The State 
Department assigned him to Japan in September 1935, where he served until October 1941.84 His 
experience in Japan had allowed him to learn Japanese, which helped him communicate with the 
Japanese troops at Yan’an. After leaving Japan, Emmerson had be detailed to General Stilwell 
and worked with an OWI team in North Burma. Emmerson arrived at Yan’an for the first time 
on October 22, 1944 along with Koji Ariyoshi, a Japanese man who was working with OWI 
whom Emmerson arranged to bring to Yan’an to assist in psychological warfare efforts.85  
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Reports by Fisher and Emmerson reflected unexpected positive impressions of CCP 
activities. Both Fisher and Emmerson expressed surprise at the cordial treatment the CCP 
guerrillas afforded to captured Japanese troops and believed that the CCP efforts in this regard 
aided the Communist psychological operations and propaganda efforts directed at the Japanese. 
For example, in memos describing his observations at Yan’an, Fisher explained “Every Japanese 
prisoner is regarded, first, as a potential worker or medium for psychological warfare, and 
second, as a potential instrument for the overthrow of the militarist government of Japan and the 
establishment of a people's government on democratic lines.” Fisher assesses the CCP approach 
to captured enemy soldiers to be unorthodox, but highly effective. He quotes one American 
fighter pilot to whom the CCP had provided aid, affording him a chance to see the Communist 
POW policy in practice as remarking that the CCP guerrillas treat the Japanese troops “as if they 
loved them. I can’t understand it—but it certainly does work.”86 Fisher and Emmerson both 
expressed the view that the United States could learn about effective psychological warfare from 
the CCP. The work that they began at Yan’an early in the Dixie Mission proceeded for the rest of 
the war with Japan. 
State Department political reports and the problem of audience 
Similar to OWI’s Fisher and Emmerson, who worked specifically on CCP psychological 
warfare efforts and Japanese POWs, the State Department officials posted to Dixie to collect 
political observations reported surprise at their positive reactions to the CCP leaders and the 
Communist modes of operation on display in Yan’an. The initial months of the Dixie Mission 
represented a time when political officers from the State Department delivered their most candid 
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assessments of the Communist activities in China, including some views that appeared charitable 
and later attracted scrutiny from critics of Communism in the United States. In retrospect, 
historical records reveal Foreign Service officers John Service and Ray Ludden excelled at 
performing their assignment of observing the CCP leadership and reporting their findings back to 
the U.S. government, even if they made the mistake of being overly trusting that recipients of 
their reporting within U.S. policymakers and military leadership circles unaccustomed to such 
intelligence would be an informed and open-minded audience.  
During his time in Yan’an, Ludden released far fewer reports than Service, perhaps 
because he spent much of his time on a field trip visiting the CCP guerrillas.87 Similar to many of 
the Dixie participants, Ludden had worked in China before the war and served under Stilwell 
during the war prior to his assignment to Yan’an. A Massachusetts native, he had attended 
college at Georgetown University and joined the FBI, where he had some intelligence training 
before he joined the Foreign Service. His completed his first diplomatic service in Japanese-
occupied Manchuria.88 Ludden’s main interest in Yan’an became testing the CCP’s descriptions 
of their operations behind the Japanese lines, which appeared to good to be true to Ludden and 
many of the other initial Dixie participants. Ludden said the purpose of his participation in the 
extended field trip to visit guerrillas was to determine if CCP operations “worked as they said it 
was working, and we found that it did.”89  
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Initial reports from Foreign Service officer John Service describe his determination not to 
fall under what he refers to as “the spell of the Chinese Communists” which he had heard about 
from numerous American and European visitors to Yan’an before arriving there himself. Service 
reports that even the American observers who were most dubious of the Communists and their 
intentions shared a similar feeling: “that we have come into a different country and are meeting a 
different people [compared to the Nationalist Party members].”90 Service’s report details 
numerous ways that the CCP members in Yan’an seem different from the Chinese Army 
personnel in Chongqing including their simple clothing and lifestyle; the lack of bodyguards, 
fancy uniforms, and badges, and the overall “absence of show and formality, both in speech and 
action.” Service’s final observations are particularly prescient of events to come in the later 
1940s: 
“I think now that further study and observation will confirm what is seen at Yenan 
is a well-integrated movement, with a political and economic program, which it is 
successfully carrying out under competent leaders. And that while the 
Kuomintang has lost its early revolutionary character and with that loss 
disintegrated, the Communist Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, 
has kept its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and moderate 
maturity. One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and 
successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the 
people that it will not easily be killed.”91  
 
The positive tone of Service’s initial reports continued throughout his official 
correspondence dispatched in August and September. For example, in a report from September 
4, 1944, Service wrote, “The general impression one gets of the Chinese Communist leaders is 
that they are a unified group of vigorous, mature, and practical men, unselfishly devoted to high 
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principles, and having great ability and strong qualities of leadership.”92 A stream of Service’s 
reporting that later generated significant controversy appeared in late August. On August 27, 
Service dispatched a report summarizing a six-hour personal meeting he had with Mao Zedong at 
the CCP leaders’ invitation. Service describes Mao’s concerns about the vulnerability of Chinese 
democracy in the event that a civil war follows the defeat of Japan. Service conveys Mao’s 
request that the U.S. government support the creation of “a new national government” in China 
by “calling a conference of all leading political groups in China.”93 Mao’s request probably 
brought to life the greatest fears of Chiang Kai-shek when he failed to stop the United States 
from deploying an official delegation to Yan’an, and it raised issues that could seriously threaten 
the alliance between the U.S. government and China’s globally recognized national government 
under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. Service sent his report to the State Department through CBI 
Headquarters and the Embassy in China. In his posthumously published memoir of his time 
working in Asia, Davies succinctly summarizes its initial effect: “Washington did not deign to 
respond to Mao.”94 
Service’s candor in his reports from Yan’an reflected pre-World War II institutional 
norms within the State Department that allowed Foreign Service officers considerable leeway in 
their opinions and fulfillment of their duties. Davies’ memoir describes an atmosphere in which 
the Foreign Service officer was seen as “a man of honor and that in his relations with the public 
and his colleagues he would so conduct himself.” Accordingly, the Foreign Service proceeded 
“untormented by anxious preoccupation with security and discipline,” a state of affairs which 
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resulted in a close-knit network of Foreign Service officers which featured “tolerance of 
considerable nonconformity and even eccentricity.”95 Davies describes the Foreign Service as a 
small and personalized organization, suggesting that most Foreign Service officers did not 
anticipate the unique political challenges of interagency work and the expansion of their 
intelligence collection duties during the war. Davies’ implication is entirely consistent with the 
behavior and attitudes of John Service preserved in the historical record. 
OSS disorganization stalls strategic intelligence efforts in China 
OSS officials posted to Dixie and their managers recognized the potential for important 
intelligence collection from the Yan’an base, but they found that capitalizing on this potential 
would be an extremely difficult and time-consuming mission. Reports from Dixie’s five initial 
OSS officers follow a general pattern: an enthusiastic officer in the field attempts to wade 
through the various turf wars in the field to design and propose a bold plan for the collection of 
strategic intelligence about the Japanese war efforts, frequently one that inadvertently conflicts 
with U.S. military or diplomatic interests in the area. First-line managers initially respond to the 
plan with optimism and support, which soon gives way to some mix of risk-aversion, simple 
bureaucratic inertia, and disagreements in headquarters offices over jurisdiction, scope, and 
vision. The problems at the management level are sufficiently serious to prevent the release of 
resources and necessary approvals to the officers in Yan’an. The initial stages of this pattern 
were on display in the first few months of the Dixie Mission for projects designed to respond to 
some of OSS’s top priorities for their work in China: developing a network of human 
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intelligence assets in north China and gathering the intelligence necessary to produce and 
maintain a complete order of battle for the Japanese troops.  
Although Dixie’s OSS officers did not find developing Yan’an’s radio base to be an easy 
undertaking, that project may have seemed simple compared to the operations they attempted for 
developing human intelligence assets and collecting order of battle information. Under pressure 
from managers who had been determined throughout the early 1940s to develop effective human 
intelligence assets in China, the OSS officers in Dixie developed plans to establish a Yan’an-
based network of Chinese and Korean intelligence assets and operators in Northeast China and 
beyond. In World War II’s European theater of battle, recruited OSS assets often participated in 
clandestine war efforts beyond the simple collection and reporting of non-public information. 
OSS handlers tasked assets to engage in enemy sabotage and demolition operations, capture 
enemy documents, and other similarly dangerous activities behind enemy lines. In an attempt to 
establish such assets in China, Dixie Mission OSS officers Charles Stelle and John Colling 
sought to develop teams of agents behind the Japanese lines in Northeast China.  
Despite their extensive experience living in and studying China, Stelle and Colling found 
developing the OSS program for human assets in northern China, which they code-named 
“APPLE,” to be an extremely challenging affair. The senior of the two OSS officers, Charles 
Stelle, had expertise on China but little operational experience. Stelle represented OSS R&A 
Division and participated in the Dixie Mission in the capacity of a targeting analyst.96 As such, 
he investigated and analyzed potential intelligence opportunities in the field, reporting back to 
headquarters about them, and helping with logistical issues to implement plans in the field. Stelle 
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himself repeatedly mentioned that his skills were not relevant to the needs of and opportunities 
available at Yan’an. Stelle’s intelligence skills and expertise were more analytical than 
operational. As an expert linguist in Chinese and Japanese, Stelle had served as the chief 
representative of OSS’s R&A division in Chongqing in early 1944, and his experience working 
closely with AGFRTS at that time had secured his selection to join the Dixie Mission in July 
1944.97 Prior to serving in China, Stelle had served as one of three deputy heads of the OSS 
R&A Branch’s Far East Division in Washington DC.98  
The more junior officer of the two, John Colling, had some training and experience 
participating in—not necessarily designing—intelligence collection operations, but with that 
experience reportedly came arrogance that made it difficult for him to curry favor with 
colleagues from whom he required help. Colling was the son of Army Captain William Colling, 
who had served in the 15th Infantry in Tianjin, the company of “old China hands” that also had 
included George Marshall, Joseph Stilwell, and David Barrett. William Colling and his wife had 
remained in Tianjin after his retirement in 1929 and raised their three sons in China.99 John 
Colling had joined the Army after Pearl Harbor and having requested assignment in CBI, ended 
up supporting guerrilla operations in Burma under General Stilwell before his assignment to 
Dixie. 
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The first reports by Stelle and Colling from Yan’an to OSS managers in Chongqing 
regarding the APPLE program recommended teaming up with CCP guerrillas and some Japanese 
Communist POWs to begin collecting intelligence in Northeast China, a strategic area that had 
had previously been completely inaccessible to American intelligence collectors. Many of the 
Japanese POWs being held at Yan’an were members of the Japanese Communist Party, and had 
chosen to defect to the CCP side while in residence there. One of these, Okano Susumu, head of 
the Japanese Communist Party, expressed willingness to send U.S. agents to Manchuria, Korea, 
and Japan to engage in psychological warfare efforts and sabotage similar to OSS foreign asset 
operations occurring in Europe.100 Colling and Stelle reportedly found Okano’s offer both 
credible and exciting. The operation to train and dispatch Chinese agents in Northeast China and 
beyond became a significant source of communication and debate between OSS Headquarters, 
various field-based OSS branch offices, and the OSS officers based at the Yan’an outpost in fall 
1944. In an August 1944 report addressed to OSS managers serving in New Delhi, Chongqing, 
and Kunming from August 1944, Colling enthusiastically claimed “We are sure that the only 
limits on the cooperation we can secure from the local Chinese authorities and on the results that 
can be attained will be the amount of personnel and equipment that we are prepared to invest and 
able to transport.”101 To support the establishment of the Apple project, in August 1944, Stelle 
and Colling underscored Cromley’s requests for radio equipment to be used in the initial training 
of Chinese agents as well as additional personnel who could train Chinese agents in demolitions, 
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radio, and general intelligence techniques.102 They also planned a trip to forward areas deep in 
the northern Chinese countryside with their Chinese counterparts in early September 1944.  
Some aspects of the plan by Stelle and Colling reflected their naiveté about operational 
concerns in China, and some circumspection on the part of OSS managers in response was 
probably warranted. Reflecting the much greater awareness of the security realities of 
performing intelligence operations in China, Dixie commanding officer offered some necessary 
guidance in a direct but extremely cordial cover letter to the OSS managers that departed Dixie 
with correspondence from Stelle and Colling about their plans in early August.103 Barrett 
declared himself to be “very much in favor of doing everything we possibly can along the lines 
of training Chinese personnel in the work in which Stelle and Colling are interested” but 
described two concerns. The first concerned approval for the plan from Stilwell’s headquarters 
and others in Chongqing, ensuring that it did not come into conflict with political concerns 
surrounding SACO and other agreements between the United States and the Chinese 
government. Second, Barrett urged awareness that the Japanese would quickly become aware of 
virtually any American presence in the CCP-controlled areas of China. He cautioned that “If the 
Japs thought the presence of the Americans was hurting, or could hurt them, they might begin 
active offensive operations against the area concerned.” Despite these cautionary notes, Barrett’s 
tone is hardly dismissive. On the contrary, he refers to the OSS opportunities to work with the 
CCP in China “almost unlimited” and offers to help OSS managers and personnel in Yan’an 
however he can. 
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Deputy Director of OSS China Robert Hall, an immediate supervisor of Stelle and 
Colling who was based in Kunming, initially reacted to the APPLE plan with optimism and some 
ambiguity. His response was to “neither approve or disapprove” the project. He wrote, “The idea 
is magnificent and we will go all the way as soon as the road is clear. It is the greatest idea in 
Cathay, if the necessary courage and imagination can be mustered to put it through,” but also 
noted that he needed more details on financial and equipment requirements.104 Hall proceeded to 
describe the politics of negotiating the plan. “As Colonel Barrett points out, the question as to 
how far headquarters is willing to go is not clear. On the other hand, this is just the kind of 
project Oboe Sugar Sugar [NB: telegrams, cables, and radio dispatches in World War II referred 
to “OSS” as “Oboe Sugar Sugar”] was created to do. I am hoping we will be allowed to 
undertake it, even if it means a slight exposure of the neck.”105  
Hall’s measured enthusiasm may have simply been his way of managing morale for the 
Dixie officers because Hall’s communications with other managers reflected less hope for the 
success of the operation. Hall forwarded the details of the Apple project as outlined by Stelle and 
Colling as well as Cromley’s order of battle plans to the Chief of Secret Intelligence at the OSS’s 
Far East Desk in Washington DC. Hall’s cover letter explains the potential of the projects and 
their consistency with the overall mission of the OSS. However, despite Hall’s assurances of his 
support to his colleagues in the field at Yan’an, Hall’s memo to Washington DC expresses 
numerous qualms. Hall explains that “these projects will not develop as rapidly as our young 
men imagine.” The majority of Hall’s memo highlights many of the political problems that the 
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mission could raise, chief among them ruffling the feathers of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. 
He notes that the KMT-led Chinese central government is sensitive “to the American press and 
to various other American expressions of dissatisfaction as to the Chinese Communist situation” 
and questions how far both the KMT and the Army officers at CBI headquarters are willing to go 
in cooperating with the CCP, particularly given the sensitivities of the SACO arrangement.106 
Hall’s true attitude about APPLE was not conveyed to Cromley and Stelle until a longer 
memo Hall sent to the field dated August 27—the day after his dispatch to Washington on the 
matter. Hall’s enthusiastic tone toward the Dixie officers had shifted to one of greater risk 
aversion and less support. In the August 27memo, Hall first told Cromley “you are getting a 
good deal accomplished and have put forth some excellent ideas. Fine going,” and then said 
“Probably because you have been so constantly on the go since your arrival in China, it has been 
impossible for you to get the overall picture and the many patches of thin ice upon which you are 
compelled to operate.”107 Hall warned Cromley that taking autonomous actions not approved by 
OSS planners and managers in Washington could land him in serious trouble and suggested that 
Cromley discuss the “history and present position” of OSS in China, noting that “I realize that I 
probably sound overly cautious and conservative to you, but if so, I have come to be that way by 
the hard school. We are getting forward, and I am not anxious to lose our gains.”108 With this 
response, Stelle and Colling had their first glimpse at the challenges they would encounter 
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obtaining management support for their plans. Discussion over if, how, and under what 
conditions APPLE could proceed continued to occur well into 1945. 
As Stelle and Colling worked to put the APPLE operation in motion, OSS officer Major 
Ray Cromley had slightly greater success on his plan for collecting intelligence for the OSS 
order of battle on the Japanese military as well as a similar order of battle for the CCP forces. 
OSS had also tasked Cromley with building a school to train Chinese intelligence officers and 
POW interrogators.109 Cromley was chosen for the Dixie Mission due to his expertise in order of 
battle work and his excellent reputation within the G-2. Prior to World War II, Cromley had been 
a journalist, working for several years as the Wall Street Journal’s Tokyo correspondent. When 
war broke out, the Japanese arrested and convicted Cromley for distributing information 
“detrimental to the national defense of Japan.” He was imprisoned in Japan for several months 
before being repatriated in a prisoner exchange. Upon his return to the United States, he quickly 
joined the Army and was assigned to work in the G-2.110 Cromley’s experience moving between 
Army and OSS posts was typical of many Americans involved in intelligence positions during 
World War II. When posted to Dixie, Cromley was technically an officer of the OSS, but while 
with Dixie he was covered first by AGFRTS and later by the G-2 itself. Cromley was sent to the 
OSS post from his previous position in the G-2 specifically to work in the China Theater on 
order of battle intelligence.111 When he arrived in Chongqing in May 1944, OSS China officials 
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assigned him to the AGFRTS personnel.112 He was under that cover for his first few weeks in 
Yan’an, before plans changed because AGFRTS decided it was not interested in his intelligence 
and was nervous about potential political blowback from American operations in forward areas 
deep in China.113 In the fall of 1944, Cromley’s cover shifted back to the G-2.  
Cromley’s initial assessment of the potential for collecting order of battle information 
from Yan’an was extremely optimistic. In his first report to the OSS officers based in CBI 
Headquarters, Cromley described access to Japanese and Chinese publications, captured 
documents, prisoners of war who could be debriefed, and captured weapons and equipment. He 
emphasized the access of Chinese Communist guerrillas to Japanese occupied areas claiming 
“There is virtually no spot in Japanese-occupied China in which the Yenan armies do not have 
permanent agents or guerrilla troops. Because of their continual skirmishing with the Japanese, 
they are an excellent source of prisoners of war and captured documents. All they need is 
training in what Order of Battle information to collect and how to collect it.”114  
Cromley was generally impressed with the Chinese guerrillas he met at Yan’an and 
remarked on their eagerness for training in intelligence methods and their willingness to help 
obtain the information that Cromley requested. He reported that the CCP officers based at 
Yan’an had sent via radio Cromley’s intelligence requirements to guerrillas at the front lines, and 
they were already collecting captured documents and using Cromley’s questions in debriefing 
POWs as of the late July, 1944, only weeks after Dixie’s arrival. Cromley’s CCP contacts in 
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Yan’an had also sifted through their files to provide him with useful materials they had already 
collected, and they brought him to a cave full of captured Japanese weapons, and they helped 
him copy the guns’ markings.115 Cromley reported that he had secured from the Chinese 
information “so secret that even the G-2 in Chungking had previously gotten it neither from the 
Chinese nor from Washington (because top secret).”116 
Cromley was one of the first Dixie OSS officers to express specific requirements in terms 
of equipment and personnel for improved radio support in Yan’an. In addition to specific radio 
technology and staff who could help support its installation and operation from Yan’an, Cromley 
also requested the establishment of a well-equipped microfilm station to facilitate the passage of 
intelligence across Japanese lines, which typically was conducted by small groups of guerrillas 
on horseback. These men had to be selective about paper copies of publications and reports they 
carried, which were conspicuous for their bulk, but they could easily carry hundreds of 
microfilmed documents in a small space without detection.117 Documents on microfilm were also 
significantly easier to transport back to OSS field offices away from the front lines and to 
counterparts in Washington DC, particularly because most communication emerging from 
Yan’an was traveling via radio or airplane.  
Cromley was adamant that it was vital to collect order of battle intelligence in the field, 
as he was doing, rather than from a safer headquarters office, as was the custom. Cromley wrote, 
“After three months in China, I am convinced that work can be accomplished only in the field 
and only by continuous work in the field.” To this end, he recommended that the United States 
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form small teams, mostly staffed by trained Chinese guerrillas, who could travel around China to 
perform the necessary intelligence duties.118 
The initial efforts of OSS in Yan’an achieved no more success than any of the other 
efforts that OSS had sponsored in China in the early 1940s. OSS officers learned that China 
represented an extremely difficult environment for intelligence operations. The intricacies of 
competition between more experienced and capable American counterparts from the Army and 
State Department as well as the diplomatic issues at stake for attempting any intelligence 
collection operations without the full awareness and cooperation of Chiang Kai-shek and Tai Li 
further stalled OSS efforts, including those during the Dixie Mission. Cromley’s progress on 
building the order of battle moved at a slightly faster pace than plans for the APPLE operation, 
but both operations remained mired in the planning stages well into fall 1944.  
Interagency cooperation easier in the field than at home  
Although the Dixie Mission arguably experienced its most cohesive and productive 
period from July to October 1944, those providing management and logistical support to the 
mission from American base areas regularly encountered bureaucratic and administrative 
challenges, within and between their representative organizations. These problems were 
particularly evident in OSS correspondence—unsurprising given the organizational age of OSS 
and the level of controversy surrounding it as General Donovan attempted to carve out a place 
for it from the jurisdictions and budgets of other U.S. government organizations. OSS managers 
in field offices in China served multiple audiences. They communicated intelligence 
requirements and managed operations in the field, offering feedback and guidance directly to 
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subordinates based at Yan’an, and they also faced the challenge of managing the expectations of 
those in Washington D.C., including lateral colleagues as well as more senior intelligence 
officials and policymakers. The challenges of managing field operations from long distances 
surface in correspondence between OSS order of battle expert Cromley and his SI Branch 
handlers Hall and Coughlin. Cromley describes feeling “baffled” at the various conflicting orders 
he receives at OSS priorities and hinting at the political equities involved in his behavior without 
providing specific guidance on expected actions or behaviors in the field. Cromley wrote, “I am 
anxious to do the right thing, but I can only do the right thing if I have the situation explained to 
me."119 Coughlin and Hall likely found it extremely difficult to explain all the sensitive 
bureaucratic politics and diplomatic negotiations influencing OSS activities, particularly in short 
communications that would hardly be private as they moved through G-2 communication 
channels on their way to Yan’an.  
In some cases, explaining how intelligence collection worked in the field to superiors and 
those in Washington exceeded the challenges of supporting the staff coping with field conditions 
themselves. For instance, in an October 1944 memo to R&A Branch Director William Langer, 
Joseph Spencer, who was serving as the Acting Chief for SI branch in the China-Burma-India 
theater at the time, veered into a somewhat flippant response as he attempted to respond to 
Langer’s query about why SI Branch was “both slow and not too successful at setting up agent 
nets throughout the whole of the Far East.” Spencer explained, “SI does not have scads of agents 
at every crossroad to secure ‘information on specific economic questions for R&A 
Washington.’” Spencer hints at the planned OSS mission codenamed APPLE that would train 
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Chinese and Korean agents to collect intelligence throughout Northeast Asia upon request from 
the U.S. government, but he cautions that intelligence collection on demand is never easy or fast: 
“You make elaborate preparations for an agent net, you provide radios, special 
equipment, special training (and R&A provides some briefing), the agent goes out 
and you do not hear from him. Was he caught? Was he watched so closely he had 
to lie still? Is his radio broken? How long do you wait before you start again? I 
assure you, it is not like putting a nickel in a jukebox. As for Washington R&A 
allowing a time sequence between the asking of a question and getting an answer, 
I would say that a conservative guess would be to place that interval at 4 months. 
It might be 2, but it could be 6. Certain kinds of operations are much more rapid 
in accomplishment than others. Where we have an excellent agent set up already 
operating, we could probably get information in brief form for radio 
communication back to Washington in 3 weeks. But this would be a rare 
occurrence.”120  
 
Spencer provides a similar description of how R&A branch officers in China attempt to 
fulfill requests from OSS headquarters. Upon receiving a question from OSS in Washington, 
OSS R&A officers in China would first draft a short memo to an OSS SI officer in China who 
could review materials available and task out the question to SI colleagues, but he cautioned that 
“under SACO it is doubtful whether we will get much of an answer.”121 The R&A officer could 
use other spokes of his network in the field, but these typically result in the request passing 
through multiple time-consuming relays before reaching a destination where the information 
might reside, and in many cases the requested information was still unavailable or unknown. He 
ends the description saying, “OSS is a bit undeveloped yet throughout the whole of the Far East. 
It will both take more time and more personnel for us to achieve a smooth efficient organization. 
We are still trying.”122  
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Communication problems between those requesting intelligence from headquarters 
offices and those providing it from the field were not at all exclusive to OSS. In his October 5 
personal letter to John Davies, John Service apologized for an intelligence mix-up over a 
typographical error that is almost comical. According to Service, Davies’ request for information 
on “factions” (as in political factions) of the CCP Army reached Yan’an as “functions,” 
presumably “after 16 paraphrasings” as it passed through the various channels of 
communications, Service wrote.123 Because the request seemed military in nature, Service passed 
it to Barrett, who reportedly “hit the roof” at receipt of such a broad request, and queried 
Chongqing to determine its meaning. They assigned him to complete the request, which resulted 
in a largely unnecessary extensive report on CCP Army “functions” and a severe delay in 
providing Davies the intelligence on factions that he had actually requested.  
Intelligence from Dixie was not necessarily circulating between agencies either. 
According to a candid description of dissemination practices by OSS’s Stelle, Service’s political 
reports—which addressed some of the most important political questions Dixie had been 
established to answer—experienced a slow, narrow, and dysfunctional distribution process 
within the U.S. government’s China experts. According to Stelle, only Stilwell’s office received 
the reports. Temporarily free of Army oversight on his communications while on his short trip to 
Kunming, Stelle complained to his superiors that “There is no point in Jack continuing his 
former practice of giving me unofficial copies, since in the first place the general community 
style of living we enjoy at Yenan isn't too conducive to doing things unbeknownst to the powers 
that be, an in the second place there is no way for me to get them out without their going through 
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G-2.”124 To circumvent what Stelle repeatedly referred to as “the problem of channels,” he 
suggested OSS officials in CBI offices access Service’s reports via Davies and then disseminate 
them secretly through OSS channels back to OSS officers serving in Kunming who needed the 
information. According to Stelle, the G2 had also failed to deliver copies of Cromley’s initial 
order of battle reports to OSS officials in Kunming, who obviously had a need and use for them. 
In both cases, Stelle specified that he doubted the slights were deliberate or political, but rather 
due to the volume of Dixie’s reporting coupled with the “limitations of staff and inefficiency in 
the G-2” that created “a first-class bottleneck” in G-2 offices in Chongqing.125  
Once Dixie Mission proposals and reports left Yan’an for higher levels of management 
within the sponsoring U.S. government agencies, a spirit of cooperation that existed in the field 
tended to rapidly disintegrate, reducing the overall efficacy of the mission in achieving its 
purposes. The early experiences of the U.S. Observer Group at Yan’an offer both negative and 
positive examples of how relationships between intelligence personnel in the field and their 
colleagues and superiors at headquarters offices mattered to the effective collection of foreign 
intelligence in World War II. Relationships between U.S. officials in China and those based in 
the United States were key in determining the administration of the war efforts and ultimately 
their outcomes. The potential pitfalls of administrative dysfunction within the emerging U.S. 
intelligence community only became more apparent as events in China moved further away from 
the strategic goals and interests of the United States and as the American national security 
bureaucracy expanded in the late 1940s. These implications probably were not obvious to the 
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Americans whose plane landed in Yan’an July 22, 1944 as they embarked on an exploration of 
their new temporary home with the CCP, but Dixie participants certainly had less doubt about 
this reality after the removal of General Stilwell from his role in China on October 19, 1944.  
Intelligence mission to CCP’s Chin-Ch’a-Chi Base Area 
General Stilwell asked Barrett in early fall 1944 to assemble a small group of U.S. 
officials to make a thorough inspection tour of the main CCP guerrilla base in an area known as 
Chin-Ch’a-Chi. In an interview in 1982, Major Wilbur “Pete” Peterkin, who was Barrett’s 
executive officer in the Dixie Mission, described “being volunteered” on September 26 by 
Barrett as the head of the delegation tasked with making the trek to the region’s capital 
headquarters at Fuping in Shaanxi province, from which the group would launch observation 
missions behind the Japanese lines with the CCP guerrillas as their guides. Barrett asked Peterkin 
and his group “gather intelligence on the Japanese and set up weather stations and air rescue 
bases for downed American airmen.”126 Several other Dixie Mission personnel accompanied 
Peterkin on the assignment, including the State Department’s Ray Ludden; Captain Brooke 
Dolan, Captain Paul Domke, Lieutenant Henry Whittlesey, and Sergeant Walter Gress from the 
Army; and Lieutenant Simon H. Hitch, the sole representative of the U.S. Navy assigned to the 
Dixie Mission.127 The group embarked by mule on October 6, 1944 and did not return until 
January 23, 1945—effectively missing the time of greatest transition and upheaval for the rest of 
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the Dixie Mission in Yan’an given their limited means of communication with the Yan’an base 
while traveling. 
Unlike many other U.S. officials who comprised the Dixie Mission, particularly in 
leadership roles, Peterkin had not made his career in the military or Foreign Service prior to the 
war. Peterkin’s preparation for leading the group had been accumulated almost entirely on the 
job, while serving as Barrett’s deputy in Yan’an and in his position immediately preceding his 
orders to Yan’an, where he served with Barrett in Guilin. Prior to the war, Peterkin had worked 
as a high school teacher and principal in a Seattle suburb. Peterkin hailed from a working-class 
family in Clinton, Iowa, and had put himself through college at the University of Oregon by 
working odd jobs to save up tuition money. He had graduated and started his teaching career in 
1931 at age 27.128 In the summer of 1941, Peterkin was called into active duty in the 15th 
Infantry, and he was attending infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia when the Pearl Harbor 
attack occurred. Given his background in education, Peterkin spent the first part of the war as a 
trainer at Fort Benning before being sent to officer school in April 1943.129 In the fall of 1943, 
Peterkin shipped out to China, where he served as a trainer for Chinese troops in the large 
American-run base area in Guilin, where he met Barrett, who was also working there at the time. 
Barrett was helping Stilwell and Davies assemble appropriate personnel for the initial Dixie 
Mission roster in the spring of 1944, when the Japanese troops began to approach and threaten 
Guilin. Recognizing Peterkin’s abilities as a trainer and aware that part of the Dixie Mission 
duties might be to train CCP troops, Barrett tapped Peterkin to join him on the trip to Yan’an. 
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Both Barrett and Peterkin had already rotated to Chongqing in preparation for the Yan’an 
mission when Guilin fell to the Japanese in late June 1944.130  
Peterkin had served in Yan’an almost as long as Barrett, and his duties included the day-
to-day staff administrative work for the mission as well as various training and observation 
duties Barrett assigned him. Peterkin had joined the Dixie Mission on August 7, 1944 when the 
second plane full of Americans reached Yan’an. As is frequently the case in military networks, 
the ages of the Dixie Mission members paralleled their respective ranks. Peterkin was 41 years 
old when he joined the Dixie Mission, close in age to Service and Davies, who were both in their 
late 30s, and younger than Barrett, who was 52 in 1944. Peterkin frequently gave talks and 
lectures to the CCP military leaders at Yan’an to help compare notes with them on how they 
were fighting the Japanese. His audiences often included such influential generals as Zhu De, 
Peng Dehuai, Ye Jianying, He Long, and Chen Yi. He also made frequent trips into the 
countryside around the Yan’an base area, such as one trip to Naniwan, 40 miles from Yan’an, 
where he watched a brigade of CCP soldiers build a new base.131 Experiences working closely 
with the CCP generals and his successful completion of several observation missions may have 
bolstered Barrett’s confidence in sending Peterkin on the Fuping trip.  
The trip to Fuping afforded Peterkin and his colleagues a completely unprecedented view 
of the activities in Communist-held north China, but their travels were neither smooth nor 
comfortable. Peterkin and his group ultimately traveled around 1,200 miles, “entirely by mule or 
on foot.”132 From October 6 until November 10, the group of Americans traveled from one 
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guerrilla hamlet to another as they slowly made their way to Fuping, where they were issued the 
“blue gray insulated pants and jacket, as well as a goatskin coat” that the guerrillas typically 
wore and gave them Chinese-style haircuts in an effort to disguise them as they began venturing 
closer to the Japanese-occupied areas.133 The Americans slept and ate alongside CCP hosts, 
experiencing the basic living conditions of people in the Chinese countryside at the time, which 
typically included no plumbing, heating, home electricity and a diet of rice with occasional 
supplementary vegetables. Along the entire route, CCP guerrillas escorted the American 
delegation in groups that Peterkin said numbered between small squads of 6 or 7 troops to an 
entire 1,500-man brigade at one point.134 
Several remarkable intelligence accomplishments emerged from the Fuping mission. The 
Americans happened to be at Fuping in November 1944 when CCP guerrilla troops brought in 
from the field a six-man American flight crew from a B-29 that the Japanese had downed over 
north China. The presence of Dixie Mission personnel at Fuping at that point facilitated the rapid 
debriefing of the American airmen, which Peterkin claimed yielded extremely rare and valuable 
intelligence on Japanese capabilities and positions in Manchuria.135 In addition, Peterkin and his 
American crew cooperate with their CCP hosts to collect intelligence on Japanese positions in 
the vicinity. The information that the CCP guerrillas provided enabled the Americans to produce 
highly detailed maps of the respective areas that the Japanese and the guerrillas held.136 The 
maps were a completely unique intelligence source for the United States at the time. Military 
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contacts between the United States and GMD guerrilla troops had charted out some other areas 
in eastern and northern China that happened to be under GMD control, but Peterkin’s Fuping 
delegation yielded the first tangible cartographic material documenting CCP and Japanese 
positions in terrain that U.S. troops might have to briefly help control or occupy if north China 
needed to later serve as a launching position for a final assault on the Japanese islands 
themselves at the end of the war. 
Along those lines, the Fuping mission also allowed Peterkin and the other American 
officials to investigate and report on the potential capabilities of the CCP troops for helping to 
support a U.S. military presence in north China if it was warranted later on in the war. Peterkin 
agreed with the CCP leadership’s assessment that with even a minimal amount of U.S. aid in the 
form of explosives, Communist troops “could effectively tie up all [Japanese] railroad traffic for 
two or three weeks,” which would help provide cover for American forces who might be 
planning an attack on the Japanese islands. Inspection of the railroads and tunnels near the 
military bases that the Japanese troops had established in the Chin-Ch’a-Chin base area bolstered 
Peterkin’s confidence in the assessments of CCP capabilities.137 However, such inspection of the 
Japanese areas proved to be quite dangerous work, and the Americans ultimately had to retreat 
back to Fuping after December 12 when the Japanese apparently learned of their presence in the 
region and began displaying posters offering a reward of $5,000 in gold for Peterkin himself, 
dead or alive. According to Peterkin, the group waited at Fuping until late December for the 
return of Lieutenant Whittlesey, whom Peterkin claimed had teamed up with some CCP contacts 
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and ventured out on an independent mission while Peterkin was away from Fuping inspecting the 
Japanese-held Beijing-Hankow Railroad.  
Peterkin and the rest of the delegation were restless, as their situation grew more 
dangerous the more awareness of their presence the Japanese had, and their presence was also 
beginning to risk the safety of their hosts. Moreover, the winter weather had intensified and was 
threatening to severely compromise their planned land-based return to Yan’an. By December 29, 
Peterkin said the Americans “could wait no longer” and departed Fuping for Yan’an, which they 
reached on January 23, 1945, trusting that the CCP guerrillas hosting their mission would 
facilitate Whittlesey’s passage back to the Yan’an Headquarters when possible. Peterkin and the 
other Dixie Mission participants learned of Whittlesey’s death via a special message from an 
extremely apologetic General Ye Jianying on February 4.138 Whittlesey and a CCP guerrilla who 
was serving as his guide had been shot and killed by a Japanese sniper in a town where fighting 
had occurred but that reportedly had been cleared. Whittlesey and the CCP counterpart had gone 
to the town to attempt to collect intelligence. Whittlesey’s death had a profound effect on the 
morale of the remaining Dixie participants. 
Conclusion: Stilwell departs 
In early October, conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell over how to mount the 
most effective military campaign to end the Japanese occupation of China and expansion 
throughout Asia came to a head. President Roosevelt, convinced that irreconcilable differences 
between the two stubborn military leaders would prevent any further progress on American goals 
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in the relationship, acquiesced to demands for Stilwell’s removal that the Generalissimo had 
been making for months. 
Stilwell’s sudden and secretive departure from China by October 20, before most 
journalists had learned of and begun to publicize his recall, precipitated a chain-reaction of 
personnel shifts within the CBI leadership that had direct and lasting effects on the American 
Observer Group in Yan’an. Stilwell’s replacement, Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, who 
had little linguistic or cultural expertise on China, initially took a greater interest than Stilwell 
had in the plans of OSS China, including various operational plans based out of Yan’an. Changes 
to high-level U.S. personnel in China in the fall of 1944 extended to the Embassy as well. 
Frustrated by the direction of U.S.-China relations and sidelined by the White House, U.S. 
Ambassador to China resigned his post in November 1944.139 Within days, President Roosevelt 
filled the opening in Chongqing with his long-time friend Patrick J. Hurley—a bold personality 
who had been serving as the President’s personal representative in China and who incited strong, 
mostly negative, responses from the other American government officials working in China at 
the time. Separate from but simultaneous to the tumult over U.S. diplomatic personnel transitions 
in China, Secretary of State Cordell Hull became ill and ultimately resigned in late November 
1944. Although President Roosevelt had restrained Hull’s influence throughout World War II, 
Hull’s indelible mark on the administrative culture of the State Department as its head from 1933 
to 1944 meant that his exit left the organization reeling. A significant portion of the U.S. 
diplomatic corps in 1944 had never served another secretary.  
                                                                
139 “Clarence Edward Gauss (1186-1960),” website, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, 
(https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/gauss-clarence-edward) accessed November 11, 2015. 
 
172 
 
As badly as Chiang Kai-shek might have desired it, discontinuation of the intelligence 
activities in Yan’an was not among the changes that resulted from Stilwell’s replacement. 
Instead, the mission to Yan’an limped along, attempting to implement its vague operational 
orders in the face of these dramatic changes in leadership and the resulting philosophical shifts 
regarding American interests and strategy in China. By the beginning of November 1944, the 
relatively new U.S. Observer Mission in Yan’an had transformed into a jaded unit of political 
survivors struggling to anticipate the next external shocks that might affect its future. Although 
the initial few months of the U.S. Army Observer Group’s presence in Yan’an fomented a spirit 
of cooperation and aura of optimism about the potential for an intelligence windfall, the fall of 
1944 delivered an undeniable reality check for all Dixie Mission participants and their 
supporting colleagues in Chongqing and Washington. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
After Stilwell: The Pillars of Support for the Dixie Mission Erode 
 
Without General Stilwell as both consumer and patron for the American intelligence 
efforts at Yan’an, communications between the Dixie Mission participants and the senior U.S. 
military and diplomatic leaders in China deteriorated significantly, jeopardizing U.S.-China 
policy and the war effort. By late 1944, U.S. officials based at Yan’an found it difficult to 
convey their analysis and observations of the Communist activities in north China to the new 
ambassador and theater commander, neither of whom had any significant expertise about China. 
Conversely, the Dixie Mission’s remote location, ambiguous orders, and improvised procedures 
for intelligence operations and analysis encouraged American officials at Yan’an to engage in 
activities that exceeded their mandate as intelligence officers and falsely raised the expectations 
of their CCP hosts about the potential direction of U.S.-China relations.  
Between October 1944 and March 1945, these trends coalesced into an intense conflict 
over whether and to what extent the U.S. should provide tangible military support to CCP 
guerrillas who were achieving success in the fight against Japan in northern China. Chiang Kai-
shek, still the main U.S. diplomatic counterpart and ally in China, firmly and vehemently 
opposed all plans to provide support to the CCP troops, regardless of the agreement he had made 
to work with the CCP to oppose Japan in an ersatz united front. Roosevelt’s new hand-picked 
Ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, who both represented and heavily influenced Roosevelt’s 
views on China policy in late 1944, argued that withholding materiel support from the Chinese 
Communists would force them to negotiate an agreement with the Nationalist Party-led Chinese 
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government. U.S. diplomats, and intelligence officers in China, including those in Yan’an, 
fundamentally disagreed with Hurley’s stance, arguing that domestic political conflict in China 
was inevitable and Hurley’s policy of withholding support for the CCP would drive the 
Communists to seek aid from the Soviet Union to protect themselves from Chiang Kai-shek.  
Participants in the U.S. Observer Group at Yan’an found themselves at the center of the 
conflict. The Group’s initial orders to determine the CCP capabilities and evaluate if and how the 
United States could involve CCP fighters in the war effort had required them to establish 
relationships with the CCP leaders. Although their core mission focused on the collection of 
information, which was intended to be disseminated to higher levels of decision making that 
could synthesize the intelligence into a broader diplomatic and strategic context, the military and 
paramilitary nature of the organizations staffing the U.S. Army Observer Group to Yan’an 
encouraged the participants to seek ways to launch operations that would further the war effort. 
Positive impressions of the CCP leaders in their first few months in Yan’an and their discovery 
that the CCP guerrillas were achieving some significant military successes against the Japanese 
contributed to the interest of American intelligence officials at Yan’an in aiding their CCP hosts, 
which the Dixie Mission participants universally supported in late 1944. Given their interest in 
furthering the military’s aims in the China Theater, Army representatives supported offering 
small arms and other supportive equipment to the guerrilla fighters, rationalizing that because the 
guerrillas were achieving measurable military successes against the Japanese occupiers with so 
few resources, additional support should multiply their success. OSS officers, unsurprisingly, 
viewed the situation from a more strategic perspective and anticipated using military aid as an 
incentive to encourage the CCP leaders to cooperate with a vast spy network the agency 
envisioned establishing throughout north China and the Korean Peninsula.  
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In general, the Dixie Mission participants perceived the loss of Stilwell’s patronage as a 
significant setback for U.S.-China relations and for their own intelligence work in support of the 
war effort, particularly those serving in the Army’s G-2 or those from the State Department 
whom Stilwell had detailed to serve CBI, a such as John Service and Ray Ludden. Many officials 
connected to the G-2 intelligence division of the Army’s General Staff in China had personal ties 
to Stilwell, and after his recall they could no longer rely upon his support for their work with the 
CCP. Their affiliation with Stilwell also cast a shadow over their reputations with both the 
Chinese Nationalists and the growing numbers of other American officials assigned to work in 
China who were not affiliated with Stilwell. The State Department ultimately recalled its officers 
that Stilwell had assigned to Yan’an with no plans to replace them, and they had all departed to 
Washington or other diplomatic assignments by the time FDR passed away in April 1945. Their 
departure left the Dixie Mission without their expertise in reporting about Chinese political 
affairs and their channels for its dissemination. OSS officers in Yan’an, such as Charles Stelle, 
rushed to expand their operations in north China and fill the void in reporting sensitive 
assessments about the Chinese Communist Party left when the State Department recalled its 
personnel from the Dixie Mission, with fairly limited success. 
By the spring of 1945, the conflict over arming the CCP pitted Roosevelt’s personalized 
form of diplomacy, whereby the President empowered his trusted contacts to engage in high-
level foreign policy decisions regardless of their area expertise, against the expert cohort of 
American diplomatic and military officials in China, who labored in an antiquated bureaucracy 
designed to address the much more limited pre-war foreign policy and intelligence needs of the 
United States. When a variety of political and personal factors led to the rejection of all the Dixie 
Mission plans and recommendations for supporting China’s Communist guerrillas, protests from 
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officials serving in Yan’an and other mid-level officials in Chongqing precipitated drastic 
personnel changes in the Observer Group and a significant change in tone that inhibited the 
expansion of intelligence operations in north China for the remainder of the time that Americans 
served in Yan’an. 
Plans for U.S. Intelligence Reorganization Underway in Washington  
As the members of the Dixie Mission attempted to weather the changes to their 
leadership and personnel in China, top civilian and military leaders in Washington DC began to 
propose their own plans for how the U.S. government should manage the collection and 
dissemination of intelligence once World War II ended, given the changed global security 
environment. The State Department submitted the first proposals for intelligence organization to 
the White House in August 1944. Proposals recommending that the State Department serve as 
the central coordinator of postwar intelligence circulated in Washington DC throughout 
September and October.1  
After the State Department initiated debate of the issue, OSS began drafting proposals of 
its own. Donovan had argued for the creation of a stand-alone strategic intelligence agency for 
wartime and peacetime since the Coordinator of Information office had been established in 1941, 
and the proposals he made to the White House in late October and November 1944 simply 
extended and specified these plans. Donovan distinguished his proposals from those of the State 
Department by recommending the creation of an independent agency that put supervision of the 
U.S. intelligence activities directly under the president, rather than running it through the 
diplomatic and military executive branch departments first.2  
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The flurry of debate and proposals for the reorganization of U.S. intelligence duties at 
this time reflects several priorities of the top U.S. leaders at the time. Policymaker interest in 
postwar intelligence demonstrated awareness among the American leadership both that the 
national security interests and obligations of the United States had changed and that pre-war 
intelligence processes were inadequate for the tasks the United States now faced in the global 
security environment. The leaders of individual agencies also wanted a postwar intelligence plan 
that preserved resources and powers that they already considered to be their agencies’ 
responsibility, and in many cases, they sought to expand the power and influence of their own 
agencies. In the face of disagreements over best practices in the intelligence process and having 
experienced frustrations in acquiring helpful and timely foreign intelligence through the 
American government throughout the war, heads of the U.S. civilian and military national 
security organizations displayed little trust that counterpart agencies could collect and 
disseminate foreign intelligence effectively.  
Given these assumptions, competition for influence and resources seemed inevitable. The 
new intelligence agency that Donovan proposed would retain the functions that had become most 
positively identified with OSS, including branches on Special Operations (SO); Secret 
Intelligence (SI); the X-2 branch, which handled covert action, Morale Operations (MO), which 
handled propaganda; and the Research and Analysis (R&A) branch. The proposed peacetime 
strategic intelligence agency would focus on the collection of sensitive strategic foreign 
intelligence information relevant to U.S. national security and interests. A key component of 
Donovan’s proposals included making the new agency the center hub within the U.S. 
government for coordinating the intelligence activities of other U.S. government agencies, 
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exclusively retaining the right to perform intelligence analysis “synthesis, and dissemination 
within the government.”3  
Unsurprisingly, the other agencies with vested budgetary and procedural interests in 
intelligence work perceived Donovan’s proposal as an attack on their interests. Throughout the 
early 1940s, the leaders of the Army and Navy attempted to develop and deploy a unified 
bureaucracy for communications and logistics specific to wartime military intelligence collection 
called the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA). Army and Navy officials in charge of 
JICA agreed on opposition to the proposals by the State Department and Donovan alike, but they 
struggled to form their own alternative plan. This outcome was hardly surprising given JICA’s 
reputation for duplicating efforts, slowing the release of intelligence, and generally adding a 
layer of intractable bureaucracy on top of the archaic methods of military intelligence in 
operation in 1943 and 1944.) Bradley Smith summarized the overall effect of Donovan’s 
proposals in achieving Donovan’s own goal of establishing a new peacetime intelligence agency 
with himself as head as “an unmitigated disaster,” but Smith argues persuasively that Donovan’s 
proposals, along with those of the State Department, succeeded in accelerating the debate over 
the long-term future of intelligence activities in the U.S. bureaucracy. As Smith explained, 
“every agency of the regular government was compelled to clarify its position and confront more 
directly the shortcomings of the prevailing intelligence system.”4  
Roosevelt allowed the debate between his subordinate executives to unfold until he 
finally entered the fray in mid-January 1945, recognizing that the war, and particularly the Pearl 
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Harbor attack, had demonstrated the need for intelligence reform. Roosevelt argued for the 
consolidation of duties for foreign intelligence between the State Department, War Department, 
and Department of the Navy, but rather than specifying how to resolve the conflict, he called on 
their leaders to negotiate a solution. Roosevelt’s response placed the status quo national security 
organizations at the center, largely ignoring Donovan’s plea for a new independent agency and 
dismissing outright the need for including commercial and economic intelligence along with 
diplomatic, political, and military topics that formed the mainstay of traditional U.S. strategic 
intelligence.  
Although these debates occurred at a high level in Washington DC, and they do not make 
specific reference to the Dixie Mission, the activities of those in forward-deployed field 
intelligence missions such as Dixie were closely related to proposals for postwar intelligence 
reforms. Moreover, the leaders of the organizations involved had the interagency competition in 
mind as they made decisions regarding intelligence operations around the world—examples from 
which could help or hurt their organization’s status in the struggle for influence. The Dixie 
Mission had always been a provocative project responsible for collecting and disseminating 
information that had the potential to stoke sensitive political controversies within the U.S. 
government as well as the potential to gather uniquely useful strategic information that could 
both hasten the end of the war with Japan and facilitate the establishment of a stable China to 
serve as a strategic partner for the United States in the postwar period.  
Bureaucratic growing pains within the nascent U.S. intelligence community as the 
requirements of World War II expanded its mandate were beginning to have transformative 
effects on the execution of intelligence operations in and around Yan’an and the reception of 
reports generated by the work of the Dixie Mission participants. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
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penetrating the foreign policy discourse occurring within the U.S. government generally required 
at least one of the following forms of status: influence from personal rank or title; influence by 
virtue of a close personal connection to an influential top leader; or, in certain cases, status 
resulting from one’s position in an accepted and respected bureaucratic process, such as the 
military, an executive branch organization, or Congress. President Roosevelt demonstrated a 
widely recognized preference for the first two forms of status and a begrudging acceptance of the 
last. The fact that fairly low-level American officials comprised the U.S. Observer Group in 
Yan’an throughout its tenure combined with the ad hoc and unprecedented nature of the Dixie 
Mission’s administrative organization placed American officials posted at Yan’an at a distinct 
disadvantage in terms of communicating their observations of the CCP to the top leaders in 
Washington, particularly given Roosevelt’s highly personalized foreign policy leadership style.  
In the midst of so many obstacles, the individual American officials posted at Yan’an 
from October 1944 to March 1945 collected a surprising amount of important non-public 
strategic information about the CCP and about the Japanese that has been preserved in the 
historical records, though it had little influence on policy at the time. Dixie Mission members 
who teamed with CCP counterparts to pursue field trips in the north China countryside and 
develop radio capabilities in the Communist areas drafted a series of reports impressive in 
quality and quantity during this period.5 Had these American officials served an experienced and 
professionalized American intelligence community, the reports may have influenced U.S. China 
policy. However, the immaturity of the dissemination channels for foreign intelligence within the 
U.S. bureaucracy in World War II coupled with the level of distraction that personnel changes 
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and diplomatic negotiations caused for American officials in Chongqing and Washington 
prevented the intelligence reports from influencing the policy discourse. 
Negative and positive procedural lessons learned from the experience of the U.S. Army 
Observer Group in Yan’an would serve as evidence and leverage in the debate over the future of 
America’s postwar national security regime. Conversely, the outcome of the debate in 
Washington could have a significant influence on the longevity and future functions of the 
American outpost in Yan’an, where American officials maintained direct personal contact with 
the leaders of the most powerful political opposition to the international recognized leadership of 
China’s government. With these larger organizational debates in the backdrop, the participants in 
the Dixie Mission and their supporting colleagues and managers attempted to provide the 
services requested of them, even as the requests and level of interest their audience exhibited 
changed significantly by April 1945. 
Big changes at the top: Fallout from Stilwell’s departure 
Upon their arrival in July 1944, participants in the U.S. Army Observer Group in Yan’an 
and their managers exhibited considerable confidence regarding the potential for unique and 
useful intelligence collection from Yan’an. These initial assessments relied on the continuation 
of several key conditions that were facilitating the group’s activities, including the presence of a 
powerful network of likeminded expert personnel that spanned several government 
organizations; a broad interagency mandate to succeed in their intelligence collection mission for 
the sake of the war; initial receptivity of the CCP leaders, who had little experience with 
Americans and were eager to reap recognition and tangible rewards from the relationship; the 
broad commitment of President Roosevelt to support the Chinese fight against Japan; and the 
nominal stated commitment of both CCP and Nationalist Chinese leaders to cooperate, 
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presenting an ersatz united front in the fight against the Japanese. By the end of 1944, these 
conditions were all deteriorating significantly, and the Observer Group experienced a rapid 
major shift in circumstances underpinning its early progress. In the period between General 
Stilwell’s departure in October 1944 and the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, Dixie 
Mission participants weathered shifts in their leadership and personnel that, combined with the 
bureaucratic and logistical constraints present since their arrival at Yan’an, significantly 
influenced both their effectiveness and morale. 
When disagreements between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell boiled over in 
September 1944 and resulted in Stilwell’s removal from China, the change triggered a series of 
personnel shifts and policy revisions that severely tested the American officials serving at the 
CCP base area. Stilwell’s replacement and the reorganization of the leadership structure of the 
China-Burma-India Theater set in motion a volatile transition period in the U.S. war effort in 
China that had a well-documented lasting impact on U.S.-China relations.6 The activities of the 
U.S. government in the Communist area became a key focal point for controversy between top 
U.S. leaders at this time, which severely affected the ability of those Americans serving at 
Yan’an to perform their jobs. Beyond simply hampering the collection and dissemination of vital 
intelligence from the CCP-held areas in China, the administrative chaos resulted in permanent 
negative career outcomes for several of the Dixie Mission participants at the time.  
General Stilwell had played a major role in supporting the efforts of the U.S. Observer 
Mission in Yan’an and in resisting the bureaucratic elements in the United States and China that 
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opposed the group’s creation or, in Donovan’s case, its Army leadership. The network of 
capable, motivated, and like-minded American China experts that Stilwell had developed from 
his protégés and carefully selected subordinates had been instrumental in launching the Dixie 
Mission and establishing constructive, cordial initial relations with the CCP between July and 
October 1944. Stilwell’s removal from his position as the sponsor of these efforts represented a 
major blow to the momentum and morale of those Americans serving in Yan’an. Stilwell’s 
departure called into question the group’s future, and subsequent leadership changes among the 
American contingent in China worsened the outlook for its continuation and productivity. The 
manner by which the president had removed Stilwell reportedly troubled many of the American 
officials working in China, who began to worry about the course that Roosevelt was setting for 
U.S.-China relations because the move suggested that Washington had failed to absorb critiques 
about the Chinese government that Stilwell and his subordinates had worked to convey 
throughout 1943 and 1944.  
In fact, Roosevelt had heard—and he shared—many of the concerns about Chiang Kai-
shek’s practices, but from his perspective, Stilwell’s behavior and attitude was beginning to 
threaten American relations with Chiang’s government, which Roosevelt believed would 
ultimately undermine U.S. interests in Asia and the U.S. war effort. Despite its many problems, 
Roosevelt and others argued that Chiang’s government still presented the most legitimate and 
capable ally for the United States in China, and even given the relative power and advantages of 
the United States in the relationship, Roosevelt calculated that the United States could ill afford 
to alienate Chiang. Moreover, mediating bickering between Stilwell and Chiang had become a 
serious distraction that was absorbing attention that the White House could not spare as the 
United States fought the war on two fronts and as Roosevelt approached the election for his 
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fourth term in office. In September and October 1944, Roosevelt became convinced that 
fundamental disagreements between Chiang Kai-shek and Joseph Stilwell about several key 
aspects of the strategy for fighting the Japanese had become irreconcilable.  
Stilwell’s approach to the war in China, which had been at the heart of a major 
disagreement between the Stilwell and Chiang for months, involved training Chinese troops in 
American infantry methods and leading them to secure the main transportation routes from India 
to China—a dangerous and grueling project. Stilwell perceived that because Chiang sought to 
avoid risking his troops and equipment, he wanted Americans to do the fighting instead so he 
could preserve his resources for the civil war in China that seemed likely to follow an Allied 
defeat of Japan. By 1943, Stilwell and his subordinates had poor impressions of the Chinese 
troops and military leaders serving under Chiang, and these views intensified throughout 1943 
and 1944. The frustration that Stilwell and his immediate subordinates felt working with Chiang 
and his forces became one factor influencing their interest in learning more about the Chinese 
Communists that drove the establishment of the Yan’an Observer Group.  
Chiang’s view of China’s role in the war against Japan differed significantly from 
Stilwell’s and caused the Chinese leader to repeatedly question Stilwell’s strategy and motives. 
Chiang and his troops had been fighting one opponent or another for most of the twentieth 
century, and they had been fighting the Japanese specifically since the 1930s, with little help 
from Western allies. Decades of fighting, as well as the demoralizing occupation of China that 
forced Chiang to reconstitute his government in Chongqing, a furnace of a city in the rural 
backwater of southwest China, had left the Chinese leaders and troops depleted and jaded. In a 
highly effective summary of the Chinese government perceptions in World War II, historian 
Rana Mitter describes Chiang’s view of China “as the first and most consistent foe of Axis 
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aggression.” According to Mitter, Chiang’s and many in the Chinese elite perceived that China’s 
perseverance, even in the complete absence of foreign assistance, entitled it to Western support 
and treatment as an equal power.7  
Moreover, the high number of Chinese military casualties potentially required to pursue 
Stilwell’s plans concerned Chiang, who remained distrustful of Stilwell and most other Western 
officials throughout the war. He suspected that Stilwell and other Western military commanders 
valued Chinese lives less than the lives of their own troops, and he doubted that Stilwell would 
pursue the same dangerous land-based strategy if he were commanding U.S. ground troops to 
participate in the battles. Chiang questioned why the United States, with all its resources and 
technology, would not make greater use of aerial campaigns in China, which he believed would 
achieve some of the same military purposes with a much lower cost of life. Chiang saw the Pearl 
Harbor attack as an opportunity to finally entice the United States and other Western powers to 
provide the resources and capabilities that they should have shared with China much earlier, 
before the Japanese had become such a strong global threat.8 Chiang’s pleas for the United States 
to provide American ground troops, planes, heavy artillery, and training in air warfare that 
Stilwell deemed unnecessary for the strategy being applied fed Stilwell’s perceptions that Chiang 
lacked seriousness about defeating the Japanese and was merely preparing for the coming 
domestic political showdown. 
Beyond their strategic disagreements, Chiang and Stilwell each had strong, stubborn 
personalities and frequently clashed over issues of personal pride, which probably contributed 
most to bringing the conflict between them to its finale as Roosevelt became frustrated with them 
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both in October 1944. By the end of the summer of 1944, the threat Japan presented to China had 
intensified. U.S.-operated base areas at Kunming and Guilin, key elements in the Allied supply 
chain through China, became vulnerable and Japanese bombing attacks on the seat of the 
Chinese government in Chongqing had increased. Sensing urgency, the U.S. military 
establishment in CBI began pressuring Roosevelt to intervene in their relationship with Chiang 
and his troops, which Stilwell and the U.S. military leaders believed were not nearly meeting 
their full fighting potential and were beginning to jeopardize U.S. efforts to help stop the 
progress of Japanese military aggression in China. After weeks of increasingly tense dialogue 
and correspondence between Stilwell, Chiang, officials in the Chinese government and 
diplomatic establishment, Marshall, and Roosevelt, the situation came to a head on September 
16, 1944, when Roosevelt issued a stern and condescending ultimatum to Chiang via a letter that 
General Marshall and his staff drafted and Roosevelt signed. The letter requested that Chiang 
place Stilwell in full command of all China’s troops or risk losing U.S. support—an ultimately 
toothless threat because the U.S. had no intention of abandoning China.  
Chiang had opposed this suggestion for several reasons, particularly his concern of the 
domestic political implications of Stilwell’s intention to fully incorporate Chinese Communist 
soldiers into the broader Chinese armed forces, which Chiang believed would weaken his 
authority and legitimacy, potentially upsetting the domestic political balance of power and 
threatening chances for a unified China. However, by the time FDR’s letter reached China, 
Chiang sensed that he was running out of options and had already decided to acquiesce to most 
of the president’s demands. Despite being informed of Chiang’s intentions, Stilwell insisted on 
delivering the letter from Marshall to Chiang in person in a move that appeared humiliating and 
spiteful to Chiang. The Generalissimo responded with extreme outrage, requesting Stilwell’s 
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immediate removal. The incident, which highlights the willingness of both Chiang and Stilwell 
to become intractable to the point of childishness in negotiations with each other, served as the 
last straw for Roosevelt, who initiated Stilwell’s recall without delay.9 
Stilwell’s abrupt removal from his position precipitated a numerous significant changes 
to the U.S. war effort in the CBI Theater that were implemented starting in late October 1944. 
The theater command split into three distinct sections—instead of China, Burma, India (CBI) 
Theater under the command of General Stilwell, the activities of U.S. forces in East Asia divided 
into a China theater, under the command of Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer; a Southeast 
Asia theater, under command of Lieutenant General Raymond Wheeler; and an India-Burma 
theater under Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, the latter two of which both fell under the 
South East Asia Command (SEAC).10 Many U.S. military leaders had argued for this change 
throughout 1943 and early 1944, and it met with substantial support from Americans serving in 
China, particularly for its ability to streamline communication channels. Stilwell reportedly left 
China in a hurry and with a good deal of bitterness, not staying to brief his successor Wedemeyer 
or taking time to leave him any particular advice for filling his new role as Chiang’s main 
counterpart in the U.S. military. As Tuchman explained, Marshall ordered Stilwell to depart 
China within 48 hours and in secret, fearing that Stilwell, never one to hold his tongue, would 
say something that would incite the further deterioration of relations with China or that might 
inhibit the ability of Marshall to find Stilwell, his protégé and long-time friend, an appropriate 
subsequent assignment.11 Stilwell and Chiang reportedly did bid each other a shallow and cordial 
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farewell. According to Tuchman, Stilwell’s final words to the Generalissimo were a popular 
Chinese proverb, Zuihou shengli (“For the Final Victory!”).12   
Wedemeyer on the scene  
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer represented a consensus choice for Stilwell’s 
replacement—an amiable and articulate officer who knew “how to work with everyone.”13 
Wedemeyer’s salient characteristics when promoted to command the China Theater included 
youth—47 years old compared to Stilwell, who was 61 that year—and an ambitious, egotistical 
persona. Youth and capability may have helped mitigate the effect of Wedemeyer’s reputation 
for arrogance among both the Chinese leadership and the senior U.S. diplomatic and military 
officials in China who all supported his selection as Stilwell’s replacement.14 Wedemeyer had 
some credibility with the Army China hands because he had served under Stilwell and Marshall 
in the 15th Infantry in Tianjin from 1930 to 1932, but he was not considered part of the Stilwell 
network within the Army. Shortly after serving in China, Wedemeyer had pursued advanced 
officer training at Leavenworth and had studied the General Staff work of the Nazi regime at the 
German War College from 1936 to 1938, an experience that by his own account heavily 
influenced his rigid commitment to staff protocols and deep respect for the chain of command, 
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though he distanced himself from the regime’s ideology.15 After his return from Germany, 
Wedemeyer served in the War Department Planning Division until after the Pearl Harbor attack. 
He was then assigned to head American efforts in the SEAC Theater.  
Wedemeyer’s distance from Stilwell and lack of familiarity with Chinese domestic 
politics may have appealed to Chiang Kai-shek and his close advisors, who believed that 
Wedemeyer’s naiveté could make him more malleable and acceptant of their recommendations. 
Wedemeyer showed Chiang much greater personal deference than Stilwell had, particularly on 
intelligence matters within China’s territorial boundaries, but Chiang’s optimism about a 
significant strategic shift once Stilwell was gone proved baseless. Wedemeyer’s commitment to 
continue many of Stilwell’s policies, particularly the tight control of U.S. Lend-Lease supplies to 
China, angered the Chinese leader. Chiang accused the United States of using its aid to China’s 
military to convince the soldiers to worship foreigners, undermining his leadership over his own 
troops.16 Chiang and his aides were more satisfied with the other major personnel change that 
occurred in the fall of 1944: the replacement of U.S. Ambassador to China Clarence E. Gauss 
with Roosevelt’s longtime friend Patrick Hurley. The Americans participating the Dixie Mission 
and their CCP counterparts were significantly less pleased with Hurley’s appointment. 
Wedemeyer despaired at the lack of coordination between the various U.S. intelligence 
organizations vying for influence in China. In an effort to disentangle intelligence activities 
occurring in his theater of battle, Wedemeyer sought to consolidate control over all China 
intelligence in one officer. Wedemeyer offered the position to Colonel Richard Heppner, an OSS 
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officer who had been serving in the China Theater since the beginning of the war in the first 
week of November. Heppner would not have been Donovan’s first choice for the position, but 
OSS China was reeling from a humiliating late October diplomatic incident in which a senior 
OSS officer in Chongqing had gone on a drunken tirade at a party held by China’s central 
government, during which the officer publicly insulted Chiang Kai-shek and his wife.17 The 
incident so angered the Chinese government that Chiang’s intelligence chief Tai Li considered 
refusing to allow any future OSS operations. Wedemeyer intervened and suggested that Heppner 
could perform the OSS position in a way the Chinese would find acceptable and also bring the 
various American intelligence officers in China to heel.  
Heppner agreed to take the position Wedemeyer offered him only with several significant 
conditions that, as Maochun Yu described them, “would grant virtual independence to 
OSS/China, away from OSS Headquarters.” Heppner would answer directly to Wedemeyer, all 
OSS supplies would be routed through India and not China (making them separate from other 
U.S. military supplies and thus secret to the Chinese government), and that 300 American 
“commando units” be provisioned for China.18 Furthermore, Heppner would staff his office in 
Chongqing with subordinates that he trusted, which meant even more personnel shifts among the 
American government presence in China in November 1944. Heppner’s deputy officer and every 
OSS branch officer serving OSS China in Chongqing as of late November 1944 were brand new.  
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Replacement of Ambassador Gauss 
A veteran diplomat who received his first diplomatic appointment in 1906, Clarence 
Gauss had spent most of his career representing the United States in China in various diplomatic 
positions. His calm and thoughtful demeanor and his frank assessments of foreign affairs earned 
Gauss the nickname “the Honest Buddha,” and he lived up to the quiet, earnest reputation that 
the name implied to the very end of his tenure as the head of the U.S. diplomatic presence in 
China.19 President Roosevelt appointed Gauss to be U.S. ambassador to China in 1941, but the 
president varied between an attitude of ambivalence to Gauss and episodes of quietly researching 
more politically expedient replacements for him.20  
Both Gauss and the President had raised the possibility of Gauss resigning his position 
numerous times between 1941 and 1944. However, Roosevelt’s interest in appointing a new 
ambassador failed to reach a boiling point until Stilwell’s conflict with Chiang Kai-shek 
necessitated change to U.S. personnel in China. On November 14, 1944, Gauss officially quit the 
position and requested reassignment elsewhere in the diplomatic service. Gauss resigned of his 
own volition, but Roosevelt did not protest his action. Despite the fact that Gauss and Stilwell 
regularly experienced professional disagreements and did not particularly like each other, Gauss 
expressed grave concerns over the treatment of Stilwell and the direction of U.S.-China relations 
in 1944 as among his reasons for resigning.21  
In the days before his resignation, Gauss expressed particular pessimism about the future 
of negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and the CCP. Gauss succinctly articulated his 
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assessment of the situation in a cable to the Secretary of State on November 4, 1944, writing, 
“Almost all moves these days, political or military, of Chiang and his medievally minded cohorts 
revolve around the pressing problem of maintaining themselves in power, and under these 
circumstances there is little if any possibility of achieving a reasonable or realistic settlement of 
either the Communist or the other difficulties which are more and more besetting Chiang's 
regime as the weeks go by.”22 Many American officials who had served in China through the 
early 1940s agreed completely with Gauss. 
Gauss had offered little support to the OSS or plans to expand U.S. intelligence activities 
in China. Through back channels, he had reportedly protested the first awkward operations of 
OSS in China in 1942, and he closely supervised John King Fairbank, one of Donovan’s first and 
most capable intelligence officers focused on China who was assigned to the U.S. Embassy 
undercover in 1942.23 The tepid reaction of Gauss to the dispatch of the Yan’an Observer group 
in 1944 did not present an obstacle, per se, but Gauss provided no help either. Despite his 
ambivalence about the mission to Yan’an, Gauss reportedly had great respect for and supported 
Jack Service, with whom he had cooperated in the Foreign Service in various capacities over 
several decades.  
Despite the fact that he lacked the depth of linguistic and cultural expertise on China that 
many of his subordinates achieved, Gauss enjoyed a generally positive reputation with the close-
knit group of American officials who worked in China in the 1930s and 1940s. In his memoirs, 
David Barrett described his perceptions of Gauss, formed while Barrett served under him as 
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military attaché in the U.S. Embassy in China: “Mr. Gauss did not speak Chinese, and in some 
ways he may have regarded the Chinese more from the viewpoint of a treaty port businessman 
than a “China hand.” He certainly did not have a missionary outlook.”24 Despite his inability to 
speak Chinese, Gauss was “scrupulously fair” in all dealings with Chinese people, according to 
Barrett, who added that he “could not have asked to serve under a kinder, fairer, or more 
considerate chief of mission.”  
Days after Gauss officially resigned in November 1944, President Roosevelt quickly 
filled the vacancy in the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing with his long-time friend and political 
crony Patrick J. Hurley, whose official appointment to the position the White House announced 
on November 17. Although the effects of this decision did not manifest immediately, the 
selection of Hurley for the position ultimately had a dramatic impact on the relationship between 
the U.S. government and the CCP that Dixie Mission officials had been working to foster. 
Compared to Gauss, Hurley was less ambivalent about the CCP and less informed—a difference 
that had significant repercussions for the Dixie Mission and for American foreign policy in 
China in 1945. Moreover, the transition between these two ambassadors is emblematic of trends 
in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy that had far-reaching consequences 
for the development of the nascent U.S. intelligence community, which was an immature arm of 
the American national security regime at this point.  
The transition from Gauss to Hurley as U.S. ambassador in China is representative of the 
major shifts underway in the United States foreign policy apparatus during World War II under 
Roosevelt’s leadership. Gauss symbolized the traditional cohort of well-educated and articulate 
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but reserved and non-interventionist American public servants who joined the U.S. Foreign 
Service in the 1920s and 1930s. Although Gauss maintained a distance from Chinese culture, 
never even learning the language to any level of fluency despite spending most of his diplomatic 
career assigned to Chinese cities, he did attempt to serve as an objective observer of Chinese 
affairs and an effective representative of U.S interests there. Patrick Hurley brought a much 
different background to the position, directly reflective of Roosevelt’s leadership style and the 
expansion of U.S. strategic interests as the United States began to play a more important role in 
global security during World War II. Rather than perceiving himself as part of an elite network 
of public servants representing American interests abroad, Hurley formed his attitudes about his 
position in China based on his history as a seasoned Washington insider and through his role as 
FDR’s appointed personal emissary to Chiang Kai-shek starting in 1943. For Hurley, as for 
Roosevelt, diplomacy and foreign affairs required highly personalized engagement, private 
communication channels, and one-on-one relationships. Neither Hurley nor Roosevelt exhibited 
much respect for the role of professionalized bureaucratic administrative processes in 
international relations. 
An Oklahoma native, Hurley had emerged from humble beginnings in a large Irish 
Catholic family supported by his father’s work as a rancher and coal miner to become an 
influential and wealthy attorney for the burgeoning oil industry in his home state. His successful 
legal career not only made Hurley a young millionaire but also launched him onto a political 
trajectory when he accepted an appointment as the federal legal representative to the Choctaw 
tribe, which had been relocated to reservation space in Oklahoma. Hurley worked for the Taft 
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and Wilson administrations in this capacity.25 Hurley never held an elected political office, but 
his connections in politics and with the Republican Party in Oklahoma eventually led to his 
appointment to serve as Undersecretary of War at the beginning of Herbert Hoover’s term in 
office. The death of Hoover’s appointed War Secretary only days later led to Hurley’s sudden 
and unexpected promotion to Secretary. That position opened the door to Hurley’s lasting 
political influence, both in the Herbert Hoover administration and with Franklin Roosevelt.  
A staunch Republican, Hurley might have seemed an unlikely friend for FDR, but 
Hurley’s ability to form personal relationships superseded his commitment to partisan politics 
throughout his career and his deep admiration for Theodore Roosevelt and the era of progressive 
reform had shaped Hurley’s views in a way that Franklin Roosevelt apparently found sufficiently 
palatable. Hurley’s biographer described him as “an opportunist” and “an accommodator of 
people in high position, especially of presidents.” According to Buhite, “While he served his 
country ably in various capacities, some of them requiring considerable sacrifice on his part, his 
life and work may best be understood in terms of the promotion, for some explicable and some 
inexplicable reasons, of Hurley—his wealth, influence, and prestige.”26 Hurley cultivated a 
special relationship with FDR throughout the 1930s, and by the 1940s, their relationship was 
sufficiently intimate that when Hurley had prostate surgery in June 1943, Hurley’s doctor called 
the White House to offer his assessment of the patient, including specific details of the surgery.27 
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Hurley must have made a good recovery because no other references to his health appear in the 
historical records from 1943, when President Roosevelt asked Hurley to serve as a “personal 
international emissary” to China.28  
Although several presidential administrations had dispatched Hurley as a negotiator on 
behalf of the U.S. government in special diplomatic engagements in the Philippines and the 
Middle East, foreign travel and international exposure seemingly reinforced Hurley’s narrow 
Western-centric world view rather than expanding his ability to communicate across cultural 
boundaries.29 In one famous gaffe, Hurley publically referred to Chiang Kai-shek’s wife, whose 
full name was Meiling Soong Chiang, as “Madame Shek,” never realizing or recognizing his 
mistake in assuming that Chinese names adhered to the same principles as Western names.30 
Similar to Gauss, Hurley lacked specific expertise about China, but he also lacked the humility 
and sense of fairness with which Gauss reputedly approached conversations with his Chinese 
counterparts.  
In many ways, Gauss represented the highly organized and gentlemanly status quo 
system for diplomacy that had worked well for the United States when it defined its role and 
interests in the international setting much more narrowly. Roosevelt observed that this network 
of urbane diplomats was too antiquated to cope with the expansion of strategic priorities that had 
followed from the global events of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Whereas Truman would later 
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undertake massive reforms to the system to adapt the organization to the post-Pearl Harbor needs 
of the United States, FDR’s personality led him to approach this deficiency by simply working 
around the antiquated system and appointing people he thought he could trust to perform the 
necessary tasks in an ad hoc fashion. This technique worked better in some cases than in others, 
and history has revealed that the U.S. diplomatic experience in China in the 1940s was not 
among the success stories in terms of the ability of U.S. diplomats to understand Chinese 
domestic politics or exert influence on Chinese actors in preservation of long-term U.S foreign 
policy interests.  
In stark contrast to Gauss, Hurley bonded with Roosevelt over their shared position that 
personal relationships often mattered more than ideology in diplomacy. Hurley’s biographer 
Buhite specifically noted this similarity between Hurley and Roosevelt. Buhite wrote of Hurley, 
“In his association with foreign statesmen later in his career, [Hurley] seems to have believed 
that handshakes, smiles, anecdote swapping and other forms of personal camaraderie would 
sweep away divisive and long-standing issues; in this sense he resembled Franklin Roosevelt.”31 
In service of this notion, Hurley could reportedly be extremely charming and had a tendency to 
communicate with a sense of familiarity that caused many to remark on his ability to make a 
good impression, at least with other Americans he met.  
Evidence of Roosevelt sidelining traditional diplomatic channels in the relationship with 
China surfaces with regularity starting early in World War II, and FDR made no secret of his 
willingness to bypass the State Department and Gauss in particular. FDR began considering 
replacing Gauss with a political choice he could trust as early as November 1942, when he had 
his aides draft multiple lists of possible candidates for the ambassadorship in Chongqing. The 
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aides at that time attempted to persuade State Department East Asia specialist Stanley Hornbeck 
to take the position, but Hornbeck had reservations, particularly about undercutting his colleague 
Gauss, and FDR moved on.32 Months later in October 1943, Roosevelt continued to consider a 
transition. The president sent a memo asking trusted State Department Undersecretary Ed 
Stettinius, whom Roosevelt later appointed Secretary of State, to quietly research Gauss’ 
standing in China and whether his replacement would be prudent. Regarding the U.S. 
Ambassador position in Chongqing, Roosevelt wrote, “I do not believe that it is necessary to 
send a career diplomat there.”33 Roosevelt himself corresponded directly with Chiang Kai-shek 
throughout the early 1940s, and throughout World War II, the president bent the traditional rules 
of diplomatic representation by frequently relying on a combination of personal contact with 
Chiang Kai-shek and those in his immediate inner circle and selecting special personal 
emissaries to meet with Chiang on his behalf.  
Roosevelt did not add Hurley to his list of contenders to replace Gauss until late in the 
conflict between Stilwell and Chiang, though Hurley had been in China as a special envoy. The 
Pearl Harbor attack had spurred Hurley to approach George Marshall about serving the war 
effort in a military capacity. Hurley had remained in the army reserves after a short and not very 
illustrious military career in the army during World War I. Marshall, reportedly less than excited 
about finding a position for an aging friend of the president with no particular military 
capabilities in his serious war effort, rejected Hurley’s appeal. When Hurley asked Roosevelt to 
intervene and overturn Marshall’s decision, Roosevelt vowed instead to find an appropriate 
                                                                
32 Handwritten notes and lists of potential candidates for China ambassador, November 30, 1942, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Library, President's Official Files, Box 3: China, Folder: China endorsements.  
 
33 Memo to Stettinius regarding FDR's attitude about Gauss, China Ambassadorship, October 22, 1943. Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's File, Departmental Files, Box 71: State Department, Apr - Dec 
1941 through 1945, Folder: July - Dec 1943. 
 
199 
 
alternate assignment for Hurley—a task that Roosevelt pursued throughout the early 1940s. FDR 
first attempted to send Hurley to negotiate war efforts with the Saudis, but advisers in the War 
Department saw too many potential conflicts of interest and suggested that Hurley instead be 
sent to China, where friction between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek threatened war efforts as 
early as 1942.34  
When Patrick Hurley became Roosevelt’s most important special emissary in China, his 
arrival sidelined Gauss. In his memoirs, Barrett—a keen observer of matters of diplomatic 
protocol and administrative norms in both the U.S. and Chinese governments—noted the breech 
in protocol and its implications. In particular, Barrett pointed to FDR’s decision not to invite 
Gauss to be present at the meetings between Chiang Kai-shek and Vice President Wallace in 
June 1944, in which Wallace pushed for, and ultimately obtained Chiang’s acquiescence to, 
American plans to send an observer delegation to the CCP base in Yan’an. According to Barrett, 
Gauss endured this humiliating snub although other American officials of “much less 
importance” did attend the meetings. Barrett describes the situation as “an example of 
‘representation by special emissary’ at its worst,” and explains that because Gauss had a 
responsibility to maintain U.S. relations with the Chinese government on a “continuous, not just 
a ‘here today and gone tomorrow’ basis,” his absence from the meetings would “unavoidably 
operate to make his task in China more difficult.”35 
Hurley was sent to China in this unique capacity to meet with Chiang Kai-shek in 
advance of the Cairo Conference of November 1943. The conference, which historian Rana 
Mitter has described as the “the only major conference of the war that attempted to make a 
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comprehensive settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict,” and at which Chiang would see 
President Roosevelt, would be in an important event for Chiang, who was pressing for a private 
audience with Joseph Stalin in Teheran.36 Chiang feared that Russia intended to “communize” all 
of China and annex portions of it.37 Historians of the Cold War era, who ultimately viewed 
Hurley as one of the greatest American opponents of communism in China, might be surprised to 
realize that Hurley spent a significant portion of his first meeting with Chiang Kai-shek 
convincing the Generalissimo that Stalin had renounced “world conquest as a fundamental policy 
of communism” and, in Hurley’s opinion, “Russia was no long subsidizing or directing 
communist activities in other nations.38  
Although Hurley’s commentary about Stalin proved unconvincing to Chiang, the Chinese 
leader perceived Hurley’s arrival as an effort by Roosevelt to ensure the Chinese leader fully 
understood the position that Roosevelt intended to take in discussions with Churchill and Stalin. 
For Hurley’s part, although he lacked specific expertise on Chinese politics, he emerged from 
meetings with Chiang in agreement with General Stilwell and other American officials in China 
regarding Chiang’s motives. Hurley informed President Roosevelt that “it is advisable to 
consider with some skepticism the Chinese capacity, or readiness, to contribute materially to 
offensive warfare” and similarly advisable to “give consideration to the relative importance 
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placed by the Chinese Central Government upon conserving its strength for the maintenance of 
its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan.”39  
As Chiang’s relationship with General Stilwell gradually became more strained in 1943 
and early 1944, Chiang’s willingness to work with Hurley improved.40 Hurley enjoyed working 
with Chiang and asked to be made Ambassador, a request that FDR had probably decided to 
honor as early as August 1944.41 Hurley’s vantage point on the situation between Stilwell and 
Chiang hastened the end of the former official’s career in China. In a memo to Roosevelt on 
October 9, 1944, only a few days before Stilwell’s dismissal, Hurley described Stilwell and 
Chiang as “fundamentally incompatible.”42 Based on this assessment, Hurley advised FDR: 
“Today you are confronted with a choice between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell.”43 FDR, 
judging the Generalissimo to be more vital to the U.S. interest in China, followed Hurley’s 
recommendation and recalled Stilwell. Roosevelt continued to follow most of Roosevelt’s 
suggestions about China until the president’s death in April 1945. Thus, Roosevelt’s appointment 
of Hurley had significant and lasting effects on the ability of the Dixie Mission participants to 
perform their intelligence duties. 
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“The Hurley Burley” 
The new U.S. Ambassador to China changed the tone of relations between the United 
States and the Chinese leaders, and the effects of his vision and personal style on the American 
relationship with the Chinese Communists permanently altered the composition, activities, and 
effectiveness of the U.S. Army Observer Mission at Yan’an. Patrick Hurley made an entrance on 
the delicate political landscape in China that David Barrett’s nephew, historian John Hart, 
likened to the level of “devastation of a tornado from his native Oklahoma.” Hurley’s verbose 
and boisterous approach to diplomacy was about as foreign as possible compared to the standard 
demure disposition that most Chinese statesmen at the time exhibited. Hurley’s biographer, 
historian Russell Buhite, described Hurley as “mercurial-tempered”—a seemingly apt 
assessment given that the Ambassador “roared commands; he hurled profane charges; and he 
threatened to fire his ablest people.”44 U.S. officials who met with Hurley universally described 
his affinity for hearing himself talk and his tendency to monopolize meetings with rambling and 
disorganized monologues. Former Ambassador Gauss told Hart in a letter in 1960 that behind his 
back, Gauss and others in the U.S. Embassy facetiously referred to Hurley’s brash and garrulous 
style as the “Hurley Burley.”45 
Beyond simply serving as a divisive figure in the history of U.S.-China relations, Hurley 
attracted vehement negative reactions from many U.S. officials with whom he had contact during 
his time in China, not to mention the even stronger disapproval he garnered from the CCP 
leaders he met in 1944 and 1945. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were said to have referred to 
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Hurley as “the clown” from as early as their first meeting with him in November 1944.46 One of 
the few people to make positive comments about Hurley in this period was Chiang Kai-shek, 
who wrote to Roosevelt that Hurley had Chiang’s “complete confidence” and praising Hurley’s 
“rare knowledge of human nature.”47 
To say that Hurley was unpopular among American officials in China in 1944 and 1945 
profoundly understates the intensity of contemporary accounts and remembrances of the 
officials, which contain a litany of derogatory comments on Hurley’s behavior and attitude. 
Indeed, positive impressions of Roosevelt’s chosen ambassador in this period are rare and 
difficult to find. Far more common in correspondence between lower-level U.S. government 
officials in China are comments such as this one from an OSS CBI manager posted in India: 
“People are generally at a loss to discover those qualities which have made him such a great 
favorite with the president.”48 Years later, negative perceptions of Hurley had only intensified for 
those who had encountered him in China. For example, in a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright 
in 1972, the normally amiable and genteel Jack Service wrote, “Hurley in my opinion was a 
stuffed shirt and phony, of limited mentality, and in some ways as vicious as a rattlesnake. At the 
time he came to Yenan, he had already begun to show symptoms of senility. Why President 
Roosevelt ever chose him for such an important mission, I have never been able to 
understand.”49 
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A complete newcomer to China with no previous knowledge of Chinese politics, Hurley 
did not share the skepticism Gauss and Stilwell had expressed about Chiang Kai-shek’s 
intentions and capabilities. Although they did not have what could be considered a friendship, 
Gauss and Stilwell agreed upon growing suspicion of Chiang Kai-shek in 1944 based on their 
dealings with him, and both Gauss and Stilwell recognized the CCP as serious challengers for 
political power in China. Conversely, Hurley viewed the Generalissimo with the highest possible 
respect and an almost uncritical eye. Hurley’s close personal relationship, and considerable time 
spent dining and conversing, with Chiang made it difficult for Hurley to learn objectively about 
the full scope of challenges in the Chinese political scene or appreciate the depth of enmity 
between the Nationalists and the Communists. Moreover, a visit with then Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov during a brief trip to Moscow Hurley completed in 1944 while en 
route to China made an indelible impression on Hurley’s perception of the Chinese Communist 
Party.50 Hurley frequently reported using Molotov’s assurances that the CCP did not conform to 
the true definition of a Communist Party and thus had little hope of bringing about socialist 
revolution in China in his attempts to reassure Chiang Kai-shek regarding CCP capabilities and 
intentions.51  
Similar to his friend and patron, President Roosevelt, Patrick Hurley displayed little 
respect for American officials stationed in China, including those in military positions as well as 
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those in diplomatic positions who were technically his subordinates. Hurley rarely shared any 
information with his Embassy staff about his negotiations with either the Chinese Communists or 
the Generalissimo, preferring to bypass State Department channels and communicate only with 
President Roosevelt. The Embassy staff responded to this treatment by referring to Hurley 
behind his back as “Colonel Blimp” and other derogatory names. When U.S. diplomatic officials 
finally began to complain to the White House through back channels about this arrangement, 
Hurley accused the embassy staff in China of disloyalty and ignorance regarding U.S. interests in 
China.52 Hurley’s behavior and attitude did not earn him the trust or support of his diplomatic 
staff, who presumably could have been an asset in the negotiations between the Nationalists and 
Communists that he attempted to undertake. In some cases, Hurley’s disrespect for other 
Americans working in the China Theater degenerated into actual arguments. According to 
Hurley’s biographer, at a cocktail party in Chongqing, the Ambassador once engaged General 
Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff Robert McClure in an argument so heated that Hurley ultimately 
challenged McClure to a fist fight in front of a full complement of Chinese diplomatic and 
military counterparts. Other American officials interrupted the argument before it could escalate 
further, but the situation cast the American delegation in a bad light vis-à-vis their Chinese 
allies.53 
Hurley’s negotiations with the CCP 
The tumult that Hurley caused among the American officials serving in Chongqing 
quickly spread to Yan’an beginning with Hurley’s first visit to the CCP base on November 7, 
1944, during which he began negotiating the CCP role in a coalition government for China. As 
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Roosevelt’s friend and special appointee, Hurley’s opinions on China policy were congruent 
with the President’s, and he had considerable influence in the Oval Office. Hurley traveled to 
Yan’an prepared to represent Roosevelt’s specific interest in finding a way to maintain a stable 
China as a bulwark against the expansion of Japanese territory, which he believed was essential 
to winning the war and future global security.54 Based on reports he had received from Stilwell 
and others during the first years of the war, Roosevelt had determined that a politically unified 
and stable China could best achieve this goal, but he (or more likely, Hurley) may not have fully 
understood the intensity of the domestic political conflict brewing in China at the time. Although 
the events of 1944 had clearly shaken Roosevelt’s confidence in Chiang, the president continued 
to argue that China’s best chance of political unification involved forming some sort of 
democratic coalition government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, whom he assessed to 
be the most competent leader in China and the one most likely to be accepted by other world 
leaders. Roosevelt concluded that the greatest potential threats to a unified democratic 
government in China would be a Communist civil war victory, which he feared not for specific 
ideological reasons as Truman would, but because he believed the Communists were not strong 
enough to hold the country together, and the threat of Soviet intervention. Thus, in cooperation 
with Hurley, from October 1944 until his death in April 1945 aimed to prevent Soviet aid to the 
CCP and force the latter party into negotiations with the Nationalists—a China policy to which 
historian Michael Schaller referred as “flawed in both conception and execution.”55 In service of 
                                                                
54 Since many relevant official documents were declassified in the 1970s, historians have achieved a broad 
consensus on Roosevelt’s views and interests at this point in the war. For example, see Warren I. Cohen, America’s 
Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, Fifth Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), 159-165 and Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 177-178. 
55 Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 177. 
 
207 
 
this policy, Hurley undertook the chore of mediating the conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and 
the CCP, beginning with a visit to the CCP base. 
Hurley’s sudden decision to undertake an unannounced and unplanned inspection tour 
and to meet the Chinese Communist leaders for himself surprised both American and CCP 
officials at Yan’an, who scrambled to accommodate him when he emerged from the regular 
weekly plane to Yan’an. The CCP leaders had extended repeated invitations to Hurley beginning 
in September 1944. A few days after arriving for his first and only visit to Yan’an, John Davies 
had also urged Hurley to tour Yan’an and meet the Communist leaders in a telegram delivered 
October 27, but the Ambassador had ignored all of them lest he be seen by the American public 
as undermining America’s main ally in China, Chiang, by recognizing the CCP leaders with his 
presence, particularly prior to election day in the United States.56 Consistent with his personal 
style, Hurley reportedly startled Zhou Enlai, who was present to meet the plane with Dixie’s Col. 
Barrett, when he emerged from the plane wearing an army uniform emblazoned with what 
Barrett joked—to Hurley’s displeasure—was “every American campaign ribbon but Shay’s 
Rebellion.”57 Hurley’s appearance presented an ostentatious display for which the awkwardness 
was only magnified by Hurley’s minimal and brief battlefield experience, particularly given his 
audience of battle-hardened CCP hosts, who had spent most of the previous two decades 
engaged in guerrilla warfare, living in caves, and proceeding by foot across the Chinese 
countryside the Long March. Hurley compounded the effect of his arrival by standing in front of 
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the CCP honor guard hastily assembled to greet him and emitting a startling Choctaw Indian 
battle cry at the top of his lungs, in homage to his home state of Oklahoma.58    
Although initially impressed at Hurley’s determination to visit Yan’an, a fairly dangerous 
act at the time given the escalation of Japanese bombings, the CCP leaders reportedly were not 
particularly amused at Hurley’s bizarre debut appearance. Hurley’s dramatic entrance gave the 
Americans living at Yan’an a small taste of the embarrassment they would regularly experience 
when observing Hurley’s interactions with the Chinese Communists. The combination of 
Hurley’s lack of respect for subordinate American officials in China, his seemingly shallow 
understanding of the domestic conflict in China, and his slightly obnoxious personality 
ultimately did little to endear Hurley to the American officials at Yan’an. However, these traits 
were not on full display during Hurley’s first visit to the CCP, which set a deceptively cordial 
tone that the CCP leaders later said they found confusing. 
While in Yan’an, Hurley met with Mao Zedong to present a set of terms he had drafted 
for an agreement between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD) over the future of China’s 
government. Any other time, John Service would have assisted in meetings between an 
American diplomatic visitor and the CCP, but Service had made a temporary trip to Washington 
and was gone from Yan’an in November. The duty to help translate and manage the meetings 
between Hurley and Mao fell to David Barrett, which according to Hart, put Barrett in the 
“untenable position of acting as a go-between for the emotional, egotistic, and, in this setting, 
inept and incompetent Hurley with the shrewd, calculating man who over the previous two 
decades had managed to overcome all this rivals within the Chinese Communist Party, as well as 
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the opposition of Stalin and the Comintern, to emerge as the sole leader of the Chinese 
Communist movement. It was truly no contest.”59  
In reports on the first meetings between Hurley and Mao, Barrett described Hurley as 
bending over backward to appeal to the CCP leader and find terms on which Mao could agree. 
Hurley originally asked Mao to agree to allow China’s National Government army, under the 
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, to assume command over all the Communist forces in exchange 
for a CCP seat on the National Military Council, which Chiang Kai-shek chaired. Mao rejected 
these terms, articulating in great detail why the CCP did not trust Chiang and arguing that a seat 
on the National Military Council meant nothing to the CCP leaders as many of the council’s 
current members “were denied all knowledge of its actions” and “the whole body had not met for 
some time.”60 Upon hearing Mao’s reasons for rejecting Hurley’s proposed terms, Hurley 
surprised Barrett and Mao by asking Mao to propose alternate terms that the CCP could find 
easier to accept.  
After conferring overnight with his comrades, Mao presented the CCP proposals to 
Hurley the next morning, and Hurley reportedly further stunned Barrett by suggesting that 
Hurley review the terms with an eye toward making them even more favorable to the CCP. 
Describing the November meetings in his memoirs, Barrett wrote, “Up to this point it seemed to 
me General Hurley had handled his side of the negotiations with considerable skill…But when 
the General offered to amend the terms in a way to make them “go farther—in other words, to be 
more favorable to the Communists—I thought he had definitely got off the rails…In truth, if I 
had not been present that day, I would have found it difficult to believe General Hurley would 
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have acted the way he did.”61 The revised list of terms that the CCP leaders suggested and 
Hurley augmented on November 9 in Yan’an became known as the Communist Five Points 
proposal. Before departing for Chongqing, Hurley surprised Barrett a third time by suggesting 
that Hurley and Mao both sign the Five Points proposal to indicate that both parties considered 
the terms “fair and just,” which they did, and Mao retained the signed copy.  
Upon Hurley’s return to Chongqing, Hurley brought the Five Points to Chiang Kai-shek, 
who flatly refused to entertain any form of agreement with the CCP unless the GMD gained full 
control of all Communist military forces. In mid-November, the National Government produced 
a counter proposal that removed most of the concessions to the CCP and added a concluding 
clause that gave the National Government full control of the military situation in China, 
effectively precluding the agreement from conveying terms the CCP could possibly accept: 
“subject only to the specific needs of security in the effective prosecution of the war against 
Japan.”62 Despite all his assurances to the CCP of his interest in serving as a neutral mediator, 
Hurley ultimately sided with the Nationalists and backed Chiang’s demands.63 Hurley asked 
Barrett to take the revised terms back to Mao and do his best to persuade the CCP leaders to 
accept them. According to Barrett, “The session with the two Communist leaders was an 
experience I shall never forget.” Given his lack of authority for official communications directly 
with Ambassador Hurley, Barrett recorded his experience in an immediate note to Wedemeyer, 
his superior officer.64 According to Barrett, “Chairman Mao’s attitude throughout the interview 
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was recalcitrant in the extreme. He was not discourteous to me, but several times he flew into a 
violent rage. He kept shouting, over and over again, “We will not yield any further!” “that 
turtle’s egg, Chiang!”…I left the interview feeling that I had talked in vain to two clever, 
ruthless, and determined leaders who felt absolutely sure of the strength of their position.”65 
Mao and Zhou argued that the terms presented would mean submitting their troops 
completely to the control of Chiang Kai-shek and placing the CCP completely “at his mercy,” 
which was unacceptable to the Communists. The CCP leaders expressed confusion at the U.S. 
position in the conflict, particularly at Hurley’s behavior in drafting the proposed agreement in 
Yan’an, certifying his belief in its fairness, and then presenting a revised version that offered 
“absolutely no guarantee of our safety.” According to Barrett, the CCP leaders said, “We cannot 
trust the good faith of the Generalissimo, and no one who has studied impartially the history of 
the relations of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party could reasonably expect us to 
have any confidence in him.”66 Mao expressed to Barrett a threat to show the copy of the Five 
Points that Hurley had signed to the press. Although Barrett deliberately did not include Mao’s 
threat in his written report, he verbally explained the terms when meeting with Hurley and 
Wedemeyer in Chongqing when he returned from Yan’an.67 Of Hurley’s reaction at this point in 
the meeting, Barrett later wrote, “I was afraid for a moment he might burst a blood vessel. “The 
mother——!” he yelled, using an expression now in rather common use but seldom heard at the 
time. “He tricked meh!” At this point, I ventured to remind the general I was not Mao Tse-
tung.”68 Thus, December 1944 marked both a low point in Hurley’s effort to mediate a 
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settlement in China’s domestic conflict and the beginning of major transformation in the role of 
the Dixie Mission in U.S. intelligence and U.S.-China relations. 
CCP-American relations and the question of military aid 
Further complicating Hurley’s efforts to encourage Chiang Kai-shek and Mao to form a 
stable coalition, the disorganized and competitive nature of U.S. intelligence practices at the time 
and the presence of the Dixie Mission at Yan’an had an important side effect that American 
strategic planners had not anticipated: raising the expectations of the CCP leaders regarding what 
their party might gain from a productive working relationship with the United States. Hurley and 
FDR—rather naively—envisioned a U.S. policy stance that would make the CCP leaders feel 
that cooperation with the National Government was their best chance for obtaining continued 
U.S. support that would both preserve the CCP in some form in China’s postwar republic and 
allow the CCP guerrilla fighters to continue fighting the Japanese. In fact, although they made 
clear that they welcomed any help the United States wanted to offer them, the CCP leaders never 
viewed U.S. support as vital to their cause or their survival.69 Furthermore, as events unfolded in 
1944, the presence of the American delegation at Yan’an and the intense commitment to 
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defeating Japan that the United States and China shared may have given the CCP leaders reason 
to hope that they could gain U.S. aid and support regardless of the status of negotiations. 
The asymmetry in rank between the Chinese Communists and the Americans assigned to 
the Yan’an station ultimately contributed to inflated perceptions of potential outcomes on both 
sides. The CCP leaders, seasoned political and military operators who nonetheless had relatively 
limited experience interacting with senior U.S. officials, viewed the effort that the United States 
expended to sponsor the delegation in Yan’an as a sign of serious American interest in the 
Communist military capabilities on which the CCP could capitalize. Historian Niu Jun, who has 
analyzed early Chinese Communist foreign policy behavior based on available CCP records 
argues based on Mao’s speeches and writings in the 1940s that the diplomatic and military 
actions of the United States in China in 1944 encouraged optimism among the CCP leadership 
sufficient to “change their tactics in dealing with the Guomindang from self-defense to taking the 
offensive, and from seeking a partial solution to the problems to demanding the reorganization of 
the Nationalist government.”70 Although CCP leaders sought opportunities to collaborate with 
the United States, they also repeatedly expressed their lack of dependence on American aid. 
Soon after the U.S. Observer Mission arrived in Yan’an, the CCP leaders began expressing their 
interest in training, equipment, and funding from the United States to continue their efforts to 
wage guerrilla warfare at and behind the Japanese front lines in northern China.  
The initial Dixie Mission participants all expressed interest in and support for these 
proposals, but the OSS officers at Yan’an appeared particularly receptive to these possibilities 
and had the greatest access to potential pools of aid and equipment. For example, as of 
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September 1944, the OSS officers at Dixie and the CCP leaders were engaged in developing 
proposals for the radio development project codenamed YENSIG, which planned to supply the 
CCP guerrillas with sophisticated radio equipment to connect communications across all 14 
discontiguous Communist-held base areas in northern China.71 The OSS officers had also started 
to develop specific plans to develop intelligence agents and assets throughout northern China 
through the program they code-named APPLE, which became known as the North China 
Intelligence Project in 1945. The Communists would likely have no other opportunities to access 
such technology at the time without U.S. generosity.  
Despite their interest in YENSIG and other plans that American intelligence officials had 
underway at Yan’an to bolster the CCP fighting capacity, Mao and the other CCP leaders 
regularly clarified what they were and were not willing to offer in return for U.S. help, and Dixie 
Mission participants regularly recorded these comments and communicated them back to their 
U.S. headquarters offices in Chongqing, Delhi, and Washington. It appeared to the CCP leaders 
that the United States needed the CCP guerrillas at least as much if not more than the CCP 
needed help from the United States. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai delivered some of the clearest 
statements to this effect in their response to the National Government’s proposal countering the 
Communists’ Five Points in December 1944. Mao and Zhou specifically told Barrett, “We have 
fought the Japanese for seven years without any outside help, and we will keep on fighting them 
no matter what happens,” and “If the United States abandons us, we shall be very sorry, but it 
will make no difference in our good feeling toward you.”72 To further clarify their perspective, 
the leaders continued, “We have welcomed the United States Army Observer Section, and we 
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have done our best to cooperate with it. If the Section stays, we shall be glad; if it goes, we shall 
be sorry. If it goes and later returns, we will welcome it back again. If the United States does not 
give us one rifle or one round of ammunition, we shall still continue to fight the Japanese and we 
shall still be friends of the United States.” These statements echoed the comments the CCP 
leaders had been making to the Dixie Mission participants since their arrival at Yan’an in July. 
The Dixie Mission personnel inadvertently bolstered the optimism of the CCP regarding 
the potential for U.S. aid through their own narrow and sheltered vision of the scope of the U.S. 
war and the role of the CCP in it. The remote location of Yan’an and the difficulties and dangers 
that came with traveling placed severe limitations on the communications of Dixie Mission 
participants. Brief and cryptic official radio communications paired with the official mail and 
letters from home that came via the weekly planes, when the planes could travel, hardly offered 
them an updated and comprehensive view of the global war being waged. More importantly, 
their location encouraged American officials in Yan’an to perceive themselves to be among the 
only U.S. government personnel with access to their privileged perspective on the war, and they 
operated in an interagency mission that frequently stretched—if not exceeded—the boundaries of 
the ambiguous and inadequate status quo protocols for oversight of intelligence activity. At the 
same time, they knew their work played a role in the bureaucratic struggle for control of postwar 
strategic intelligence capabilities that was playing out through U.S. intelligence operations being 
planned and executed throughout the world in 1944.  
Donovan and his subordinate OSS managers were particularly keen on achieving 
dramatic operational intelligence successes in China through Yan’an-based activities and 
cooperation with the CCP. By October 31, 1944, when Donovan visited China for talks with U.S. 
and Chinese personnel, OSS officers were participating in three different projects in China: 
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cooperating with Chinese government officials in Chongqing on intelligence work sanctioned by 
SACO, cooperating with the 14th Air Force in Kunming under the cover of the AGFRTS 
organization, and at Yan’an in the Dixie observer group.73 Almost all American officials in 
China believed SACO to be a huge policy failure that served only to constrain U.S. intelligence 
operations in China according to the whims of the Nationalist Party. Similarly, OSS officers 
operating out of Kunming gained little traction for their operations. The 14th Air Force, under the 
direction of General Chennault, an unquestioning supporter of Chiang Kai-shek, experienced 
regular and heavy contact with various Chinese Army and National Government components 
who reported all OSS actions back to Chongqing, which effectively blew the AGFRTS cover 
that OSS had previously enjoyed and brought any future OSS operational plans from that base 
under the SACO umbrella. Of the three outposts, the Dixie Mission showed the greatest potential 
by far for the type of cutting-edge intelligence work that Donovan sought to use as examples that 
could help him persuade Roosevelt and others in Washington of the need for a independent 
peacetime strategic intelligence organization in the United States after the war’s end. The fact 
that Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government had no jurisdiction over U.S. intelligence 
operations in Communist-held areas to which the CCP leaders agreed joined the long list of 
conflicts between the GMD and CCP at the time. Not only did OSS face the least amount of 
foreign government restrictions on their operations at Yan’an, but the CCP also offered guerrilla 
capabilities and unique access to Japanese vulnerabilities that would highlight activities that 
Donovan viewed as the potential strengths of OSS and its potential successor organization for 
which he was lobbying.  
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In late 1944, the combination of Wedemeyer and Hurley serving at the top of the chain of 
command for U.S. strategic actions in China inspired a great deal of optimism among OSS 
officers. Hurley and Donovan, both staunch Republicans, had formed a lasting friendship when 
both served the Hoover administration. Under Donovan’s leadership, the OSS had developed a 
reputation as a “Republican establishment, filled with the upper crust of American society,” 
according to historian Maochun Yu, which initially appealed to Hurley as did the mission and 
approach of the new organization. Hurley reportedly said “OSS rates #1 in my opinion” and of 
Donovan, he opined, “I am behind him from Hell to Harrisburg.”74 Hurley displayed no such 
affection for army intelligence, based on negative opinions the ambassador had formed during 
his term as War Secretary. He believed OSS would fully replace the G-2 after World War II 
ended.75 Hurley’s affinity for OSS did not liberate the organization from the challenges it faced 
for operations in China in 1944 and 1945, particularly when it came to Yan’an and intelligence 
activity in north China.  
OSS officials in China also had a positive initial view of General Wedemeyer. OSS had 
assessed that Stilwell’s disagreements with ONI officials in Chongqing, who were responsible 
for the creation of the deplorable and restrictive SACO agreement, had also consequently 
constrained the ability of OSS officers to operate in the China Theater.76 More than Stilwell, 
Wedemeyer had been supportive of expanding U.S. efforts to collect strategic intelligence in 
China throughout the war, and had been particularly vocal in complaining to General Donovan 
about the lack of “reliable information on the structure, conditions, and quality of the Chinese 
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Army” in late 1943.77 Joseph Spencer, the main official representing OSS R&A in Delhi, 
doubted the Army would plan any active operations during or immediately after the transition 
period, opening a gap in the field that OSS could fill. Spencer speculated that this change could 
significantly increase the influence of OSS in China, both in terms of operations run by the SI 
branch and the role that R&A branch would have in supporting operations and processing the 
information that intelligence collection activities produced.78  
The clash in expectations between Hurley, Wedemeyer, Chiang Kai-shek, and the CCP 
leaders coalesced in the issue of potential U.S. military support for CCP guerrillas —a conflict in 
which the Dixie Mission found itself at the center between November 1944 and March 1945. The 
recommendation for the United States to provide military support for the CCP fighters was 
among the few issues on which the American officials at Yan’an achieved a consensus across all 
agency boundaries, though they disagreed on how to provide the support, to what extent the 
United States should aid the Communist fighters, and which agency would take the credit. 
Service, Davies, and Stelle all believed U.S.-mediated negotiations between the GMD and CCP 
were doomed to fail and the U.S. support for the CCP was the only way to the keep the party 
from turning to the Soviets for aid to defend themselves from the Japanese. Barrett most likely 
agreed, but because the topic exceeded what he considered to be the bounds of his job 
description as military intelligence officer and commanding officer of the Observer Group, he 
was cautious not to specify his personal views on the topic in official documents.79 In one of 
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many reports John Davies cranked out during his visit to Yan’an from October 22 to November 
8, he wrote: 
 “The United States is the greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese 
Communists. They recognize that if they receive American aid, even if only on an 
equal basis with Chiang, they can quickly establish control over most if not all of 
China, perhaps without civil war…We are the greatest fear of the Communists 
because the more aid we give Chiang exclusively the greater the likelihood of his 
precipitating civil war and the more protracted and costly will be the Communist 
unification of China…If we continue to reject them and support an 
unreconstructed China, they see us as becoming their enemy. But they would 
prefer to be friends.”80  
 
Stelle’s opinions focused less on the politics of arming the CCP and more on the potential 
results. In a status report to John Coughlin, who had become the OSS head for the India-Burma 
Theater after Stilwell’s recall precipitated reorganization, Stelle wrote, “Observations in the field 
confirm previous believes that the potential of these people for large scale demolitions is 
practically unlimited. If the negotiations in Chungking make it possible for us to bring in 
explosives and gadgets, I don’t think there is any doubt that we could build up one of the biggest 
and most effective SO [Special Operations] jobs of this war. If the negotiations break down and 
official OK is lacking for supplies being brought up here, there may still be the possibility of a 
fairly large scale "clandestine" SO operation.”81 Stelle’s hint at clandestine or covert plans to arm 
the CCP through OSS later became a considerable controversy. 
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Although the plans to provide aid to the CCP consistently failed to achieve traction in 
Washington, the Dixie Mission officials, convinced the Communists were capable of achieving 
gains in the fight against the Japanese, regularly suggested ways that the U.S. government could 
assist the guerrillas, which they argued would serve both the strategic interests of the United 
States and the near- and long-term intelligence collection interests of the respective sponsoring 
organizations of the Yan’an Observer Group participants. From his perspective as a military 
intelligence official, Dixie Commanding Officer Barrett repeatedly suggested giving the CCP 
guerrillas some form of tangible military support that would enhance their effectiveness and 
encourage their cooperation with U.S. efforts. In fact, one of his first reports to Stilwell about the 
Communists had made a cautious recommendation about providing small arms, such as 
handguns. In the report, Barrett conveyed his firm belief that the CCP and the United States were 
fighting the same enemy—Japan—and the CCP soldiers’ commitment to the cause made them 
“worthy” of U.S. aid in the form of “ammunition, weapons, pack artillery, and signal equipment” 
that “would bring immediate results” and if it did not, “we would have lost very little.”82  
Reflecting awareness of how his report was likely to be received, Barrett added some 
important caveats. He recognized the logistical limitations of the U.S. observers at Yan’an 
compared to the urgency of the war effort and suggested that the military aid be provided right 
away, rather than waiting “until we have sent out observers to cover areas from which reports 
cannot be received for a long time.” Seemingly anticipating surprise at this suggestion, Barrett 
noted that he has “long regarded with a jaundiced eye the reports of the many foreigners who 
have gone all out in the support of the Chinese Communists” and his belief that his “sales 
resistance to any cause in China is as high as that of any observer who wishes to be fair minded.” 
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Barrett explained that despite his awareness of weaknesses in the CCP military organization and 
staff work and what he calls “how masterfully the Chinese can present a cause when they really 
put their hearts into it,” he was still convinced of the CCP guerrillas’ entitlement to a limited 
amount of U.S. military aid. Barrett later wrote that his recommendations at the time were 
“carefully considered” in light of the opposition they would raise from the National Government. 
Barrett believed the possibility that the CCP fighters might eventually use the weapons against 
the National troops “would have to be accepted as a calculated risk.”83 
At the end of September 1944, a few weeks before Stilwell’s recall, Barrett reiterated his 
positive assessment of CCP efforts fighting the Japanese. He wrote: “To sum up, I am convinced 
that the Communist forces can be of immediate assistance to the Allied war effort in China, and 
that this assistance can save American lives, and speed up the ultimate victory. The amount of 
use which can be made of the Communist forces will in general be in direct proportion to the 
assistance which we can give them in arms, equipment and training.”84 By the time General 
Wedemeyer took control of the China Theater for the United States, the Yan’an observers had 
succeeded in traveling to some of the far-flung areas where CCP guerrillas operated. These first-
hand observations only fortified Barrett’s resolve to help the CCP troops, and in late November 
he specifically recommended that the United States should help arm a CCP guerrilla force of up 
to 5,000 fighters.85 Around the same time, OSS’s John Colling, an expert in sabotage operations 
and demolition, had been talk with guerrillas from the CCP’s 18th Group Army about their 
demolition capabilities, and he had been offering various demonstrations of the equipment and 
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techniques on which the U.S. military relied. On November 18, Colling wrote General 
Wedemeyer to advise that his CCP military contacts could easily be trained to use American 
demolition techniques and put them to good use against Japanese targets in north China. He 
recommended that demolition equipment be provided to the 18th Group Army to assist in their 
extensive efforts to disrupt Japanese communications.86 
The most controversial plan for cooperation between the CCP and the U.S. military 
involved discussions that occurred between November 1944 and January 1945. On several 
occasions in this time period, CCP leaders discussed with American officials the possibility of 
the Chinese Communists providing logistical support for the landing of a U.S. airborne division 
in north China, potentially on the Shandong peninsula, from which the United States could 
mount an invasion of the Japanese islands that almost everyone at the time believed would be 
necessary to end the war. According to reports from John Davies, the idea for the plan originated 
with the CCP leaders, particularly Zhou Enlai, who invited Barrett and Davies to a meeting with 
General Ye in Yan’an on November 3, where the CCP leaders explained the concept to the 
American officials.87 Davies, never a permanent member of the Dixie Mission, although heavily 
involved in its planning and establishment and closely following its progress, made his sole visit 
to Yan’an from October 22 to November 8, 1944. The trip had been hastily arranged prior to 
Stilwell’s departure to ensure that Davies would have a chance to investigate Yan’an and meet 
the CCP leaders himself in case Stilwell’s successors ended the mission or ended Davies’ 
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association with it (which, ironically, is what happened in 1945, probably due to Davies’ actions 
during his Yan’an visit). For their part, the idea of assisting the United States while it prepared 
for the final invasion of Japan would have provided a clever—and perhaps irresistible to the 
United States—solution to some of the biggest challenges facing the CCP in its relations with the 
United States and the National Government, namely, how to entice the United States to provide 
materiel support and recognition for the part CCP troops were playing in fighting the Japanese.  
Given the potential of such a plan to upset Chiang Kai-shek and derail diplomatic efforts 
the United States had underway with the Chinese central government, Davies recommended that 
the OSS secretly pursue the possible arrangements without allowing the Chinese government to 
discover the plans yet. Donovan supported the idea, which he believed would support the 
months-long effort by OSS to develop intelligence assets in Japanese-occupied northeast China, 
including a plan that Donovan had personally requested R&A division staff based in Delhi to 
devise, which became known as the North China Intelligence Project. Evolved from the APPLE 
project that initial Dixie participants had proposed in their first few weeks at Yan’an, the new 
North China Intelligence Project sought to train Allied agents in Yan’an and send them behind 
the Japanese lines into north China, Manchuria, and the Korean peninsula, similar to OSS 
operations that were being conducted successfully in Europe. Donovan intended to discuss all the 
plans for U.S. involvement in north China with various U.S. and Chinese officials during his late 
December visit.  
With the green light from Donovan and Davies, the responsibility for working with the 
CCP to cooperate in north China fell to Wedemeyer’s newly appointed “China intelligence czar,” 
director of OSS China Colonel Richard Heppner. Faced with the urgency of Donovan’s planned 
December 26 arrival in China during which the OSS Director might wish to discuss plans for 
224 
 
operations in north China, Heppner quickly tasked one of his new subordinates, Colonel Willis 
Bird, who served as deputy chief for the OSS office in China under Heppner, to take the lead in 
pursuing Zhou Enlai’s idea for landing U.S. paratroopers in Shandong and other unconventional 
warfare operations run by OSS in the area. On December 14, 1944, Barrett escorted Bird to 
Yan’an for talks with the senior CCP leadership. Bird’s trip occurred with the blessing of 
General McClure, Wedemeyer’s deputy. At the time, Wedemeyer was away from Chongqing, 
and he later claimed no advance knowledge of McClure’s intentions.88 The objective of Barrett 
and Bird on this particular trip was to discuss with the CCP leaders the possibility of American 
troops landing in northeast China, but long eager to find a way to penetrate the Japanese territory 
in China’s northeast with its own intelligence agents and assets, OSS also had its eyes on 
developing intelligence operations at the same time. From a military perspective, the discussions 
of a Shandong landing for U.S. troops represented sound strategic planning based on the 
information available to those at the level of Wedemeyer and McClure in January 1945. The 
development of the nuclear weapons that ultimately helped hasten the end of the war with Japan 
was a closely held secret, not something the U.S. military leadership in China nor the Chinese 
Communist Party leaders could have anticipated or might have predicted. From the information 
they had, envisioning that the United States might require a Normandy-style attack on Japan to 
bring about the end of the war was logical, and such action would require considerable advance 
planning, but its precise timing was unknown and contingent upon a series of events in Europe 
and the Pacific. Thus, the CCP’s idea about offering Shandong and the U.S. officials’ enthusiasm 
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for it at the time seemed fairly consistent with the types of activities the Yan’an Observer Group 
had been established to develop. But the political timing for the plan’s development was terrible, 
and OSS plans to combine the landing agreement with a laundry list of other intelligence 
operations added to the problems. Given the heightened expectations of the CCP leaders 
previously described and the difficulty that U.S. diplomats in China, including Hurley, were 
encountering in November and December 1944 with enacting the unification plan for China that 
Hurley and Roosevelt had cooked up, the political and diplomatic context for plans of this nature 
may have been more volatile than the Army officials in China realized. 
Unsurprisingly, the initial conversations between Col. Bird and the CCP leaders about the 
possible collaboration in attacking Japan from north China were enthusiastic. Bird reported that 
he participated in five hours of meetings with General Zhu De, head of the CCP forces, and Ye 
Jianying, the Chief of Staff to draft the following list of recommendations (as Bird described 
them in internal communication channels using informal language) that the U.S. Army officials 
would bring back to Chongqing, intending to seek approval for the plans from the Chinese 
government and the United States leadership: 
“If the government approves, the following is tentative agreement: 
a. destroying Jap communications, airfields and blockhouses, and to generally 
raise hell and run. 
b. To fully equip units assisting and protecting our men in sabotage work. 
c. Points of attack to be selected in general by Wedemeyer. Details to be worked 
out in co-operation with Communists in that territory. 
d. To provide compete equipment for up to twenty-five thousand guerrillas except 
food and clothing. 
e. Set up school to instruct in use of American arms, demolitions, 
communications, etc. 
f. Set up intelligence radio network in co-operation with 18th Route Army. 
g. To supply at least one hundred thousand Woolworth one shot pistols for 
Peoples Militia. 
h. to receive complete co-operation of their army of six hundred fifty thousand 
and Peoples Militia of two and half million when strategic use required by 
Wedemeyer.” 
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At the end of the meeting, General Zhu reportedly finished the discussion by conveying 
positive feelings toward the United States, using nearly identical language to that of Mao and 
Zhou quoted in December 1944: “the General stated regardless of whether we gave them one 
rifle or one round of ammunition or not, the people of North China looked upon the United 
States as their best friend, and General Wedemeyer as their Commander-in-chief, and would 
follow his military orders if he chose to give them.”  
Discussion of Bird’s poorly kept secret plans emerged in Chongqing mid-January, and 
the topic surfaced in part at the instigation of the Communists. The main concern of the CCP 
leaders after meeting with Bird was the potential for the plan to be approved by senior U.S. 
leaders and executed. They had no expectation that Chiang would agree to U.S. support for 
Communist efforts, which would be required under the terms of SACO, and they doubted that 
the United States would go behind Chiang’s back, blatantly violating SACO, to support them. To 
encourage the plan’s acceptance, Zhou Enlai offered to travel to Washington and made attempts 
to secure his own meeting at the White House. As rumors of Zhou’s request began to swirl in 
Chongqing, specific reports of Bird’s secret plans also began to leak out of the OSS and Army 
G-2 channels, probably through the U.S. Navy intelligence officials, who had endured a troubled 
and competitive relationship with their Army and OSS counterparts in China since 1942. The 
leaked reports lead Ambassador Hurley to learn of the Bird/Barrett Yan’an trip for the first time 
in January 1945, and his anger reportedly reached depths that his staff at the Embassy had not 
previously thought possible.  
Hurley informed Roosevelt about what he had learned in an explosive January 14 memo. 
Hurley strongly urged Roosevelt to refuse any attempts by the CCP leaders to communicate with 
him directly. Hurley believed that the legitimacy and optimism the CCP leaders would gain from 
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any contact with the U.S. President would undermine Hurley’s ability to bring about the policy 
on which he and the President had agreed, which involved enticing the CCP leaders to negotiate 
with Chiang Kai-shek. Hurley’s memo also asked Roosevelt not to inform anyone in the State 
Department about his recommendations because Hurley doubted their loyalty. Hurley’s 
comments were sufficiently consistent with Roosevelt’s existing attitude about both the State 
Department and U.S.-China relations that the Ambassador succeeded in preventing the CCP 
from gaining any access to the President before his death a few months later. 
Hurley’s January 14 memo to the White House unsurprisingly precipitated demands from 
the White House and General Marshall for Wedemeyer’s immediate explanation. General 
Wedemeyer at first attempted to play down the seriousness of the plans that Bird and Barrett had 
discussed, but when these efforts failed to defuse the situation, Wedemeyer ultimately blamed 
the actions on the OSS and the pressure OSS officials in China had felt to prepare for Donovan’s 
planned visit to China. This approach, along with considerable contrition and deference 
throughout the remainder of the war, allowed Wedemeyer to patch up a working relationship 
with Hurley, but it cost him in terms of a loss of respect and trust from OSS and serious 
concessions he was required to make in the administration and function of the Dixie Mission, 
beginning with the replacement of Colonel Barrett.89 Marshall had nominated Barrett for a 
promotion to lieutenant general in November 1944, but the promotion was ultimately and 
permanently withheld. Barrett was old friends with his replacement, DePass, from the time when 
both of them had served with Stilwell, Marshall, and many other U.S. Army “China” hands as 
part of the 15th Regiment in Tianjin. However, DePass also had cultivated a reputation among the 
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diplomatic community in China as a friend of the Chinese Central government intelligence 
officers in 1943 and 1944, which set him quite apart from Barrett in terms of his administration 
of the Dixie Mission.90  
At the same time, Hurley officially ended the connection of the Foreign Service with the 
Dixie Mission. He sent Davies back to Washington and had him permanently transferred out of 
China. John Service made a final trip to Yan’an in March 1945, and after that became embroiled 
in a controversy over accusations that sympathy for the CCP had caused him to deliberately leak 
sensitive official files to the liberal media in the United States. Ray Ludden, the third Foreign 
Service officer who had served Stilwell and been assigned to Yan’an returned stateside a bit later 
than his colleagues due to his involvement in a lengthy study tour of the guerrilla activities in 
northern China, near an area called Fuping. Gone from Yan’an for most of the period from 
October 1944 to February 1945, Ludden did not return to Washington DC until later in the spring 
of 1945. 
Conclusion  
Thus, the first quarter of 1945 marked a major transition point in the tone, composition, 
and behavior of the American officials stationed at Yan’an. In terms of their primary mission to 
collect useful strategic intelligence and convey it to the U.S. government, the U.S. Observer 
Group in Yan’an faced two clear difficulties in late 1944. First, the main consumers of their 
messages had little experience with Chinese domestic politics or with the new methods of 
intelligence collection they were employing. They could not expect a sophisticated and receptive 
audience for their reporting. Second, their location in a remote field area with extremely limited 
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means of communication with the rest of the government (and indeed, with the rest of the world), 
facilitated their development of a myopic perspective on the topics they were studying and 
intensified the inherent tensions between officers in the field and their counterparts and superiors 
located in rear, headquarters areas. These two characteristics encouraged the original Dixie 
Mission participants to independently exceed the bounds of their vague mandate by engaging 
directly in operational plans with and support for the CCP that were kept secret from and not 
condoned by top U.S. executive branch officials such as Hurley and Wedemeyer who had greater 
influence with the President. Consequently, by early 1945, senior policymakers had severely 
restricted the activities and influence of the Yan’an outpost. 
Considering the Dixie Mission as an example of U.S. efforts to collect vital strategic 
foreign intelligence during World War II reveals the extreme lack of coordination experienced 
by the U.S. government, which exacted very high costs. Disagreements between officials 
operating in the field and those at headquarters over policy or officials with specific area 
expertise and training versus the more generalized knowledge typically required of senior leaders 
are hardly rare or surprising. This aspect of the Dixie Mission case is both memorable and 
instructive for several of its specific characteristics. The intensity of the conflict and its 
consequences were reflective of the immaturity of the government processes that would have 
been necessary to process such disagreement more constructively and at reduced cost to the U.S. 
government in terms of its foreign policy and personnel. That the incident involved officials 
from so many government agencies—including some very new organizations—working together 
in an ad hoc capacity combined with the high stakes of the war and Roosevelt’s disregard for 
regularized processes of foreign and strategic policy in lieu of more personalized protocols 
resulted in a perfect storm of a situation when it came time for the U.S. government to determine 
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its China policy. The fact that the minority opposition party in China espoused a communist 
ideology further intensified the controversy, not only in the 1940s but in years to come. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Mission Creep: The Yan’an Section’s Journey from Intelligence Collection to Military 
Liaison 
 
“With the relief of General Stilwell the importance of the Dixie Mission became 
limited to: (1) the dissemination of weather reports; (2) the collection of Order of 
Battle information; (3) liaison with the Communist headquarters; and (4) the 
forwarding of twenty-five rescued fliers brought in by the Communists.” -- Col. 
Wilbur “Pete” Peterkin, member of the Dixie Mission from July 1944 to July 
1945 and commanding officer of the group from February to July 1945.1 
 
When then Army Major Wilbur “Pete” Peterkin returned to Yan’an in January 1945 from 
the inspection tour of nearly four months that had taken him behind the Japanese lines in 
northern China, he found that the Dixie Mission had experienced significant change. 
Not only had major transitions occurred in the composition of the top American 
diplomatic leadership and the administrative organization of the U.S. military effort in China 
during his time away, but the response to Dixie Mission’s involvement in plans to aid and 
cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1945 had also permanently altered the 
character of U.S. intelligence activities in north China. Dixie Mission participants had taken 
much of the blame when disagreements within the U.S. government over the direction of 
America’s policy toward the CCP devolved into a personalized power struggle between the U.S. 
Ambassador, career diplomats, and intelligence officials in the Army and OSS. In 1945, the 
departure of the Foreign Service officers from Yan’an all but eliminated the dissemination of 
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political assessments of the CCP from U.S. government communication channels. Meanwhile, 
the Army shifted gears and significantly amplified efforts to collect information on weather and 
monitor military activity in north China. The latter was useful military intelligence work but 
broke no new ground in terms of strategic intelligence support for the policy that the United 
States was struggling to implement in China.  
In addition to other personnel changes in the works at Yan’an that would remove most of 
the initial participants from the area by March 1945, Peterkin found that the Army Observer 
Group’s initial Commanding Officer, Colonel David Barrett, had been moved to a different 
position in Chongqing in December 1944.2 Instead of serving under Barrett, who had handpicked 
Peterkin to assist with administrative duties and training programs at the Yan’an outpost after the 
two had worked together in Guilin in 1943, Peterkin would now serve as executive officer to 
Colonel Morris DePass, who had been hastily appointed to take charge of American affairs in 
Yan’an in January 1945 (and who lasted in Yan’an less than a month).  
Between December 1944 and the departure of the last American plane from Yan’an in 
March 1947, the main objectives of the Dixie Mission shifted from prioritizing the collection of 
intelligence about the CCP, including a focus on understanding CCP leadership intentions and 
political objectives, to a more traditional military intelligence relationship in which U.S. 
personnel shared logistical military information with the CCP leaders and provided basic 
administrative support and operational security for ongoing diplomatic negotiations to resolve 
China’s domestic political conflict.  
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Yan’an’s strategic location and access to those with knowledge of the CCP-held and 
Japanese-held areas in north China meant that despite the potential political ramifications of 
having lower-level U.S. officials interact directly with the CCP leadership, the U.S. government 
still valued the unique intelligence information available through the Yan’an base about the 
weather over China and order of battle for the Japanese and Communist armies. Unfortunately, 
U.S. intelligence collectors in fall 1944 had made a slow start in establishing the necessary 
infrastructure to efficiently extract the required strategic information from north China and 
distribute it to the rest of the U.S. government. Thus, when U.S. leaders in China placed new 
bureaucratic constraints on the officials in Yan’an after January 1945, the post-Barrett Dixie 
Mission personnel had little momentum to build upon.  
Meanwhile, despite tremendous initial excitement about the potential for intelligence 
collection in north China, OSS China officials came to terms with bureaucratic limitations for 
their ambitions in China and shifted their operational focus away from Yan’an to Guomindang 
(GMD)-held areas. The persistent focus of U.S. China policy on somehow peacefully uniting 
China’s domestic political opponents under a U.S.-friendly coalition government led by Chiang 
Kai-shek preserved the desirability of an open liaison channel to CCP leaders through Yan’an. 
Thus, the U.S. Observer Group at Yan’an unexpectedly outlasted both World War II and the 
OSS.3  
Spring 1945: A turning point for U.S. intelligence operations in Yan’an 
The spring of 1945 marked a key turning point for the Dixie Mission in several respects, 
leading to constraints upon or the elimination of some U.S. intelligence activities and the 
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expansion of other operations from January 1945 until the final American officials left Yan’an in 
March 1947. U.S. Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley had an undeniable influence on the 
activities of the Dixie Mission in the final months of World War II. Hurley’s anger over the 
Dixie Mission’s efforts to arrange cooperative military agreements with the CCP in late 1944 and 
General Wedemeyer’s contrition over not preventing his subordinates from taking such actions 
resulted in severe limitations on the types of intelligence U.S. officials in north China collected 
on the CCP itself in 1945 and 1946, when the information might have helped influence failing 
U.S. efforts to help mediate China’s post-World War II civil war. As President Roosevelt’s 
friend and special representative in China, Hurley wielded influence that U.S. career diplomats 
and military intelligence officials serving in China at the time believed exceeded his 
understanding of Chinese domestic politics by a wide margin. However, little information in 
opposition to assessments was able to reach Washington. 
In the face of Hurley’s explosive anger over OSS and G-2 actions in December 1944, 
involvement of Dixie Mission officials in plans for covert military operations in cooperation with 
the CCP terminated swiftly and completely by February 1945. To help smooth interagency 
relations between Hurley and the Army, General Wedemeyer released a sternly worded 
statement in January 1945 regarding Army support for U.S. policy in China, which was briefed 
to all U.S. Army personnel in China, including and especially those at Yan’an to whom it was 
particularly directed.4 Wedemeyer’s statement reminded all Army subordinates that they were in 
China “to implement the policy of the United States, not to formulate or discuss that policy,” and 
that U.S. policy specified “wholehearted cooperation with the present Chinese National 
                                                                
4 Wedemeyer statement regarding support of U.S. policy in China, January 30, 1945, National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 493: U.S. Forces in the CBI Theaters of Operations, Entry UD-UP 
635: Yenan Liaison Group, Box 143. 
 
 
 
235 
Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.”5 Rather than leaving these initial 
statements to interpretation, Wedemeyer then spelled out his meaning in terms that required no 
sophisticated analysis: 
“Officers in China Theater will not assist, negotiate or collaborate in any way 
with Chinese political parties, activities or persons not specifically authorized by 
the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater. This includes discussing 
hypothetical aid or employment of US resources to assist any effort of an 
unapproved political party, activity or persons. This also forbids rendering local 
assistance or making loans or gifts of arms, ammunition or other military materiel 
or equipment to such groups, activities or persons by an individual or organization 
of the United States Forces in the China Theater."6 
 
No subsequent historical records make reference to the participation of Army personnel in 
Yan’an in talks regarding significant tangible support from the United States to the CCP.  
Events of late 1944 in Yan’an also affected U.S. diplomatic officials in China, sharply 
limiting the scope of political assessments and candid reports about Chinese domestic topics that 
reached higher levels of the U.S. government. In early 1945, State Department personnel serving 
in China, particularly those at Yan’an, experienced considerable upheaval, some of which they 
brought upon themselves after disagreements between the Foreign Service officers in China and 
Ambassador Hurley reached their peak in February 1945. Friction between Hurley and the 
Foreign Service officers serving in Yan’an helped contribute to conflict between the new 
ambassador and his staff in Chongqing. In his fury over the actions of General McClure and the 
Dixie Mission participants in meetings with the CCP leaders about potential U.S. support for 
CCP military efforts, Hurley ordered the withdrawal of all State Department officials from 
involvement with the U.S. outpost at Yan’an. Hurley had ensured that Foreign Service officers 
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who had been participating in or assisting the Dixie Mission received assignments to other posts 
within the State Department. John Service, Ray Ludden, and John Emmerson continued working 
on China-related issues from Chongqing and Washington in spring 1945. Service even made a 
final temporary visit to Yan’an in March 1945. Hurley’s inability to overcome his anger and 
disappointment with what he perceived to be the disloyalty and insubordination of John Davies 
meant permanent assignment away from China affairs for Davies. 
Although Davies had never been officially assigned to the Dixie Mission, he had in many 
ways orchestrated the group’s establishment and vehemently defended its work to others within 
the U.S. government beyond officials serving in China. A highly articulate and influential senior 
Foreign Service officer, Davies vocally disagreed with Hurley’s China policy throughout late 
1944 and into early 1945. In a position that far outranked Davies and enjoying extensive personal 
influence with President Roosevelt, Hurley requested Davies’ relocation outside the China 
Theater. State Department officials, including Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, who had held 
his title an even shorter time than Hurley, acquiesced.7  
Foreseeing a falling out with Hurley, Davies had started searching for a position outside 
China in fall 1944 after Stilwell’s recall. In his memoirs, Davies claims he wanted “a transfer to 
the embassy in Moscow from which to observe the Soviet entry into the war against Japan, 
Soviet relations with the Chinese Communists, and Moscow’s approach to the Chinese civil war, 
which I believed would follow on the heels of Japan’s defeat.”8 Davies’ queries sent to secure 
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himself a new job landed him a position at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, where he worked with 
George Kennan, observing and assessing the start of the Cold War.9  
Hurley and Wedemeyer cooperated to reassign the other diplomats involved with Dixie 
starting in early 1945. On January 7, 1945, General Wedemeyer received a telegram marked 
secret from the Secretary of State ordering the “release of any or all Foreign Service officers” 
detailed to the Army’s China Theater Headquarters, specifically John Davies.10 Hurley had 
insisted that State Department headquarters issue the order to Wedemeyer, but ambiguity within 
the telegram suggests that support for Hurley’s personnel decisions was not unanimous in 
Washington. Specifically, after issuing the order for the release of the Foreign Service officers 
from General Staff work, the telegram states, “Secretary of State indicates Embassy staff in 
Chungking can assist you there although he believes it advantageous to have Foreign Service 
officers in Communist Area at Yenan.”11 The telegram then offers the continued work of Ray 
Ludden as a political advisor to the military intelligence officers. Ludden continued his career 
with the Foreign Service focused on China and East Asia, in 1945 and after, but he never 
returned to the Dixie Mission staff. The American group at Yan’an never again had permanent 
State Department representation after March 1945. 
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Embassy staff mutiny and Hurley cracks down 
Further reducing the potential for the U.S. intelligence officers in Yan’an to collect and 
disseminate useful political intelligence on the CCP, tensions between Hurley and his embassy 
staff in Chongqing continued to mount from December 1944 to the spring of 1945. At this time, 
more China hands serving under Hurley began to express doubts about his policy and political 
assessments, and Hurley became defensive and paranoid about their loyalty. Many career 
diplomats who comprised the staff of the U.S. Embassy to China objected to Hurley’s close and 
unquestioning relations with Chiang Kai-shek and his assessments about the capabilities and 
interests of the CCP leaders. The combination of Hurley’s arrogant and not particularly erudite 
style of leadership and communication with his ignorance of and disinterest in Chinese history 
and culture provoked severe distrust and disagreement from Hurley’s diplomatic staff. Many of 
the Foreign Service officers assigned to the Embassy agreed with John Davies and John Service 
that Hurley’s policy of withholding U.S. aid from the CCP to drive them to the negotiating table 
would backfire and encourage the CCP leaders to pursue assistance from the Soviet Union.12 
Behind his back, the diplomats criticized Hurley’s position, which they believed was not 
sufficiently neutral to preserve the potential for U.S. mediation efforts to successfully assist 
political actors in China with forming a true coalition government—the ultimate goal of U.S 
policy in China in the 1940s.  
Knowing that they disagreed with him and aware that many Embassy staffers shared the 
views of the U.S. officials in Yan’an who had angered him, Hurley became distrustful of his staff 
and deeply concerned about the potential for them to undermine his policies. Hurley reportedly 
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forbid embassy staff from sending critical messages to Washington. He demanded to review all 
messages to Washington before they left Chongqing so he could scrub them for material that he 
thought could humiliate him with the White House or threaten his policy direction.13  
This level of personalized micromanagement significantly slowed the pace of work at the 
U.S. Embassy, but it also terrified Hurley’s staff into submission. In one frequently cited and 
extreme example, Foreign Service officer Arthur Ringwalt, a career Foreign Service officer who 
served in the U.S. Embassy in China in 1945, claimed that Hurley threatened him with a gun 
over a critical report Ringwalt had submitted to Washington through internal State Department 
channels that might have cast a shadow on elements of Hurley’s policy. According to Ringwalt’s 
account, Hurley reportedly brandished a pistol while informing Ringwalt “he had killed men for 
less than this.” Ringwalt never discovered whether the pistol had been loaded, but he claimed he 
also never wrote another derogatory word while serving Hurley. Ringwalt’s specific anecdote is 
impossible to corroborate, but historical records of the Embassy, such as those compiled in the 
State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on China in this period, 
reveal a significant change in tone. Before Hurley’s arrival, Embassy political officers such as 
Service and Davies frequently published warts-and-all accounts of Chinese politics, including 
candid assessments of Chiang Kai-shek and his domestic policies. Reports that reached 
Washington from the Embassy political officers in Chongqing in 1945 tend to adhere to much 
more banal topics, such as reports of inflation in the Chinese countryside with detailed lists 
relating the prices of groceries.  
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With little evidence offered for weaknesses in the China policy he and Hurley had 
designed, President Roosevelt continued and fortified his policies in negotiations with other 
Allied leaders in the months before his death. Unlike U.S. policy toward European allies, 
Roosevelt’s condescending approach to China policy focused almost exclusively on near- and 
long-term U.S. interests, often with little regard for how China itself might fare. As historian 
Warren Cohen succinctly described the situation, “Roosevelt’s East Asian policies gave 
Americans no cause for grievance—and the Chinese no cause for gratitude.”14 Roosevelt’s 
behavior at the Yalta Conference provided further evidence of his attitude. Without Chinese 
voices or input, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin negotiated agreements designed to entice Soviet 
participation in the war against Japan that would significantly affect Chinese sovereignty and 
territory, particularly in Manchuria.15 Hurley and Wedemeyer traveled to Washington DC for 
talks with Roosevelt and other top U.S. leaders about policy implementation in early March 
1945. 
Taking advantage of Hurley’s absence from China, the staff of the U.S. Embassy in 
Chongqing prepared a report explaining their view of the problems with Hurley’s China policy 
and making alternate recommendations. The diplomats argued that as a result of U.S. policy and 
other events in China, circumstances “have combined to increase greatly Chiang’s feeling of 
strength and have resulted in unrealistic optimism on his part and lack of willingness to make 
any compromise.”16 Furthermore, because the CCP determined the United States to be definitely 
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“committed to the support of Chiang alone, and that we will not force Chiang's hand in order to 
be able to aid or cooperate with them,” CCP leaders were taking steps for "self-protection" that 
would move China closer to civil war.17 They claimed that without a drastic change in U.S. 
policy, “chaos in China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict 
will be accelerated,” which would be dangerous to American interests both “from a military 
standpoint” and “from a long-range point of view.”18 Finally, the diplomats suggested that the 
January controversy over initial plans to support the CCP military efforts had resulted in clarity 
over particular elements of U.S. China policy:  
“The Generalissimo and his Government will not at this time on their own 
initiative take any forward step which will mean loss of face, prestige or personal 
power. The Communists will not, without guarantees in which they have 
confidence, take any forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual 
elimination of their forces upon which their present strength and future political 
existence depend.”19 
 
The document explains that the diplomats timed its release to take advantage of the 
presence of both Wedemeyer and Hurley in Washington, which could provide “a favorable 
opportunity for discussion” of U.S. relations with the political parties in China and plans to aid 
the CCP guerrillas.20 The authors also clarified that the document represented the consensus of 
all the diplomats in Chongqing and Wedemeyer’s Chief of Staff. 
The report arrived in Washington on February 28, 1945, just before Hurley himself 
arrived. Unsurprisingly, Hurley perceived the document as a mutinous personal attack on his 
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leadership. Its wide distribution around Washington deeply embarrassed Hurley and led to what 
historian Warren Cohen has aptly called a showdown between Hurley and his staff.21 After 
lengthy discussions of the matter at the State and War Departments, Roosevelt finally sided 
firmly with his friend, Ambassador Hurley. Thus, the CCP would receive no assistance from the 
United States unless Chiang approved it, and U.S. policy in China aimed only to “sustain and 
reform” Chiang’s regime.22  
Upon his return to Chongqing, Hurley initiated significant changes to the personnel at the 
Embassy and their relationships with other U.S. government organizations operating in China, 
effectively silencing dissent from his subordinates until he resigned as ambassador in November 
1945. Until that point, Hurley’s draconian censorship and loyalty exercises in the embassy 
combined with the example of what happened to Service and Davies—two career diplomats 
whom peers viewed as coming under attack simply for doing their jobs—strongly discouraged 
other Foreign Service officers to report information about the CCP that could in any way be 
perceived as charitable. Detailed sensitive political analysis on the CCP not provided through 
Chinese central government or GMD sources ceased to be broadly available to U.S. foreign 
policy decisionmakers in 1945 and 1946. Few reports about Chinese Communists or the plans 
and intentions of the CCP appear in the official State Department records at this time, even 
though from April 23 to June 11, 1945 the CCP leaders in Yan’an held their Seventh Party 
Congress, which historians today consider to be among the most important conferences in CCP 
history.  
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U.S. collection of political intelligence on the CCP wanes 
The loss of participation of U.S. diplomats in the Dixie Mission significantly impaired 
the Mission’s ability to meet the goals initially set for it when Stilwell and Davies had perceived 
a U.S. intelligence gap about Chinese domestic politics in 1942 and 1943. When considering the 
fate of the Dixie Mission in early 1945, as well as U.S.-China policy more generally in this 
period, it is important to note that the State Department at the time was tasked with fulfilling a 
unique role within the U.S. government executive branch for providing political assessments and 
intelligence reporting on social, economic, and political topics. U.S. diplomats in the 1940s did 
not frequently use the term “intelligence” to describe the products of their work, but the 
information meets the basic definitions of intelligence used today: U.S. diplomats collected 
information not generally available to the public about foreign affairs that was relevant to the 
policy interests of the United States. At Yan’an, political assessments about the CCP and official 
discussions with the CCP leaders of a specifically political nature on behalf of the U.S. 
government had been the sole responsibility of the Foreign Service officers, particularly John 
Service. U.S. diplomats not serving in Yan’an had much less contact with CCP leaders, 
particularly outside of formal meeting and negotiation settings. 
Other agencies with personnel operating in China did not generally engage in the 
production of political assessments. Intrinsic competition for resources and influence between 
U.S. agencies responsible for foreign policy and strategic issues had resulted in strict divisions of 
labor between diplomats and attaches prior to World War II, and some of these bureaucratic 
protocols are so deeply entrenched that they remain in place today. The traditional division of 
labor between U.S. agencies complicated efforts at adaptation to improve upon American efforts 
to collect strategic foreign intelligence in China during the war, even when new agencies were 
created to assist. As explained in greater detail in Chapter One, Roosevelt established the OSS in 
 
 
244 
part because the combined efforts of the State Department and military intelligence organizations 
were failing to meet the more sophisticated intelligence demands that World War II had 
presented for the United States. However, OSS officials found it extremely difficult to break 
through established administrative norms and formal intelligence agreements such as SACO to 
begin effective political intelligence reporting from China during the war.23  
Thus, the complete withdrawal of State Department participation in U.S. intelligence 
efforts at Yan’an early in 1945 significantly reduced the capacity of the Dixie Mission to provide 
political intelligence reporting on the CCP from Yan’an. Without Foreign Service officers to 
observe the CCP leaders and compile their observations in contextualized reports, the other 
American officials who remained at Yan’an found it difficult or impossible to succeed their State 
Department colleagues in their duties.  
U.S. officials serving in remote forward areas such as Yan’an tended to be extremely 
cautious about exceeding the mandate of their prescribed professional responsibilities, which 
would create unnecessary tension between colleagues serving under often arduous conditions 
and cause controversy with management in rear areas who all tended to be geographically 
located together in U.S. Embassy compounds, such as the one in Chongqing. Barrett frequently 
refers to this phenomenon of respect for organizational specialization in his memoirs. At one 
point, Barrett explicitly notes that his reports were “all on military subjects, as the political side 
was covered by [Foreign Service officers] Jack Service and Ray Ludden.”24 Barrett further 
specifies the list of topics that he considered to be within his purview:  
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“…estimates of the strength of the Communist forces—on these I had to accept 
generally the figures given me, as there was no way to check them—and their 
tactics, equipment, training, discipline, and morale. I also did my best to make a 
fair assessment of the contribution they had made in the past to the war effort in 
general and what they were likely to be able to contribute in the future.”25  
 
Although the frequency of his personal contact with CCP leaders and his years of service 
in the military attaché’s office in China might have qualified Barrett to provide constructive 
commentary on CCP leadership politics, norms and protocols of bureaucratic behavior prevented 
him from engaging in such activity. Political reports simply exceeded the scope of Barrett’s 
position, if not his expertise. This phenomenon ceased to be an issue after 1945, when few 
American personnel newly dispatched to Yan’an possessed expertise on Chinese politics. 
Expansion of military intelligence projects at Yan’an in 1945 
General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley had excluded both the OSS and State 
Department from performing any innovative strategic intelligence work from the CCP 
headquarters, leaving the Army’s G-2 in charge of setting the agenda for the group at Yan’an. 
The top priority of the Dixie Mission during the spring of 1945, as General Wedemeyer 
conveyed it to officials in Yan’an, was collecting the type of logistical information that the Army 
could immediately act upon. This definition meant quantifiable information of the sort U.S. 
military intelligence officials felt comfortable processing but that did little to increase 
policymaker understanding of the Chinese domestic political situation or improving White 
House China policy. As Truman assumed office in the spring of 1945, the goals of the Dixie 
Mission focused on the expansion of the ability to collect weather intelligence in north China, 
continued work on collecting order of battle intelligence, support for downed airmen, and liaison 
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activities with the CCP.26 Each of these goals involved a steady flow of new U.S. personnel 
rotating into the Dixie Mission, some permanent and some temporary. Many of the new officials 
had no particular expertise in Chinese affairs or language but were technical experts participating 
in the installation of advanced radio or weather technology. 
Although the potential for the collection of new political information on the CCP 
diminished in early 1945, personnel and the military resources available to the U.S. officials at 
Yan’an expanded significantly, generating a set of new problems. Rather than learning about the 
CCP and drafting politically focused intelligence reports for U.S. audiences, almost all American 
effort at Yan’an shifted to focus on basic military and intelligence liaison activities and the 
construction of operational infrastructure, such as radio communications systems and weather 
equipment. Information collected in these efforts mainly served specific military purposes and 
had little influence on U.S. policy in China generally or on the ongoing U.S. efforts to broker a 
truce between the CCP and GMD. The only potential exception was the flow of Japanese 
periodicals and captured documents that U.S. officials at Yan’an eventually were able to dispatch 
in great volume to colleagues in rear areas. However, administrative and logistical issues with 
interagency communications in rear areas that will be explained below generally prevented these 
materials from reaching the relevant analytic personnel in Chongqing and Washington in time to 
be of immediate use.  
Throughout late 1944 and 1945, U.S. officials at Yan’an continued to call for the 
development of more effective radio networks in the CCP base areas. Without sophisticated 
radio technology and established protocols for its use, intelligence collection from these remote 
areas was simply infeasible. Physically transporting time-sensitive intelligence documents by air 
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was impossible for several reasons. First, Japanese troops often occupied the areas between the 
geographically discontinuous CCP base areas such that planes flying between them would be 
vulnerable, but this concern was minor compared to the other logistical issues preventing such 
transportation. Few of the necessary airstrips or fuel depots existed in the northern parts of 
China. Building these assets would be time consuming and expensive, particularly because the 
area also lacked reliable and efficient roadways, transportation vehicles for construction 
equipment and resources, and, in many cases, the fuel infrastructure required to support heavy 
vehicles. The same issues prevented moving the materials by road, particularly considering that 
the most important intelligence had to be delivered immediately. If details of attack plans, troop 
movements, or weather data required a month to travel across the Chinese countryside, the 
information would be obsolete long before its arrival. Thus, for the U.S. intelligence officials in 
Yan’an to collect and disseminate any useful intelligence, they needed to use radio technology to 
transmit the most important details. 
Although the need for this equipment was fairly obvious to all involved in the war in 
China, procuring radio equipment suitable for use in rural north China, where power supply 
issues were severe, and dispatching it to where it was needed was frustratingly slow. The same 
poor conditions and terrain in remote north China during World War II that made ground and air 
transport of intelligence information infeasible also stalled the development of the radio network. 
The first American intelligence officials to reach Yan’an had assessed in August 1944 that they 
needed radio equipment and trainers, and they had submitted the necessary requests and 
justifications.  
Once approved, these requests wended their way through the military and OSS 
bureaucracies, and the first planes carrying equipment and trainers arrived in Yan’an late in 
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1944. However, according to a memo from OSS officer Burton Fahs, who visited Yan’an 
temporarily in December 1944 to assess the intelligence needs and potential in China, many of 
the radio sets sent to Yan’an and intended for field use were completely unsuitable in the field 
conditions in China, where climate, transportation, and power supply challenges prevented the 
equipment from being used as it was in the European conditions for which it was designed.27  
OSS officers working throughout China to establish a reliable radio network had 
specifically complained about radios with rechargeable batteries, which often required up to 10 
hours steady power supply to recharge. One OSS official serving in eastern China explained to 
Headquarters that power in Shanghai, one of the most sophisticated cities in China at the time, 
only operated 10 days out of each month in January 1945 and the supply probably would be 
reduced further out of Japanese and Chinese concerns for fuel conservation.28 Other cities 
smaller or more remote than Shanghai had no power at all. Thus, American intelligence officials 
serving in China specifically requested radios powered by dry-cell batteries. The replacement 
equipment needed at Yan’an finally arrived in mid-February 1945 along with eight signal corps 
radio operators to build and operate the radio network as well as train CCP counterparts in the 
use of the equipment.29 
Along the same lines, the initial Dixie Mission officials had observed a need for 
microfilm equipment to facilitate processing the huge volumes of captured documents and 
difficult to find Japanese publications to which CCP guerrillas had access for dissemination to 
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the U.S. government. The Dixie Mission routinely received copies of the Tokyo Asahi only ten 
days after publication via the CCP communication networks through north China, according to 
Col. Barrett. “As everyone who knows anything about intelligence work is well aware, a daily 
newspaper, even though published under the strictest of wartime security regulations, is one of 
the best sources of military information in the world.” Barrett explained.30 Despite the utility of 
these sources, they lacked the sense of extreme urgency of the type of intelligence customarily 
transmitted via radio. Moreover, the challenge in transporting these materials was their volume. 
Without microfilm equipment, the only way to transport the documents and publications to U.S. 
base areas in southwest China was overland, typically on the backs of mules, a time-consuming 
affair in which time the documents were vulnerable to loss, damage, and exposure to poor 
weather that could render them useless, if they even arrived in the hands of U.S. intelligence 
officials in time to be of use. Transferring the materials to microfilm in the field would 
significantly accelerate the pace at which they could be distributed as well as the volume that 
could be sent from Yan’an to Chongqing. The weekly flight between the two cities could easily 
carry microfilm.31  
U.S. intelligence officials at Yan’an recognized that the United States must not only 
provide the microfilm equipment and supplies but also the American personnel who could train 
the CCP members to use the equipment. U.S. personnel established an effective microfilm lab at 
Yan’an in 1945, but plans to provide other, more remote, CCP outposts with the necessary 
equipment and training to for additional microfilm stations never progressed.32 Once they 
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successfully obtained the required equipment, the U.S. officials at Yan’an created a photography 
lab and trained a Chinese technician to operate it.33 U.S. officials made arrangements with 
Japanese agents loyal to the CCP to send agents to Beijing, where they purchased Japanese 
publications not generally available to the U.S. government elsewhere. Once the agents had 
transported the periodicals overland to Yan’an, the Chinese technician photographed them and 
printed them onto microfilm for easy transport to Chongqing via the U.S. planes that made 
regular trips to Yan’an from Chongqing. From Chongqing, officials with OSS and the Army’s G-
2 were able to forward the film to intelligence analysts and policymakers in Washington DC via 
the diplomatic pouch system. 
OSS struggles to operate from Yan’an  
In late 1944, the OSS strategy for developing intelligence collection programs in north 
China relied on plying the CCP leaders in forming a web of clandestine intelligence assets that 
could report on vital information. Whereas OSS officials in European operations had 
occasionally relied on well-trained U.S. agents to enter enemy and occupied territory under deep 
cover, such operations were generally impossible for the OSS to execute in China, where 
physical characteristics and language barriers prohibited most American agents themselves from 
hoping to blend in with the Chinese population. Instead, their plan relied upon methods and 
networks of people that CCP guerillas had already developed for moving back and forth across 
Japanese lines of communication. Such plans comprised the North China Intelligence Program, 
codenamed APPLE, that OSS China officials spent considerable time debating and drafting 
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proposals for in late 1944.34 However, events of January 1945 set OSS operations in China on a 
slightly different course. After the diplomatic disaster that erupted from Col. Bird’s meeting with 
the CCP leaders in mid-January, General Wedemeyer’s aversion to the potential political 
blowback that could result from any U.S. efforts to provide aid to the CCP, even secretly, largely 
ended the OSS ability to pursue planned strategic intelligence collection operations from 
Communist areas in any meaningful way. 
The complications that emerged from the January visit to Yan’an by Col. Bird and Col. 
Barrett left General Wedemeyer concerned about miscommunications that resulted from separate 
and complicated lines of communication between intelligence agencies with officials in the 
field—such as OSS and ONI—and U.S. government personnel in Chongqing. Wedemeyer 
consequently centralized all U.S. intelligence operations in China under his control via Colonel 
Heppner, the head of OSS China Wedemeyer had personally selected. Wedemeyer formalized 
the changes in an operational directive issued on February 6 that specified the responsibility of 
OSS officials in China to coordinate all operational activities with counterparts from the Army’s 
G-2 (intelligence) and G-3 (operations) divisions in Chongqing.35  
Wedemeyer’s order covered the broadest possible scope of OSS activities in China. It 
specifies the “most important” functions of OSS that require coordination to include any 
operations “designed to affect the physical subversion of the enemy,” “the delay and harassment 
of the enemy,” “the collection of secret intelligence by various means including espionage and 
counterespionage,” morale operations, and “the accumulation, evaluation and analysis of 
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economic, political, psychological, topographic and military information concerning the enemy 
and enemy occupied territories, and the preparation of appropriate studies embracing these 
subjects.”36 The fact that the Army physically controlled communications infrastructure for U.S. 
installations in Chongqing insured that it was difficult for OSS officials to evade the directive. 
Under the new arrangement, OSS officials in China would have less flexibility to evade the 
parameters of the SACO agreement than they had previously enjoyed.  
General Donovan became concerned that Wedemeyer’s reorganization would ruin his 
plans to accelerate OSS operations in China through the network of clandestine agents 
infiltrating occupied China through the Communist networks. Donovan perceived the OSS plan 
for operations based out of Yan’an to be a key element in his efforts to persuade FDR of the 
postwar relevance of OSS.37 As early as October 1944, Donovan and his staff had started 
working on proposals for a peacetime version of the OSS that would become the first 
independent intelligence agency in the United States. General Donovan so strongly desired the 
OSS expansion in China that he was willing to negotiate with the Army on the exact terms. In 
February 1945, Donovan and Wedemeyer reached a compromise that allowed OSS to pursue its 
operations to develop a network of Chinese and Japanese clandestine agents in north China, but 
instead of relying on CCP networks, the OSS would partner with GMD guerilla units near 
Xi’an.38  
Wedemeyer’s centralization of intelligence operations in the China Theater under Army 
auspices was a predictable move for a leader with his considerable expertise in military planning 
                                                                
36 “Operational Directive No. 4” by command of General Wedemeyer via acting chief of staff, dated February 6, 
1945, attached to memo from Heppner to Donovan, February 17, 1945, NARA RG 226, Entry 148, Box 14. 
 
37 Yu describes the evolution of Donovan’s attitude and the resulting operations in OSS in China, 214-218. 
 
38 Yu, OSS in China, 216-217. 
 
 
 
253 
and organization. Consolidating intelligence collection resources in this way streamlined 
communications and enhanced efficiency. Wedemeyer’s change resulted in a significant 
expansion for OSS operations in China, except in Yan’an, where China’s GMD-controlled 
central government strongly opposed their activity. By limiting the activity of U.S. strategic 
intelligence collectors in areas beyond GMD control, Wedemeyer’s change gave the GMD much 
greater influence on the information about China that U.S. policymakers received. As a relative 
newcomer to Chinese domestic politics who spoke no Chinese, Wedemeyer may not have 
realized the full implications of his decision, and his top position in the Army hierarchy in China 
probably limited opportunities for subordinates to provide any input on Wedemeyer’s plan 
before its implementation. 
The shift in focus to cooperation with the GMD instead of the CCP introduced a new set 
of challenges for OSS officials in Chongqing and Yan’an. Heppner, the head of OSS operations 
in China, who had a keen awareness of Chinese domestic politics, foresaw some of the 
difficulties, but OSS operational planners in Washington who were trying to hold together the 
patched up relationship with Wedemeyer ignored his protests.39 In the end, the OSS operations in 
north China in collaboration with the GMD mirrored most of the organization’s earlier efforts in 
China: a great expenditure of funds and resources for very little return, punctuated by a few 
extremely humiliating international incidents.  
The most notable of these incidents that emerged from the new OSS human asset 
operations in north China was the famous case of John Birch, an American missionary 
cooperating with GMD troops and the OSS to collect intelligence who was killed in a conflict 
                                                                
39 Yu, OSS in China, 215. 
 
 
 
254 
with CCP guerillas in late August 1945.40 The Birch incident resulted from a highly complicated 
set of diplomatic and military factors, ranging from simple bad luck and poor communication 
between Chinese troops to poor discipline among the untrained irregular CCP guerrillas. 
However, reports of the affair simplified to the point of bias quickly became a cause célèbre for 
the anti-communist movement and China Lobby in the United States that persisted throughout 
the Cold War.   
In terms of closing the U.S. government’s intelligence gap about the CCP and the 
intricacies of Chinese domestic politics, limiting the ability of OSS to cooperate with the CCP 
was a definite setback. Similar to U.S. military officials based at Yan’an, OSS officials at the 
CCP refrained from reporting intelligence about CCP politics for broad dissemination within the 
government because they had no orders or mandate to do so. With the exception of a handful of 
internal analytic reports that circulated within OSS R&A Branch, OSS China never weakened 
the monopoly that the State Department officials had on providing political assessments about 
the CCP within the U.S. government.41 Hurley’s fear of disloyalty and policy criticism prevented 
Foreign Service officers in China from exercising their authority to report on the CCP. Thus, 
Washington received almost no reporting on the CCP during this time except for information 
conveyed through contacts in the Guomindang—the CCP leaders main domestic political 
opponents.   
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Distrust and institutional rivalries distract U.S. intelligence collectors in Yan’an  
Personnel changes and the departure of the close-knit group of China experts that had 
comprised the initial Dixie Mission opened the door for engrained institutional rivalries to 
surface and impede efficiency at Yan’an starting in 1945. Continued competition for budgetary 
resources in Washington DC trickled down to personnel in field offices in the form of lack of 
approvals for interagency operations and destructive secrecy between agencies supposedly 
collaborating. On the level of organizational culture, strong personal identifications with the 
agencies that employed them often encouraged U.S. intelligence officials in Yan’an and their 
most immediate colleagues in Chongqing and Kunming to feel confidence bordering on 
arrogance with regard to the efficiency of their own bureaucratic processes and disdain for other 
agencies. These perceptions contributed to a willingness to duplicate efforts and reluctance to 
share information with or delegate duties to other agencies. Heppner described dealing with such 
issues as a matter of course in a letter to Donovan on February 17, 1945. Heppner wrote, “I have 
been forced to sit on the SI Branch very sharply because of excessive branch-mindedness and an 
attempt by them to emasculate AGFRTS. I had expected this sort of thing, however, and I know 
how to deal with it.”42 
The steady struggle to perform intelligence work efficiently in often spartan and remote 
field conditions provided further incentive for intelligence officials to establish procedural norms 
that favored their individual agencies, even at the expense of others, although all U.S. 
government agencies with representatives in Yan’an supposedly worked toward the same goals. 
For example, the U.S. Army, Navy and State Department had formed the Joint Army-Navy 
Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) as early as 1941 to resolve duplication of efforts in the 
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dissemination of military intelligence from the field to Washington DC. Military officials serving 
JICA included staff officers in rear base areas and couriers, who physically transported sensitive 
government materials between war zones. Attempts by JICA personnel based in Chongqing to 
organize and centralize the flow of intelligence and intelligence requirements in and out of China 
during World War II naturally attracted critique and suspicion from OSS officials, who viewed 
the Army intelligence procedures as the cumbersome status quo bureaucracy that OSS had been 
founded to improve and replace.43  
In December 1944, Joseph Spencer, the OSS official in CBI headquarters who served as 
direct supervisor for OSS personnel stationed in Yan’an wrote to OSS R&A Division Chief 
William Langer complaining that OSS intelligence requirements sent from Washington for 
Yan’an officials were not reaching his office. Instead, any lists of questions and requirements 
OSS headquarters sent to the field through military channels were languishing at the JICA 
offices. Spencer noted that none of the requirements Langer claims to have sent the unit through 
JICA arrived, and he speculated that the failed deliveries were deliberate and related to 
competition between the military intelligence and OSS. “Frankly, JICA has been looking for 
opportunities to get into research for some time, and this is just one of the ways,” Spencer 
wrote.44 With frequent liberal use of all capital letters—the most expressive formatting available 
in diplomatic cable communications at the time—Spencer implored Langer and his subordinates 
to bypass military communication channels and exclusively send their questions directly to 
OSS/R&A officials in China. JICA records fail to reveal if the delay in delivery of OSS 
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correspondence in China was indeed intentional as Spencer suggested or simply a side effect of 
the fabled inefficiency of that short-lived organization. In this case, Spencer’s perception of the 
situation is instructive, regardless of the reality. 
Spencer’s memo also highlights a separate common set of problems with bureaucratic 
processes for intelligence collection that emerged as the intelligence operations at Yan’an limped 
along through late 1944 and 1945: intra-agency rivalry. In addition to the pride U.S. intelligence 
officials felt toward their agencies compared to other U.S. government organizations, they also 
tended to display considerable loyalty to their own divisions within agencies, which were often 
responsible for completely different portions of the standard cycle of intelligence collection.45 
Two examples of the effects of such attitudes surface in Spencer’s December 5 memo alone. 
First, Spencer responded to Langer’s concern that OSS intelligence analysts in Washington are 
not receiving sufficient answers to their questions by reminding Langer that the collectors in the 
field must receive more timely and specific requests for information. Spencer wrote, “Give us as 
much of a detailed statement as you can—please do not just say “any new material on…” since 
we do that automatically when we get anything—and give us something realistic on what your 
deadline may be so that we know how to plan our programs.”46  
Although Spencer is noting an important gap in awareness and communication between 
the OSS/R&A Headquarters officers and those working in the field in remote parts of China, his 
next comments reveal how Spencer prioritizes his loyalty to the various groups of which he is a 
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part. In the paragraph immediately following Spencer’s frustrated instructions to Langer, he 
explained to Langer how a visiting OSS/R&A officer in China is “seeing the evidence that R&A 
is the best damned branch in the whole shop.”47 Obviously taking considerable pride in his 
affiliation with OSS/R&A, Spencer wrote: 
“It’s that way because we worked hard at it, because with all our heckling back 
and forth, R&A at home and in the field is in closer touch, is better organized, and 
doing a more effective job than any other branch. On that we stand. We are all 
zealous to keep it that way, to improve our production, to serve you better, and to 
get on with both the war and the chances of the peace.”48 
 
The rivalries that erupted between agencies and offices of the U.S. government 
responsible for intelligence collection and operations in China are neither unique to the U.S. 
government’s activities in China nor are they unexpected to any student of U.S. national security 
administrative history. Rather these examples serve to highlight one of the most obvious 
problems that surfaced during World War II as U.S. leaders expected its pre-war national 
security bureaucracy to adapt itself to assume demanding new strategic responsibilities. Even if 
establishing the OSS took the government a step in the right direction in terms of developing a 
capacity to collect and absorb strategic foreign intelligence to serve U.S. interests, expecting 
older organizations to simply step aside and make way for the new intelligence collectors in the 
field in such difficult operational environments as those in East Asia proved naïve.  
The shift from area experts to technical experts in early 1945 
In conceptualizing the Dixie Mission, Stilwell and Davies had attempted to sidestep some 
of the biggest challenges of coordinating between agencies in the old-fashioned bureaucratic 
system for intelligence collection by carefully selecting capable personnel whose expertise and 
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ties to one another and Stilwell could encourage cooperation on their intelligence collection 
mission despite the proscribed boundaries of their respective organizations. However, once 
Hurley and Wedemeyer made significant changes in 1945 to the personnel serving at Yan’an in 
part to accomplish their own goals in China and in part because they identified Stilwell’s 
informal network as a threat to their interests and policies. The delegation of Americans based at 
Yan’an consequently experienced three changes of commanding officer and two name changes 
in the 12 months of 1945 alone—extremely jarring transitions from an administrative standpoint 
for an outpost as tiny and remote as the American presence in Yan’an.49 By February 1945, only 
six of the original members of the Dixie Mission remained in Yan’an, and by the fall of 1945, 
they had all left as well.50 The rapid and substantial personnel turnover among U.S. officials 
working in both Yan’an and Chongqing on CCP intelligence collection that had started in late 
1944 decimated the remaining vestiges of knowledge about the institutional history behind the 
Dixie Mission’s creation that might have existed. Few reminders of the original Dixie 
participants remained at Yan’an beyond the story of the fate of the young Lieutenant Henry 
Whittlesey, Dixie’s solitary American casualty, after whom the newly constructed American 
mess hall at Yan’an was named in early 1945.51  
                                                                
49 Commanding officers changed from Col. Morris DePass (January 1945) to Col. Wilbur Peterkin (February – July 
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Personnel turnover within the Dixie Mission and the broader U.S. military and diplomatic 
delegation in China reduced the instances of informal interagency communication that had been 
relatively rare and dangerous from an information security perspective but productive for U.S. 
intelligence officials in 1944. Prior to the recall of General Stilwell and the resignation of 
Ambassador Clarence Gauss, many of the U.S. intelligence officials serving at Yan’an shared a 
professional interest in Chinese affairs and a connection to Stilwell that facilitated trust and 
communication between them.  
A simple and tangible example of this network in action circumventing bureaucratic 
constraints obstructing the overall progress of U.S. intelligence in China occurred in January 
1945, when an OSS official serving in China on behalf of the Morale Operations (MO) Branch 
secretly received a copy of a report John Davies wrote after his visit to Yan’an entitled “China 
and the Kremlin,” which he conveyed from China to OSS leadership in Washington. His cover 
letter to the report specifies that Davies passed it to OSS in confidence, and “it would be most 
unfortunate if there was any leak on this.”52 As the U.S. intelligence personnel serving in China 
began to change and increase in 1945, similar instances of unauthorized interagency information 
sharing and trust became rare and then obsolete. The personal and professional networks 
between individuals supporting such activity simply no longer existed in Chongqing or Yan’an. 
Rapid leadership transitions in Dixie Mission in spring 1945 
Serving as a further distraction from intelligence work, rapid transitions in the leadership 
of the Dixie Mission in 1945 reflected its changing—and mostly declining—status as a potential 
base location from which innovative intelligence operations in north China and northeast Asia 
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could launch. Soon after his arrival in Yan’an to replace David Barrett as commanding officer of 
the Dixie Mission in late December 1944, Colonel Morris DePass had worn out his welcome 
with the CCP leaders. Similar to Barrett, DePass had served in the Army for his career and was 
considered a respected staff officer with some expertise in Chinese affairs who could represent 
U.S. interests in Yan’an admirably. However, the reputation DePass had for close connections 
with Chinese Central Government intelligence officers made the CCP leaders reluctant to share 
information with him and ultimately convinced them to declare DePass persona non grata, 
requiring his immediate departure from Yan’an.53  
In mid-February 1945, the top leadership role in the Dixie Mission officially passed to 
Peterkin, whom the Army hastily promoted to the rank of colonel required for such a position. 
Peterkin would serve as Dixie’s interim commander until Wedemeyer could name a more 
suitable officer of his choice from elsewhere in the Army staff. Unlike predecessors Barrett and 
DePass, Peterkin was not an Army careerist, and he did not possess specialized expertise in 
intelligence or an understanding of the situation in China other than what he acquired in the 
context of his Army positions during World War II. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Peterkin had been a 
high school teacher and principal, respectively, in a suburb of Seattle, Washington.54 Peterkin’s 
connection with the Army began in 1939 when he served as a reservist for the 15th Infantry. In 
1941, Peterkin volunteered for a year of active duty and attended officers’ school in Fort 
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Benning, GA. He remained at the school until 1943, teaching weapons courses in the infantry-
training program.  
In 1943, Peterkin’s skills as an instructor earned him a position working as an instructor 
for Chinese troops in Guilin at the 3515 Infantry Training Center where Colonel David Barrett 
was serving as dean. Japanese advances in China lead to the closure of the Guilin base and its 
training center in 1944. Peterkin was awaiting new orders in Chongqing when Barrett had 
appointed him as chief executive officer for the Dixie Mission. Reflecting the disarray of the 
Dixie Mission leadership in this time of transition, Peterkin was not in Yan’an when word of his 
new orders and rank arrived but driving through the Chinese countryside supervising a convoy of 
much needed jeeps and trucks.55 Day-to-day leadership of the struggling U.S. mission to Yan’an 
for most of February and March 1945 fell to the next most senior U.S. official at Yan’an, OSS 
officer Ray Cromley, who was undercover with the G-2 attempting to assemble orders of battle 
for the CCP troops and Japanese forces in north China. 
Peterkin made a dutiful and capable leader of the Dixie Mission for the time he was in 
charge, but he had no particular ambition toward or expertise in innovation when it came to 
intelligence work. Unlike the other individuals that commanded the American group at Yan’an 
during the base’s short tenure, Peterkin’s participation in intelligence work was serendipitous 
and specific to the needs of the war. He considered his military service to be a temporary 
patriotic duty to help his country at war, and he returned home to resume his career in public 
education by the end of 1945. Given his situation, Peterkin’s approach to leadership emphasized 
following orders he received from Chongqing to the best of his ability, maintaining respectful 
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and cordial relationships with the CCP leaders, and encouraging esprit de corps among the U.S. 
officials stationed in the remote and difficult living conditions at Yan’an.  
Although Peterkin did little to push the limits of his intelligence collection assignments 
while commanding the Dixie Mission, the influence of the initial Dixie Mission participants, 
such as Barrett, Service, and Ludden, on his understanding of Chinese politics is evident. 
Peterkin’s memoirs and his personal letters demonstrate that he shared the positive impressions 
of the CCP, bordering on myopia, that his colleagues had expressed at their peril.56 Peterkin’s 
position as a trainer for Chinese central government troops in Guilin gave him a sound basis of 
comparison for the attitudes of GMD and CCP soldiers, and he held a more favorable view of the 
latter. In his memoirs, Peterkin wrote, “During the approximate ten months I spent in 
Kuomintang China I was amazed at the magnitude of graft and corruption in both civil and 
military areas…When I arrived in Yenan it was refreshing to see troops well-fed, with good 
uniforms, using old but immaculately cared for weapons.”57 Similar to the his Dixie Mission 
colleagues, Peterkin recognizes that the CCP leaders may have been putting their best foot 
forward at Yan’an to make a positive impression on the American observers. However, similar to 
his traveling companion and lifelong-friend Ray Ludden, the months Peterkin spent traveling 
among CCP guerillas in rural north China failed to alter Peterkin’s initial impressions. Peterkin, 
Ludden, and Barrett all repeatedly joked in their letters and memoirs that if the CCP leaders had 
been simply putting on a show for the Americans, their extensive acting and theater production 
skills deserved commendations. 
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CCP leaders also appeared to have respect for and a friendly attitude toward Peterkin. 
The American had gone to great lengths to protect operational security for CCP hosts who 
escorted him while traveling in dangerous front line areas. Peterkin even donned CCP uniforms 
and a Chinese haircut to help him blend in with his escorts and avoid attracting Japanese 
attention.58 Out of both self-preservation and the best interests of his CCP guards, Peterkin 
curtailed his countryside field trip early when, despite his attempts at disguise, the Japanese 
troops in the area learned of his presence and began offering a reward for his capture.59 Perhaps 
reflective of the excellent rapport Peterkin developed with CCP hosts during his time in Yan’an, 
he was one of a small group of Dixie Mission participants invited to China for a reunion 
celebration in 1978.60 Peterkin explained “Personal relations between the members of the 
mission and the Communists were always cordial. Even after the Hurley debacle our hosts 
assured us that they made a sharp distinction between us and our government.”61 
Yeaton takes charge 
The appointment in July 1945 of Col. Ivan D. Yeaton as commanding officer of the 
Yan’an group effectively ended the potential of the group to evolve into a cooperative and 
productive base for interagency strategic intelligence collection on the CCP. Yeaton arrived in 
Yan’an only a few days before the United States destroyed two cities in Japan with its newly 
developed nuclear weapons, hastening the end of the war. Although the Japanese surrender soon 
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ended the war, President Truman’s long-term U.S. policy goals in China, which had mostly been 
simple extensions of Roosevelt’s policies, had not been achieved in August 1945. Despite the 
lack of progress in negotiations, President Truman continued to advocate the creation of a U.S.-
friendly coalition government in China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the U.S. 
government continued to hope—however vainly—that it could help prevent all-out civil war in 
China. Ambassador Hurley, Generals Wedemeyer and Marshall, and Truman’s White House 
aides all determined that maintaining a U.S. connection to the CCP leaders via the group at 
Yan’an could facilitate negotiations with minimal cost to the United States. Thus, the American 
contingent remained in Yan’an into early 1947. Yeaton’s tenure in charge of the American 
mission at Yan’an lasted into the spring of 1946. 
Yeaton had served in intelligence roles for most of a long career in the Army, and the 
Army considered him a top expert on Russia and communism. Yeaton’s first experience in the 
Army in 1919 and 1920 had been as a staff officer in the American Expeditionary Force in 
Siberia aiding White Russians fleeing persecution by the rising Bolsheviks.62 Subsequent 
training and education in Russian language and Communist philosophy, including an abbreviated 
Masters degree program at Columbia University in the 1920s, had prepared Yeaton for a position 
in the U.S. attaché’s office in the Moscow Embassy in the 1930s. He eventually served as U.S. 
military attaché to Russia in Moscow and was among the U.S. personnel evacuated from that city 
prior to the Battle of Moscow. He returned to Washington DC from Moscow and served in the 
pool of G-2 intelligence analysts preparing orders of battle for European forces to aid Allied 
strategic planning. 
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Yeaton’s education on Communist philosophy and his experience living in Stalin’s 
Moscow had granted him considerable respect within the Army staff as an expert on 
communism. His experiences had also imbued him with a legendary hatred for communist 
regimes and a blanket vehement opposition to communist ideology, which he perceived to be a 
threat to individual freedom designed solely for the goal of global domination and controlled 
globally by Soviet leaders, particularly Stalin. Yeaton held a view increasingly common at the 
time that communist movements beyond the Soviet Union, such as the movement in China, were 
Soviet puppets, lured into the ideology by the insidious propaganda and proselytizing of the 
Soviet Comintern. According to Yeaton, “The expansion of communism under Soviet hegemony 
by military power to enslave small nations would be directed at us some day, when we were no 
longer powerful enough to defend ourselves successfully. On that basis I reasoned that the Soviet 
Union was our enemy.”63 Yeaton’s attitudes about Europe, Russia, and communism are 
important to understanding his role in U.S. intelligence efforts at Yan’an in 1945.  
Yeaton had received orders to China after General Wedemeyer repeatedly requested the 
services of an intelligence official with expertise on Communism. According to Yeaton’s 
recollection, after learning of Yeaton’s background during a dinner with Chiang Kai-shek and 
Yeaton, Ambassador Hurley recommended that Wedemeyer send Yeaton to head the Yan’an 
mission instead of making him chief of intelligence at Theater Headquarters in Chongqing to 
replace Colonel Joseph Dickey, as had been expected.64 Yeaton’s selection to command the 
Yan’an group was part of a broader trend of populating new positions in the China Theater with 
Army staff officers previously assigned to the European Theater. With the end of the war in 
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Europe in May 1945, success in the Pacific War immediately became the top priority for U.S. 
military leaders. The palpable shift in policymaker attention from Europe to Asia, which began 
as early as the start of Operation Overlord (D-Day) in Europe in June 1944, caused some barely 
repressed bitterness among Army officials such as Yeaton who had spent years learning 
European languages and studying European politics and who saw posts in East Asia as career 
suicide.  
Prior to World War II, only a small fraction of American diplomats or military officials 
had served in East Asia, and the region had a reputation as a backwater. Most lower-ranking U.S. 
officials who served in East Asian positions did so for duration of their careers, and they often 
had personal connections to the region, such as Davies and Service, whose parents had been 
missionaries. Higher-ranking personnel posted to East Asia tended to be outcasts from the central 
currents of the Washington DC elite, if not before they achieved their posts in East Asia, then 
almost certainly afterward. President Roosevelt had contributed to the reputation by using posts 
in Asia to dispense with problematic friends and cronies to whom he owed political favors but 
who could not be trusted with posts the president and his inner circle of advisors perceived to be 
more important. Career diplomats such as Davies viewed Roosevelt’s appointments of 
Ambassador Hurley and Donald Nelson, who served as Chiang Kai-shek’s personal 
representative on economic matters, to be of this variety. Upon Nelson’s selection as Roosevelt’s 
special economic emissary to Chiang, Davies joked in a letter to his wife, “China is apparently to 
the American political scene what Siberia is to the Russians. Only, Roosevelt’s technique is 
quicker and more humane.”65  
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The Army Intelligence Division’s Far East Branch had a particularly undesirable 
reputation within G-2 circles, especially compared with the Division’s more successful record on 
European intelligence during the war. Perhaps reflecting the strain that World War II had placed 
on the underdeveloped U.S. intelligence capabilities, many Army General Staff officers 
perceived the G-2 itself to be dysfunctional, disorganized, and mismanaged throughout the war. 
Yeaton quotes General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who replaced General George Marshall as chief 
of staff of the Army in 1945, as remarking that the “G-2 did not even know how to organize 
itself.”66 Similarly, Yeaton likened the G-2 in 1944 and 1945 to Humpty Dumpty “desperately 
trying to put itself back together again after someone had pushed it off the wall.”67 Within the G-
2, the elements focused on the Far East had the worst reputations, and of these, the elements 
focused on China were perceived to be the worst of the worst. Yeaton and fellow European 
intelligence analysts had high regard for G-2 Japan analysts, particularly those who were 
working with General MacArthur to develop and utilize the findings from the cutting-edge 
cryptography unit, codenamed MAGIC. Other than this exception, Army officials within the 
broader G-2 looked down their noses at their colleagues who served in China.  
Despite being written thirty years after the events he describes, Yeaton’s memoirs clearly 
convey his passionate resentment at being diverted from his focus on Europe and sent to China. 
Yeaton opposed the abrupt shift of U.S. policymaker attention away from Europe toward Asia. 
Prior to the summer of 1944, Yeaton was among the G-2 staff officers in Washington who 
worked intently on the detailed intelligence required to support the successful U.S. military 
campaigns in Europe, particularly Operation Overlord. Yeaton describes how he and his 
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colleagues who worked on Overlord within the G-2 became locked out of efforts to follow up on 
the progress of their plans, claiming that “overnight our orientation was shifted 180 degrees from 
Europe to the Far East. The why was only one of the several questions that were never 
answered.”68 Yeaton’s memoir rails against Roosevelt’s strategic planners, particularly Harry 
Hopkins, and showcases Yeaton’s low esteem for General George Marshall and any of his 
perceived cronies, most especially General Joseph Stilwell and David Barrett.  
Perhaps most importantly, Yeaton’s memoirs reveal his assumptions about the 
reorganization of the G-2 in 1944 as the U.S. government intensified efforts to end the Pacific 
War. Yeaton criticizes the reorganizations for removing area experts, such as himself, from their 
core area of expertise and seeking to deploy them as a more fungible workforce of intelligence 
officials wherever a surge of personnel was needed. He explains that intelligence work within the 
U.S. government and other countries such as Great Britain had been organized by region with 
good reason. He ascribed the lack of attention to such organizational effort to the Roosevelt 
Administration, which he argued did not want to see intelligence experts grow powerful enough 
to criticize foreign policy. In particular, Yeaton observed that the Roosevelt White House was 
not open to critiques of U.S.-Soviet policy.69 Yeaton suggested that the surge staffing within the 
Army in 1944 made the United States more vulnerable to Soviet geopolitical machinations that 
devolved into the Cold War after V-E Day. Yeaton’s points on the issue of how to use area 
experts in intelligence work are somewhat ironic because Yeaton confidently assumed that his 
expertise on Russia and Soviet Communism would make him more capable than his Chinese-
speaking predecessors in Yan’an at determining the CCP leaders’ intentions.  
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Yeaton had a low opinion of the intelligence work that U.S. officials had performed at 
Yan’an and of the base’s contribution to the war effort. Yeaton made his opinion of the Dixie 
Mission completely clear in his memoirs: 
“From a military intelligence standpoint, the “Dixie Mission” was ill-conceived, 
organized without reconnaissance, dispatched without concrete directives, 
overstaffed with personnel unfamiliar with communist ideology, tactics or 
methods, and located in an area inaccessible except by animal transport. 
Moreover, the mission was a guest of a rebel government, no longer interested in 
the war against Japan and seeking United states recognition and lend-lease 
supplies only to continue the civil war, after the Japanese surrendered. How many 
strikes are “out” in this ball game?”70  
 
Yeaton assessed the first six months of the Dixie Mission to be an unmitigated disaster, 
insidiously designed by Zhou Enlai, who seduced Barrett, Service, and Davies into positive 
impressions of CCP activities in the Americans’ ignorance of communist ideology and tactics. 
Yeaton argued that “only trained eyes” such as his own “would recognize the sheathed claws and 
unctuous manner of the communist when he is in trouble and needs help.”71 
Relations between CCP leaders and the Americans at Yan’an retained a hollow civility 
after Yeaton’s arrival in Yan’an, but Yeaton maintained profound suspicions of both his CCP 
hosts and the Americans who had previously served at the base. Yeaton noted what he perceived 
to be lax security procedures around Yan’an and communications likely to be vulnerable to 
monitoring by Soviets. In his eagerness to note connections between the Soviets and CCP 
leaders, Yeaton claimed to have spotted two uniformed NKVD Signal Corps officers sitting in 
the corner of the room where Yeaton first met Mao Zedong, though Peterkin believed Yeaton 
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may have been confusing the uniforms of two GMD liaison officers stationed at Yan’an at the 
time with his memory of the Soviet intelligence service uniforms.72  
Yeaton displayed little interest in interagency cooperation or innovative intelligence 
collection. His arrogance toward the existing personnel at Yan’an and his lack of curiosity about 
the group’s prior activities made him unpopular with his subordinates. Peterkin described Yeaton 
during their first encounter as “very unfriendly!” and the situation never improved before 
Peterkin permanently left Yan’an in mid-August 1945.73 Peterkin attempted to follow the orders 
Colonel Dickey, head of the G-2 for China, had given him to brief Yeaton on active programs at 
Yan’an. According to Peterkin, Yeaton said “he was an expert on communism and there was 
nothing I could tell him that he didn’t already know.”74 As Peterkin packed to leave the base on 
August 12, he recorded in his diary that most of the Dixie Mission personnel had visited him 
“asking for transfers, stating that they did not want to serve under Yeaton.”75  
Reports about Yeaton’s attitude toward interagency cooperation and the base at Yan’an 
are reflected in one example Yeaton included in his memoirs. He describes discovering 25 radios 
and two generators that OSS officials had transported to Yan’an but never used after he had 
settled in and surveyed the situation in the building spaces the American officials occupied in 
Yan’an. Rather than arranging for the equipment to be utilized for intelligence work in north 
China or returned to Chongqing, Yeaton installed one of the generators in his living compound to 
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power electric lights and movies for the comfort of his Army subordinates.76 Yeaton’s use of the 
generator may have inadvertently fostered more cordial relations with CCP leaders. The top 
party leaders enjoyed private screenings of the American films that arrived on the weekly planes 
from Beijing throughout 1946; Mao Zedong reportedly particularly relished films that featured 
Laurel and Hardy.77 
The decline of U.S. intelligence collection from Yan’an after 1945 
By the time Yeaton settled into his role in charge of the American group at Yan’an, the 
base had fully transformed from its original function as an experiment in interagency strategic 
intelligence collection to a basic Army outpost for wartime military intelligence gathering. 
However, the Japanese surrender and end of the war made such military intelligence irrelevant. 
By the fall of 1945, the American intelligence activity at Yan’an had sharply declined, even 
though the U.S. government maintained a presence of 15-20 U.S. officials from various agencies 
there at all times. From the fall of 1945 until the last Americans left Yan’an in spring 1947, U.S. 
intelligence collection activities at Yan’an dwindled. Instead, U.S. officials who remained at 
Yan’an helped support ongoing negotiations between CCP and GMD leaders, though these talks 
were failing, and relations between the two parties steadily deteriorated. In addition, American 
officials at Yan’an participated in plans to develop transportation infrastructure in north China, 
particularly improving access to fuel, which would facilitate continued U.S. efforts to aid the 
Chinese central government with reconstruction and the demobilization of Japanese troops. 
Reflecting the group’s changes in function and its sharply declining status within the U.S. 
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government, the name of the group itself was also officially changed at this time from the 
Yan’an Observers Group to the Yan’an Liaison Group.78 
Meanwhile, in Washington DC, President Truman and his national security advisors were 
busy assessing how to meet the new demands the outcome of the war had placed on the U.S. 
national security infrastructure but without sacrificing the preservation of democratic values and 
concern for individual civil liberty that had prevented the development of such U.S. intelligence 
capabilities prior to the war. Truman dismantled the OSS in the fall of 1945. Via executive order 
effective October 1, 1945, Truman assigned the well-respected OSS R&A branch to the State 
Department and assigned the War Department to administer elements of the OSS offices that 
handled clandestine intelligence collection and counterintelligence.79 The War Department 
referred collectively to the new offices as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The executive order 
rendered the rest of the OSS functions, including its nascent covert action capability, defunct and 
left Roosevelt’s crony William Donovan without a position in the government. Nonetheless, 
Truman acknowledged Donovan’s arguments that the United States needed a capable and 
coordinated intelligence regime to address Stalin’s brazen incursions into Eastern Europe and 
prevent analytic catastrophes such as the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.80 
Recognizing the inadequacy of the national security bureaucracy that had served 
Roosevelt in the 1930s for the postwar role of the United States in global security, Truman and 
his staff conceptualized a massive reform of the U.S. national security regime. The Truman 
White House and executive branch personnel began a bureaucratic adaptation process that 
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culminated in the National Security Act of 1947. The act established the Central Intelligence 
Agency, National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also dramatically 
restructured the civilian military leadership structure, creating the Defense Department with a 
civilian secretary overseeing departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.  
The reform process was far from a smooth and direct path for Truman and his aides. 
Rather, the White House found itself mediating between strong personalities who were 
defending deeply entrenched bureaucratic interests and who each held passionate opinions about 
the best way for the United States to protect its national security interests and develop modern 
intelligence capabilities. The executive branch organizations that had previously had partial and 
ad hoc responsibilities for intelligence activity all had opinions about how postwar U.S. 
intelligence capability should be developed and administered. These agencies included the 
departments of State, War, Navy, and Army and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Legendary 
disagreements on the topic between Army Secretary Ferdinand Eberstadt and Navy Secretary 
James Forrestal alone have captivated historians for decades. A major source of disagreement in 
late 1945 focused on which agency would have overall administrative (and budgetary) control of 
intelligence capabilities. After reviewing several plans, Truman created an independent 
organization called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) that operated at first with a skeleton 
crew and no designated budget.81 CIG eventually became the CIA.  
Work at the U.S. Embassy in China continued after the war, as did intelligence operations 
that were underway throughout north China and liaison activities that were still in progress at 
Yan’an. However, by late 1945, intelligence reporting from Yan’an had slowed to a trickle. 
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Leonard Meeker, chief of the Research and Intelligence Service branch of the SSU in China 
submitted one of the most revealing reports about the true state of the Yan’an Liaison Group in 
late October 1945.82 Meeker made a short trip to Yan’an in early October 1945 to confer with 
Yeaton and survey the intelligence work of the unit, and his report to the SSU Research and 
Intelligence Service headquarters chief in Washington, classified secret at the time, is remarkable 
for its candor. Compared with reports OSS officials such as Stelle were sending from Yan’an in 
October 1944, the report demonstrates the dramatic transition that the section had experienced in 
one year in terms of intelligence collection and operations. 
Meeker begins his report by firmly dispelling rumors in Washington that the Soviets had 
constructed airfields in north China near Yan’an and were supplying the CCP with weapons and 
resources. Instead, Meeker describes the absence of any visible airfields, including the one at 
which his party attempted to land.83 Meeker explains that his pilot flew back and forth across 
Shaanxi province for over an hour in search of Yan’an before locating the only small landing 
space for a plane that they saw all morning in the location north of the Wei River where the 
Yan’an base was supposed to be located. Fortunately, the space was the correct location—the 
grave-pocked rudimentary airfield into which pilot Jack Champion had crash-landed in the 
summer of 1944 with the first American staff of the Dixie Mission. The difficulty in locating 
Yan’an made a deep impression on Meeker, who argued that his experience “made perfectly 
clear to me that the reports of Communist airfields constructed around Yenan and receiving large 
amounts of Russian supplies were entire fabrications.” Moreover, he wrote, “no plane can come 
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in there without the whole population, including the Americans, knowing it. So whatever 
dealings the Russians may have been having with the Chinese Communists elsewhere, it seems 
definite that they have not had any in north Shensi.”84 The swirling rumors in Washington about 
Soviet contact with the CCP and the fact that Meeker, a short-term visitor to Yan’an, had to be 
the one to dispel them hints at the poor state of intelligence reporting emerging from Yeaton and 
the American contingent based at Yan’an by the final months of 1945. 
In the report, Meeker soon articulates this point even more bluntly. “From conversation at 
Yenan and with G-2 personnel here in Chungking, I judge that the Observer Group is largely 
engaged in servicing itself, with a little liaison function and very little intelligence thrown in,” he 
wrote. “This is of course discouraging, in view of what seem to me the great opportunities for 
valuable intelligence work there at the present time.”85 Meeker diagnoses the problem as the 
terrible reputation of OSS China among the still G-2 dominated section of American officials 
based at Yan’an. He explains that the poor OSS reputation partially stemmed from specific 
personality conflict. Many G-2 officials had found it impossible to cooperate with OSS’s 
Cromley, who was notoriously arrogant, inflexible, and unwilling to participate in the Army 
chain of command for communications. The problems also evolved from severe misjudgments in 
OSS operations in north China performed unilaterally without proper clearance from the G-2 
leadership of the group or from the CCP hosts. Nonetheless, Meeker argued that it would be 
worth sending a new intelligence official to Yan’an to develop opportunities in the postwar 
environment. He wrote “What it takes essentially is someone with active interest and moderate 
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qualifications; there is just about no one like that at Yenan now. It seems to me that if R&A can 
possibly spare someone for the job it would be a tremendously good investment.”86 However, the 
few new personnel who rotated into Yan’an in 1946 came from the Army, not the SSU. U.S. 
strategic intelligence collection on the CCP or the CCP areas in north China from Yan’an never 
regained its strength.  
The end of the U.S. mission to Yan’an 
In 1944 and 1945, the U.S. government had a significant intelligence gap on the CCP that 
some American officials working in China recognized and senior leaders in Washington failed to 
recognize. This distinction became more pronounced and problematic in 1945 as personnel 
lacking expertise on Chinese politics rotated into the top positions in the American delegation to 
China. Personnel who had spent careers working in China feared U.S. policymakers’ lack of 
understanding of the intricacies of Chinese politics, including the negative aspects of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s leadership, as potentially undermining the ability of U.S. policy to support U.S. 
interests in China. These lower-ranking officials faced a major bureaucratic hurdle of delivering 
their observations and assessments to policymakers who could calibrate U.S. foreign policy in a 
format that the policymakers would accept the message. With suspicions of Stalin’s policies and 
global ambitions mounting in Washington, U.S. policymakers were rightfully resistant to 
intelligence from China that appeared to be overly sympathetic to Communist viewpoints.  
Initial Dixie Mission participants in their first six-months in Yan’an had attempted to 
supersede what they perceived to be obsolete bureaucratic procedures that prevented interagency 
cooperation on strategic intelligence collection about the CCP. Shared professional connections 
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to General Stilwell and the protection of his authority facilitated the limited trust and shared 
sense of purpose between U.S. intelligence officials from various agencies apparent in the Dixie 
Mission’s first few months. However, the results in Yan’an suggest that the risks of 
circumventing government channels and oversight to perform intelligence work probably 
outweighed the benefits, given the high stakes of intelligence work in terms of information and 
operational security and diplomatic sensitivities. Moreover, the changes that began occurring to 
the composition and functions of the American base in Yan’an by early 1945 destroyed its initial 
spirit of collaboration and rendered its most productive features impossible for the remainder of 
the American operations at the CCP Headquarters. Back in Washington, the experiences—
positive and negative—of the U.S. intelligence officials in north China failed to factor into 
debates in Washington over the design of the new postwar U.S. national security regime for 
purely political reasons. 
The last American plane departed from the dilapidated airstrip in Yan’an on the morning 
of March 11, ferrying the skeleton crew of American officials and journalists who had remained 
at the CCP headquarters to Nanjing, where the Chinese central government had reconstituted its 
capital following Japan’s defeat. The plane’s departure formed a tangible symbol of the ultimate 
acceptance by the United States of its failed attempts to intervene in China’s domestic political 
conflict. Relations between top leaders of the CCP and the United States continued to deteriorate 
in the decades that followed. 
American activities at Yan’an had been winding down for months in advance of the final 
plane’s departure. Yeaton had departed Yan’an for another more promising Army staff position 
in April 1946, ceding interim control of the Yan’an post’s continuing support for U.S. radio 
communications in north China and development of transportation infrastructure in the area to 
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his chief of staff, Major Clifford Young. U.S. leaders claimed that transportation development in 
north China had the short-term benefit of facilitating U.S. aid to China as it recovered from the 
Japanese occupation and decades of war. Similarly, the development of fuel resources, from oil 
wells to pipelines, assisted the U.S. in short-term aid projects. Both road building and fuel 
development activities could also assist the long-term interests of U.S. corporations who sought 
to operate in China if China’s domestic political conflict resolved in the American’s favor, in the 
form of a liberal democracy and capitalist economy. 
President Truman’s appointed representatives in China met little success in implementing 
the disjointed U.S. policy in China, which required U.S. diplomats to continue their attempts to 
mediate in political negotiations between the GMD and CCP leaders while simultaneously 
offering public support to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Following Patrick Hurley’s abrupt and 
unexpected resignation from the role of Ambassador to China in November 1945, President 
Truman had appointed General George Marshall to be his special representative in China, 
personally overseeing the negotiations.87 Fearing the loss of continuity in the U.S. delegation to 
China, Truman also convinced Wedemeyer to accept a one-year stint as U.S. Ambassador to 
China starting in May 1946 after Wedemeyer’s duties as theater commander in China were 
completed.88 
As it became clear that U.S.-hosted negotiations were failing, the Army designated 
Colonel John Sells to serve as the final commanding officer for the American mission to Yan’an. 
His main assignment was overseeing the physical relocation of CCP leaders and their dependents 
to Yan’an from GMD-held areas, such as Chongqing. However, Sells reportedly approached his 
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work with considerable bitterness and a possible alcohol dependence problem that prevented his 
efficacy in the role.89 The American officials made their final departure from Yan’an because 
Yan’an had become vulnerable to GMD attack. With the airfield serving as one of the few 
visible targets for GMD aerial bombers, the CCP leaders had decided to pre-emptively destroy 
the airfield. Colonel Sells chose to heed the warning he received from CCP General Zhu De and 
relocate the entire American delegation to the safety of Nanjing.90 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Jack [Service] called last night to let me know that Dave Barrett died 
yesterday. He didn’t go into any detail, but the immediate cause was kidney 
failure. For my money, David died some years ago of a broken heart.” — Letter 
from Ray Ludden to Wilbur Peterkin, February 5, 1977 
 
This remarkable exchange of information in personal correspondence between Ray 
Ludden and Wilbur Peterkin almost exactly thirty years after the last American plane departed 
Yan’an hints at the intensity of emotion original members of the Dixie Mission felt toward each 
other, the work they did in China, and the outcomes (or lack thereof). Ludden and Peterkin, 
roommates at Yan’an whom Colonel Barrett had dispatched to verify CCP intelligence reports 
on the four-month trek through CCP-held forward areas, maintained a friendship that lasted until 
their respective deaths, generally corresponding weekly via thoughtful letters. By all accounts, 
including his own memoir, Barrett suffered lifelong career repercussions from his participation 
in the Dixie Mission, and he retained great bitterness about the fate of U.S.-CCP relations. 
Barrett left Yan’an in December 1944, but friends such as Service, Davies, and Ludden 
frequently recalled feeling that he never really moved on; he experienced the failure of the Dixie 
Mission to achieve its goals as a personal failure similar to heart break. Evidence of the short- 
and long-term burdens that participation in the Dixie Mission created for those originally 
involved seeps from the records they left behind. That an official mission should have exacted 
such a high toll on individual participants for so little gain underscores the extent to which the 
U.S. government lacked the professional foreign intelligence capabilities it required in the 1940s.  
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In the same way that December 1944 was a personal turning point for Barrett and other 
original participants in the American intelligence mission to Yan’an, the events of December 
1944 and January 1945 represented a true turning point for the Dixie Mission itself. Prior to 
December 1944, American intelligence officials stationed at Yan’an operated under a sense of 
considerable optimism and formed relationships with their CCP hosts on the basis of their shared 
passion for developing effective, if unconventional, methods to defeat the Japanese. Buoyed by 
initial support and enthusiasm from their superiors and their perceptions of White House interest 
in their achievements, the initial Dixie Mission staff stretched the limits of their vague 
operational mandate to learn about and cooperate with CCP fighters. Just as they began to 
implement cooperative operations with the CCP that had been emerging for months, the 
administrative pillars upon which their actions were based began to shift.  
Recognizing the lack of the intelligence on China’s domestic political situation necessary 
to develop and implement effective strategy in China as early as 1943, General Stilwell and his 
State Department aides had attempted to rectify the situation with an ad hoc solution in the form 
of the Dixie Mission. Stilwell relied on a cohesive professional network of trusted China experts 
loyal to him to rise above the administrative boundaries and lack of precedents for the work they 
were doing. Stilwell’s network of China hands was unique in the U.S. government because it 
possessed sufficient expertise to develop at least a limited comprehension of the complexities of 
China’s domestic political conflict, the network cohesion to develop plausible plans for resolving 
the U.S. government’s lack of necessary intelligence on the CCP, and the temporary institutional 
influence within the Roosevelt administration to encourage the fruition of the plans. 
To some extent, Stilwell’s plan was too effective. The Stilwell network proved to be a 
double-edged sword for the advancement of strategic intelligence collection and dissemination 
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on the China Communists. As Stilwell expected, the Dixie Mission crew did cooperate across 
interagency boundaries to the best of their ability, and they did attempt to report accurately their 
impressions of CCP capabilities and intentions. However, the initial Dixie Mission participants 
suffered from a dangerous analytic myopia that predisposed them to positive views of the CCP 
and diluted the impact of their intelligence messages with Americans who were unfamiliar with 
China (i.e., most Americans, including senior leaders) and increasingly suspicious of communist 
ideology.  
Reflection on the activities of U.S. intelligence officials in China’s Communist base areas 
in the 1940s is significant because it reveals that the underdevelopment of the U.S. government’s 
national security bureaucracy prior to World War II impeded the ability of accurate and timely 
intelligence about the CCP to reach and be absorbed by the appropriate policymaking audience. 
Throughout the lifespan of the American presence in Yan’an, military intelligence officials, and 
specifically army intelligence officers, commanded the mission. The American foreign policy 
bureaucracy was entirely unequipped to allow any other organization to lead such a mission in 
the early 1940s. The type of field intelligence collection and strategic operational activity in 
which American officials were engaged at Yan’an had only previously been the purview of 
Army and Navy intelligence divisions prior to World War II, and even those organizations had 
limited experience with the type of work that the U.S. government expected the Dixie Mission 
personnel to do. The endless competition for budgetary resources intrinsic to the American 
executive branch organizations and the entrenched interests it bred in Army and Navy leadership 
increased the reluctance of Army and Navy leaders to relinquish intelligence duties to the 
fledgling OSS or the State Department. Not only were they unwilling to delegate intelligence 
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work to civilian agencies, but the Army and Navy battled each other for control of U.S. foreign 
intelligence responsibilities throughout the 1940s.  
Lacking an established administrative structure for intelligence procedures or even 
institutional norms to provide oversight that would help limit negative political ramifications of 
the conduct of covert military operations, the unilateral actions of American intelligence officials 
in a remote and isolated but strategically significant area such as Yan’an could and did lead to 
counterproductive diplomatic disasters. Although some Army intelligence staff possessed 
expertise on China and in the logistics of operating in field conditions, they were not necessarily 
prepared to develop new methodologies necessary to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate 
sensitive information about foreign governments. The OSS officials at Yan’an, particularly 
Stelle, recognized a need to develop such methodologies, but the Army’s influence and 
hierarchical dominance over the Dixie Mission drowned the voices and influence of alternate 
agencies. Disorganized, new, and absent the necessary influence in China, OSS repeatedly 
encountered obstacles to developing effective and professional intelligence operations in China, 
particularly in Yan’an. 
By December 1944, Dixie Mission participants found themselves at the center of a clash 
between the policy priorities of new top American representatives in China—Hurley and 
Wedemeyer—and the interests of their predecessors. Hurley and Wedemeyer performed a 
predictable course correction for the implementation of U.S. policy in China based on the 
substantial gap that existed between their perceptions of China and the messages they were 
receiving from the original Dixie Mission participants. Regardless of their skills or evidence 
supporting their policy advice, the relatively low ranking American officials based at Yan’an in 
December 1944 could not influence their administrative superiors. Under the supervision of 
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Hurley and Wedemeyer in 1945, the U.S. mission to Yan’an transformed into an exercise in 
fairly benign and inconsequential military intelligence collection operations with support to 
negotiations that the U.S. leaders were attempting to conduct between GMD and CCP leaders. 
The shift that occurred in the priorities of the American presence at Yan’an after 1945 
had two important implications for U.S. intelligence on China in the late 1940s. First, the 
changes eliminated the unique and unprecedented potential for productive interagency 
collaboration and cooperation that had existed in the Dixie Mission’s first few months. Second, 
Hurley’s suggestion that Communist sympathies had biased the U.S. intelligence officials at 
Yan’an tainted perceptions of the achievements and shortcomings of the entire U.S. intelligence 
project at Yan’an. The immediate politicization of the Dixie Mission fundamentally altered 
assessments of operational “lessons learned” from the engagement. This result reflects the 
structural deficiency of U.S. bureaucratic procedures for the collection and dissemination of 
strategic foreign intelligence collection about China in World War II.  
The zeal with which Barrett, Service, Ludden, Davies, and Stelle reported on CCP 
intentions and capabilities made it easy for leaders who were less familiar with Chinese politics 
to discount their reports and sideline them as Communist sympathizers. Although subsequent 
events and decades of historical inquiry have revealed Patrick Hurley’s accusations that the 
initial Dixie Mission personnel were Communist sympathizers to be exaggerated claims 
manufactured by Hurley out of vengeance and personal insecurity, the rest of the U.S. 
government in the 1940s took Hurley’s comments quite seriously. Hurley’s vindictive public 
questioning of the ideological loyalties and potential Communist sympathies of initial Dixie 
Mission participants almost certainly facilitated perceptions in Washington that Communist 
sympathizers within the U.S. government were responsible for the shortcomings of U.S. 
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intelligence operations in Yan’an, and even the shortcomings of U.S. policy toward the CCP to 
some extent.  
Introducing ideological loyalty issues into the evaluations of the Dixie Mission had the 
effect of temporarily exonerating Hurley from the effects of his obstinate behavior and poor 
decisionmaking, but it also distracted attention from structural inadequacies in the U.S. 
intelligence process that prevented U.S. personnel at Yan’an from effectively conveying their 
observations and assessments to others in the U.S. government who needed the information. By 
the end of 1945, strengthening anti-communist elements in American politics had emerged as an 
influence on the American intelligence efforts in Yan’an in a new way; undertones of ideological 
conflict were unmistakable. Opposition to Communism and loyalty to American liberal political 
ideology superseded regional expertise in the selection of Dixie’s final leaders.  
The diplomatic fallout from the Dixie Mission’s greatest shortcomings occurred in 1945 
and 1946, synchronous to the negotiations in Washington DC among Truman’s senior advisors 
and executive appointees over the creation of the postwar U.S. intelligence regime, preserving 
norms and precedents of wartime intelligence practices that were productive in Europe but less 
so elsewhere in the world. U.S. intelligence officials in China had struggled and ultimately failed 
to adapt themselves and their procedures to meet the new U.S. national security demands. 
However, Hurley’s political tactics encouraged policymakers in the Truman Administration to 
disregard the difficulties and pitfalls of the American intelligence experience at Yan’an as an 
unfortunate aberration. Policymakers in the Truman Administration consequently disregarded the 
American experience in Yan’an as an instance of alarming Communist sympathy within the U.S. 
government ranks instead of perceiving it as a cautionary tale of the risks of ad hoc foreign 
intelligence activity.  
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The case of the Dixie Mission foreshadows several challenges of foreign intelligence 
collection practices that became key issues for the developing U.S. national security regime in 
the 1950s and 1960s. For example, the experience of the American intelligence officials at 
Yan’an emphasized potential pitfalls of combining intelligence collection with uncoordinated 
and improvised covert military operations under the direction of leaders with little regional 
expertise, such as Hurley, Wedemeyer, and Yeaton. Similarly, the fate of the original Dixie 
Mission participants is an early example of the potentially dangerous consequences of 
politicization of intelligence activity. Political decisions about diplomatic appointments and the 
personal preferences of the White House, particularly under Roosevelt, distorted perceptions of 
the Dixie Mission reports by senior U.S. policymakers in Chongqing and Washington. Most 
importantly to ongoing current debates about the bureaucratic structure of the U.S. national 
intelligence regime, the Dixie Mission case reveals the degree to which the professionalized 
collection of strategic foreign intelligence is an activity that requires a sophisticated bureaucracy 
to succeed in efficiently providing policymakers with useful and timely information.  
The Dixie Mission case argues that simply placing capable experts in the field to collect 
information is not nearly sufficient to achieve the goal of arming policymakers with the 
information they require. Intelligence officials in the field must be actors in a functional 
bureaucracy, in which the relevant organizations have clearly established jurisdictional 
boundaries and are capable of and motivated to work together instead of competing. In addition, 
intelligence collection requires logistical conditions that allow for the information to be safely 
and quickly disseminated to headquarters offices, analyzed and contextualized by experts, and 
distributed to policymakers before the information becomes obsolete. Lastly, the policymakers 
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themselves must recognize the information as useful to them and trust the process by which it is 
produced. They must understand the scope and limits of the information presented to them 
through the intelligence process, and prepare themselves to receive undesirable messages without 
killing the messenger. These conclusions are the result of both decades of trial-and-error by the 
U.S. national security regime that unfortunately occurred after the passage of the National 
Security Act of 1947 and analysis of events by historians, political scientists, and public policy 
scholars.1 Between 1944 and 1947 when the Dixie Mission operated, the United States had not 
yet established an intelligence community capable of achieving these requirements, and the 
outcome of the U.S. Observer Mission to Yan’an highlights the potential consequences.   
This study adds support to historian Richard Aldrich’s argument that the evolution of 
American national security institutions in the aftermath of World War II, and procedures for the 
collection of foreign intelligence and covert actions abroad in particular, are intricately related to 
changing American attitudes about the implications of global decolonialism in the latter 20th 
century.2 Aldrich convincingly demonstrates that conflicting, volatile, and frequently 
subconscious American attitudes about international human rights, democratization, and the 
potential violence of imperialism shaped both policy motivations and intelligence practices in 
China in World War II. However, records from the Dixie Mission put a personal face on this 
theory that is absent from Aldrich’s work. This study offers important tangible examples of how 
individual American intelligence officials attempted to make decisions about communications 
and resources that could reinforce or undermine American philosophical priorities for which the 
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ranking was in flux, from expelling the Japanese occupiers from China to establishing a liberal 
representative democracy in China to rejecting the visible corruption of the Chinese central 
government in the early 1940s.  
In such a transitional phase, the hazards for the U.S. government of expecting individual 
intelligence American officials to unilaterally engage with and determine appropriate U.S. 
relations with the leaders of an entity as complex and unfamiliar as the Chinese Communist 
Party are painfully obvious in retrospect, though they were much more murky at the time. 
Strategic missteps by Allied forces in Asia in the 1940s and collective uncertainty within the 
U.S. government about social and political trends in countries such as China diluted the influence 
of the experiences of U.S. intelligence officials in Asia on the creation of the postwar U.S. 
national security regime. In other words, instead of becoming useful negative examples, the 
results of experiments such as the Dixie Mission that attempted to adapt archaic U.S. intelligence 
capabilities to meet new purposes simply reinforced policymaker perceptions of China as an 
uncivilized backwater. U.S. policymakers preferred to base postwar intelligence infrastructure 
development on European examples that were more clear to them and achieved more success.  
The Dixie Mission case is particularly helpful for its ability to humanize the ambiguity of 
the political, ideological, philosophical, and strategic questions intelligence officials operating in 
remote areas in the 1940s faced on a daily basis. The case thus provides a rich and valuable 
historical example of the sort that has been largely absent from the important ongoing debate 
among security studies scholars in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the botched National 
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in 2004. These high-profile intelligence events have prompted a 
steady stream of academic questions about why the U.S. intelligence community has struggled to 
adapt to new threats.  
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This study supports the initial findings of scholars such as Amy Zegart, Richard Betts, 
and Richard Immerman who have suggested that resistance to effective reform is an intrinsic 
bureaucratic feature of the multi-institutional U.S. national security regime.
1 However, unlike these scholars, who have focused on manifestations of the problem in 
Washington DC, from a top-down perspective, and particularly in recent examples, this study 
emphasizes specific historical examples of attempts by U.S. intelligence officials operating 
outside the United States as they attempt to adapt outdated bureaucratic procedures and norms to 
new responsibilities.  
By tracing examples from the experiences of individual U.S. intelligence officials 
operating in Communist-held north China during World War II, this study reveals both the 
vulnerabilities and potential policy costs of dysfunctional administrative norms for U.S. 
intelligence activity that were in many cases codified and formally funded in the National 
Security Act signed into law by President Truman in 1947. In the Dixie Mission case, 
intelligence examples display evidence of a failure to move beyond outdated bureaucratic 
protocols and political competition between institutions, even in the face of significantly changed 
security demands and the highest possible stakes for national and global security. The problems 
are evident even when highly capable personnel are in place as intelligence collectors, and 
replacing the expert personnel with technical generalists exacerbated the problems. Given the 
stakes of negotiations in Washington about the architecture of the postwar national security 
regime in terms of resources and influence, it suited cabinet-level officials to highlight European 
                                                                
1 See Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), and Richard Immerman, “Transforming Analysis: The 
Intelligence Community’s Best Kept Secret,” Intelligence and National Security 23:2-3 (April-June 2011), 159-181. 
 
 
 
291 
intelligence successes by their agencies and play down precedents of the inadequacy of U.S. 
intelligence practices during the war in places such as China that could potentially be traced back 
to individual agencies. The commitment of China’s major domestic opposition party to 
communist principles only facilitated the lack of policymaker attention to the north China 
examples. 
In this way, the Dixie Mission provides an early glimpse of a pattern of institutional 
behavior within the U.S. national security apparatus that made it particularly vulnerable to so-
called intelligence failures. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s Truman’s new Central 
Intelligence Agency attempted to aggressively carve out a space for itself among the old and 
inadequate U.S. national security bureaucracy. Given the ossification of wartime norms 
governing which institutions had jurisdiction over which intelligence duties, CIA’s growth in the 
early Cold War meant vigorously pursuing risky covert actions, for which there was little 
precedent and few, if any, forms of formal or informal oversight into the beginning of the Cold 
War. The early CIA also perfected methodologies for secrecy, which were necessary for 
operational security, but also had the added benefit of keeping in the dark other executive branch 
agencies that might emerge as competition for resources. Attention spent on these activities not 
only diverted resources away from core missions such as intelligence collection and analysis but 
also had the tendency to explode into embarrassing international incidents, such as those in 
Guatemala, Iran, and Cuba.  
Deconstructing how the U.S. intelligence community consistently fails to adapt itself to 
face new threats is an important component to developing more effective national security policy 
and institutions in the future. Thus, debates between scholars about the origins, character, and 
severity of the adaptation failure the U.S. national security regime has experienced have real 
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implications both for policymakers and for the emerging field of U.S. intelligence history. The 
complexity of the Dixie Mission example strongly suggests that scholars seeking to fully 
understand the origin of the institutional cultures of today’s U.S. intelligence agencies must 
begin incorporating cases that occur beyond Washington and Western Europe and below the 
level of U.S. presidents, White House aides, Cabinet members, and Directors of Central 
Intelligence.  
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